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This thesis focuses on the politics of electoral reform. It examines dynamics operating at 
both the public and political elite levels. The first paper looks at the place of electoral 
reform in British politics, in particular the place of the Alternative Vote (AV), and 
demonstrates a positive relationship between disproportionality and interest in electoral 
reform. The second paper focuses on the tension between representative democracy 
and direct democracy and considers why the referendum became the pathway to 
decide on the issue. The third paper analyses the voting behaviour in the UK’s 2011 AV 
referendum and demonstrates that voters cast their votes based on cues and in 
harmony with the positions taken by the party leaders they trusted. Agreement with 
campaign statements was also indicative of an individual’s vote mediating the impact of 
partisanship. Direct contact by campaigns did not have much significant effect on a 
typical individual’s vote except for those individuals contacted by the Liberal Democrats. 
Contact by the Liberal Democrats, contrary to the expectations had an impact in the 
negative direction of the position endorsed by the Party.  
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Elections translate preferences of the public expressed in terms of votes cast by the 
electorate into parliamentary seats and determine who shall form the government, 
legislate and take executive decisions. The electoral formula shapes the behaviour of 
politicians and their style of representation (Norris, 2006; Farrell and Scully, 2007).1 
Whilst elections are competitions between diverse interests and ideologies, the rules 
that translate votes into seats are themselves subject to political struggles. Electoral 
rules have often evolved at the same time as mass political movements.2 In a dynamic 
and heterogeneous society, electoral systems can be expected to be open to 
contestation and scrutiny by those who either think the system is unfair or who simply 
lose out under the status-quo. Parties, politicians and other political actors may seek to 
improve the quality of democracy or to increase their own representation.  
This thesis examines the politics of electoral reform in the United Kingdom (UK) 
with a focus on the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum. Of particular interest to the thesis 
is the role of political culture and institutional constraints in conditioning the content of 
electoral reform proposals and how attempts at reform are carried out. A topic as 
complex and varied as electoral reform requires detailed case studies.3 Although it is 
reasonable to assume that a nation’s electoral rules may, to some extent, be influenced 
by exogenous international trends, the preservation of existing rules can be linked 
                                                 
1
 Norris examines the impact of electoral reform on the proportion of female representatives in the 
Netherlands. Based on Farrell and Scully’s study on the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 
ballot structure has the highest effect on the style of representation. 
2
 The American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, for example, is directly linked to the demand to 
reform voter eligibility rules. This political movement gained momentum as a reaction to polling rules 
disabling less privileged sections of the public, i.e. African Americans, from voting. Similarly, women’s 
suffrage demands in Britain and the USA in the early twentieth century have shaped and been shaped by 
the feminist movement. The desire for equal voting rights and democratic elections has been important in 
conditioning the political movements in numerous other national contexts. Most recently, year 2014 has 
witnessed mass protests against the Chinese government’s desire to institutionally control candidate 
selection process in Hong Kong elections. 
3
 The endogeneity of votes, seats and electoral systems makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
particular effects of each on the other two (McLean, 2006). 
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endogenously to the national conversation and/or the ability of the actors participating in 
that debate to resist reform that may appear to contradict historically determined 
principles. The value of large-N cross-country comparisons in theorizing electoral reform 
cannot be denied (King et. al, 1994). Nevertheless, electoral reform attempts and 
processes vary from country to country (Blais and Shugart, 2008).  Case studies are, 
therefore, essential for understanding constitutional, institutional and/or traditional 
intricacies that vary from one national context to another.  
The UK presents itself as an instructive case for the purpose of studying electoral 
reform mainly due to its multi-layered network of political institutions as well as its long 
tradition of democratic politics.  The political system and history of Britain have inspired 
countries all over the world. Political events that take place in Britain are, often, quickly 
communicated to other countries and shape the political and democratic visions of 
geographically distant populations.4 Furthermore, a large portion of the world’s 
democracies are based on the Westminster model. The Houses of Westminster are 
seen by many as the mother of parliaments.5  
 It is a truism that the debate on electoral reform is as old as elections 
themselves. Reform of the UK’s electoral rules has been subject to parliamentary 
deliberation from the early 1800s if not from before (Hart, 1992). Yet, the interest on the 
topic has not always had the same level of intensity. The inter-war years witnessed a 
sudden increase in the number of eligible voters.6 This change was accompanied by a 
                                                 
4
 One recent example is the spill-over effect created by the Scottish Independence referendum within the 
context of the European Union. Shortly after the Scottish Referendum took place, Catalonia held its own 
referendum on becoming independent from Spain. 
5
 This may perhaps slightly owe to the iconic place Big Ben has in many people’s minds. 
6
 The Representation of the People Act of 1918 enfranchised women over 30 and men over 21, subject to 
a minimal property requirement, elevating the number of eligible voters from 7.7 million to 21.4 million. 
Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act, 1928 lowered the voting age for women to 21 and 
gave them equal standing to men as voters. 
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greater parliamentary interest on reforming the electoral formula.7 During the three 
decades following the WWII, the UK became preoccupied with reconstruction and 
differences had to be put aside in order to create a renewed national ethos (Kavanagh, 
1987; Jenkins, 1989). The post-WWII years saw little interest in electoral reform. In the 
1970s, however, Britain’s increasingly adversarial political environment stimulated 
renewed interest in the issue (Finer, 1975; Gamble et. al., 1984). The UK’s place in 
relation to Europe also became a highly contested issue domestically and eventually led 
to the 1975 referendum.8 Furthermore, attempts were made to devolve power to 
Scotland and Wales in 1979. The emergence of polarizing issues on the political 
agenda illustrated the extent of disagreement about the very nature of the UK. With 
increasing expression of the variation and diversity in the British political landscape, the 
nature of Britain’s democratic system began to be questioned again (Marr, 2013).  This 
variation has been accompanied by a decreasing support for the two major parties.9  
In accord with increasing polarization and diversification in British politics and 
decreasing support for the two major parties, the years from the mid-1970s to 2010 
witnessed a renewed interest in reforming the system of electing members to the 
Houses of Parliament. In May 2011, a proposal to adopt the Alternative Vote (AV) was 
eventually put to the British people in what became only the second national 
referendum held in the history of the UK. The proposal failed with the No side receiving 
more than double the number of votes received by the Yes side.  
The existing literature on electoral reform suggests the need to consider cases of 
non-reform and failed reform attempts, in order to aid theories on cases of actual reform 
                                                 
7
 In the context of this thesis, ‘electoral reform’, for the most part, refers to the reform of the formula for 
electing members to the House of Commons. This definition, unless made explicit, excludes the 
modification of constituency boundaries and changes made to voter eligibility, electoral administration and 
campaign funding. 
8
 For a detailed account of the EEC referendum: King (1977). 
9
 The first paper of the thesis will demonstrate this decline. 
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(Rahat and Hazan, 2011).10 This thesis adds to the previous case-studies on failed 
reform attempts by looking at the UK case.11 The thesis focuses on both the long- and 
short-term developments before the referendum. It also aims to complement recently 
published literature on the results of the 2011 AV referendum. In order to do so, it 
addresses the following three aspects by answering three corresponding questions: 
1. Content: Why was AV chosen as the alternative to the existing first-
past-the post system? 
2. Pathway: Why did a referendum become the method to settle the issue 
of electoral reform? 
3. Discourse: What effect did campaign discourse have on the outcome 
of the referendum?  
First, it locates the AV referendum within the perspectives of both the politically 
motivated electoral reform debates and the existing academic literature on electoral 
reform. Second, it positions the AV referendum within the context of the British debate 
on the use of referendums by drawing on the theoretical literature on referendums. 
Third, it aims to explain the outcome of the referendum itself, using the best data 
available.  
The main focus of this thesis is electoral reform. However, the content of the 
case necessitates the consideration of literature also on topics including but not limited 
to the following:  constitutional politics, referendums, electoral systems, methodology 
(survey methods), electoral behaviour and British politics. The relevant selections from 
                                                 
10
 The barriers approach developed by Rahat and Hazan looks at the factors which prevent electoral 
reform from happening. Their ‘negative’ approach (a positive one would be to focus solely on factors that 
result in reform) also highlights the need to integrate diverse and at times incompatible academic 
approaches to electoral reform under a comprehensive umbrella. 
11
 For example, Leduc (2009) looks at the failed electoral reform referendums held in the three Canadian 




such diverse literature are integrated into the body of each of the papers whenever 
need arises.  
The proposed reform option and the method to bring it about will be analysed 
considering two cross-cutting perspectives:  The perspective driven by individual and 
partisan levels of self-interest and one informed by normative evaluations of what a 
good democracy should be like.12 No matter the content of a proposed reform and 
whether or not it would be good for the country as a whole, the manner in which political 
and democratic channels are used to bring about reform is indicative of the legitimacy of 
any reform proposal and/or its outcome. Although the move to AV would not have 
represented a fundamental change of the UK’s electoral system,13 the topic merits 
academic attention.14  
The thesis makes use of a selection of primary and secondary sources including 
the following: personal interviews, British Election Study AV referendum survey data, 
parliamentary records, anecdotal accounts written by politicians including ones that took 
part in the coalition negotiations.15  
Electoral rules have more impact on the way politicians behave than socialization 
(Norris, 2004). The electoral reform debate about proportionality represents the 
endogenous aspect of electoral reform and leads to a circular relationship between 
                                                 
12
 It is essential to acknowledge, however, that strategic and self-interested motivations may be disguised 
under convincing normative arguments. Normative evaluations may also take the form of practical 
concerns in relation to what is appropriate from an institutional, constitutional or traditional perspective. 
13
 The AV Referendum, however, has been described as a major constitutional change by a number of 
British politicians. The Government’s response to the comments received in relation to the Coalition 
Agreement demonstrates that the Government has seen the AV proposal as constitutional reform. These 
are available on www.parliament.gov.uk 
14
 Electoral systems have consequences for the party systems. Duverger’s law (Duverger, 1954) is the 
seminal work on the effect of electoral systems on the party systems. 
15
 Anecdotal evidence includes three insider accounts of the coalition talks in particular: Laws, Adonis and 
Wilson’s memoirs. While Wilson was not a member of the Conservative negotiation team, his account still 
reveals insider perspective on the negotiation talks. The interview data consists of interviews with Labour 
party MP’s Andy Burnham and Richard Burden, the director of the No campaign Matthew Elliott, Guy 
Lodge and Glenn Gottfried of the London-based think-tank Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
and two campaigners from the Yes side who asked to remain anonymous. 
11 
shifting party systems and electoral reform (Colomer, 2005).16 Evidence from Western 
Europe suggests that changes in the variance of the policies offered by the parties are 
linked to shifting variance of voters’ policy preferences and that this effect is stronger 
under plurality systems (Ezrow, 2007). Plurality systems in which parties are not able to 
respond to shifts in voters’ policy preferences, party system dealignment and increased 
disproportionality may lead to pressure in favour of electoral reform, as the New 
Zealand case demonstrated (Vowles, 2008).  
An important distinction is that between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of 
reform (Renwick, 2010; Shugart, 2008). The spur to reform may come from either elite 
or public dissatisfaction with existing electoral arrangements (Norris, 1995). Regardless 
of where impetus for reform originates from, the actors involved in the decision-making 
differ from one context to another. In Canada, for instance, the public has played an 
active part in the debate, as both deliberative and direct democratic methods have been 
utilized there.17 Similarly, New Zealand held a two-stage referendum in the early 1990s 
that gave Kiwis the chance to have their say.18  
At first it may seem odd that strategically informed elites and parties should use 
methods associated with deliberative or direct democracy. Yet, such methods can work 
to the advantage of politicians who want to take deeply divisive issues outside 
parliament and prevent direct conflict at the elite level, especially within their own parties’ 
                                                 
16
 Colomer turns Duverger’s law in the other direction, arguing for a circular relationship between party 
and electoral systems (Colomer, 2005). 
17
 In Ontario, electoral system possibilities were initially evaluated by an assembly consisting of randomly 
selected citizens. The assembly’s final proposal was subsequently put to a referendum, in 2007, for the 
entire electorate of the state. While the proposal was not adopted, the public definitely had a bigger role in 
the process in comparison to Italy. For more details on this referendum: ‘Democracy at work: The Ontario 
Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform: a record of Ontario’s first citizens’ assembly process, the Ontario 
Citizens’ Assembly Secretariat, 2007’. 
18
 The first referendum held in 1992 asked New Zealanders whether they wished to see a system change 
or not. An overwhelming 85 per cent voted for reform. The second referendum held in 1993 asked them 
to choose among the proposed alternatives. The outcome of the second referendum was pro-reform and 
country’s FPTP system got replaced by MMP (mixed member proportional system). 
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ranks (Bogdanor, 1981).19 Alternative pathways like official reviews, committee reports, 
citizens’ assemblies and referendums remove direct liability from the parties and 
delegate it to other political agents, i.e. the public, lobbying groups, academics and 
NGOs.  
The three papers that comprise this thesis focus on the three questions posed 
above. The first paper examines why AV, among the many alternatives, became the 
alternative to the plurality (first past the post) system. The second paper focuses on the 
factors that led to the decision to hold the post-legislative referendum. The referendum 
pathway was by no means inevitable. In principle a sovereign UK Parliament could have 
chosen to alter the system of election without a ‘reference to the people’. The British 
political elite were long suspicious of ‘references to the people’.20 This mechanism 
would not have been seen natural had there not been important changes as a result of 
‘constitutional flux’ involving increasing use of referendums (Norton, 1982). The third 
paper examines the effect of campaign discourse on the `typical’ individual’s 
referendum vote. Due to the nature of their content, the first two papers focus largely on 
the political elites and are to some extent intertwined. The elites determined both the 
question that was referred to the public and its timing. Moreover, the elites were also 
integral to the campaign process and framed the campaign arguments. The third paper 
sustains the consideration for the positions of the parties but shifts the attention towards 
public attitudes and estimates the effect that campaign discourse had on the 
referendum outcome.  
                                                 
19
 This point has also been made by a number of other scholars. 
20
 In relation to Winston Churchill’s offer to hold a referendum on the continuation of the War-time 
Coalition, Clement Attlee famously responded: ‘I could not consent to the introduction into our national life 
of a device so alien to all our traditions as the referendum, which has only too often been the instrument 
of Nazism and Fascism. Hitler’s practices in the field of referendums and plebiscites can hardly have 
endeared these expedients to the British heart.’ It was true that referendums were used by the interwar 
fascists to justify and legitimize their authoritarian rule (see Appendix 1 for an example of Mussolini’s 
referendum propaganda). While Clement Attlee may have said this in contemplation of higher chances of 
a Labour win in an election held before the war came to a complete end, the omnipresence of this quote, 
hints at the negative sentiment towards referendums that have existed in Britain. 
13 
A substantive part of the thesis obviously covers the period before the 2010 
General Election up to the day of the 2011 referendum. Yet, the coalition negotiations, 
and the period before the 2010 General Election, were only the penultimate stage in 
Britain’s electoral reform debate. In order to contextualize the case and analyse it more 
effectively, some consideration of the historical background is necessary. Path-
dependence and process-tracing are key to processes of electoral reform and to their 
study, respectively.   
Gordon Brown’s proposal to hold a referendum in the period leading up to the 
2010 General Election was not random and needs to be understood in light of the on-
going reform debate within the Labour party.21 The process-tracing approach enables 
us to establish path-dependencies in public policy. The three main types of tests the 
literature on process-tracing focus on are the hoop, straw in the wind and the smoking 
gun tests (Mahoney, 2012). The first two try to detect whether the necessary conditions 
for a causal link exist. The third tests whether the sufficient conditions are met. These 
tests enable the researcher to draw causal links between events that may be separated 
by long periods of time. The smoking gun test is useful in revealing the dynamics in the 
period between Brown’s initial overture and the formation of the coalition government.  
Our contemporary usage of computer keyboards is path-dependent on a decision 
made a long time ago, during the time of mechanical typewriters (David, 1985). When 
the early secretarial typewriters were manufactured, the letter layout was designed 
(QWERTY) in order to lower the chance of the typewriters becoming jammed during 
speedy typing. The letters were arranged so that common English words could be typed 
with ease and efficiency. The layout has, however, been conditioning the way people 
                                                 
21
 The referendum promise Gordon Brown made pre-election was characterized as an empty gesture by 
the NGO, Power 2010. Subsequent to Brown’s ‘democratic opening’, the Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act 2010 received royal assent one month before the 2010 General Election. The clause on 
the AV referendum was, however, removed from the Bill during the wash-up period. 
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write. When the electronic typewriters or computers began to replace the mechanical 
ones, the QWERTY layout was retained even though the problem of jamming no longer 
existed. People, after all, had been trained and become skilled in the QWERTY 
keyboard.  
In a similar way it is necessary to recognize the importance of decisions made 
some distance from the particular circumstances of the 2010 general election. It was 
during John Smith’s leadership that the issue of electoral reform had become attached 
to the referendum pathway. The then Labour leader was concerned about a possible 
split in his party over electoral reform. The affiliated unions were especially opposed to 
reform, while the more ‘liberal’ wing of the party was more sympathetic. In a speech 
hosted by Charter 88, Smith made a promise to hold a referendum, in the first term of a 
Labour government (Smith, 1993). 
Following John Smith’s unexpected death, the referendum idea remained on the 
Labour agenda. However, a referendum never took place during Labour’s period in 
government. Just before Tony Blair took office, the Cook-MacLennan Agreement was 
signed between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Under Blair’s premiership, the 
Independent Commission on the Voting System chaired by Lord Jenkins, a Liberal 
Democrat peer, was set up. This was in line with Blair’s manifesto commitment to 
review the aptness of alternative electoral systems.22 Jenkins recommended a system 
called AV-plus that failed to appeal to both reformers and the Labour government. 
Thereafter electoral reform was all but forgotten and ‘kicked into the long grass.’23 
Brown resurrected Jenkins proposal short of the ‘plus’ element in the hopes of attracting 
Liberal Democrats to vote Labour and/or encourage them to enter into a coalition in the 
event of a hung Parliament.  
                                                 
22
 This commission was more popularly known as the ‘Jenkins Commission’. 
23
 Liam Fox uses this expression in reference to the Commission. This quote is used in its full context 
later on in this chapter.  
15 
The 2010 General Election took place in an environment of uncertainty and 
anxiety for the three parties and the Cabinet Office (Adonis, 2013; Laws, 2010; Wilson, 
2010). There was a general concern that the hung parliament should not weaken the 
UK government’s image at home and abroad. The Euro debt crisis and the protests in 
Greece, which were shown on television each night, added to the sense of urgency to 
form a government. While the Conservatives were anxious to form the government as 
soon as possible, the Liberal Democrats wanted to prolong negotiations until they got a 
better deal on electoral reform.  
On the other side, institutional and strategic considerations as well as personal 
calculations were presumably going through Gordon Brown’s mind. He was pressured 
by the other parties and certain sections of the media to resign but at the same time he 
felt that it was his constitutional responsibility to stay in office until a deal to form the 
new government was reached (Adonis, 2013). Brown initially stated that he would step 
down as the leader of the Labour party by the time of the party conference. The next 
day, however, he made another statement in relation to his resignation. On 11 May 
2010, he immediately resigned as prime minister and the party leader, marking the end 
of negotiation talks with the Liberal Democrats. Even though he was no longer Prime 
Minister and never a coalition partner, Brown’s actions in the months up to the general 
election influenced the decisions taken by the new coalition and the trajectory of 
electoral reform in the UK. Brown’s pre-election proposal to hold a referendum on the 
Alternative Vote was realized under the government formed by the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats. The terms of the United Kingdom’s 2011 debate on electoral 
reform were, therefore, indirectly set by the Labour party. As the conclusive paper of 
this thesis will demonstrate, the division of Labour party voters in the referendum was 
decisive also in the failure of the referendum. Not only did the Labour party set the 
16 
terms of the electoral reform prospect, but they were also able to influence the outcome 
of the election, though not necessarily in an intentional manner, by sending mixed elite 
cues to their voters.
17 
2. WHY AV? Electoral reform debate trajectory and the 2011 AV referendum 
2.1. Introduction 
This paper examines the UK debate on electoral reform within a broader historical and 
constitutional context. More specifically, it focuses on the re-emergence of interest in 
electoral reform in the period leading up to the 2010 General Election and why the 
Alternative Vote system (AV) became the proposed alternative to the Single-Member 
Plurality system (SMP).1 The popular and obvious explanation is that some deal on 
electoral reform was essential to persuade the Liberal Democrats to enter the coalition 
and that AV represented a reasonable compromise to those Liberal Democrats and the 
Conservatives responsible for the two-party negotiations that took place before the 
formation of Britain’s first post-war coalition in May 2010 (see Adonis, 2013; Kavanagh 
and Cowley, 2010; Laws, 2010; Quinn et. al, 2011; Wilson, 2010).2 This straightforward 
explanation sums up the game-theoretical mind-set of the negotiation talks and its effect 
on the final coalition agreement. It does not, however, wholly address the question of 
why electoral reform became a key policy issue and why specifically AV rather than 
another reform option, became the focus of the negotiations and, hence, the alternative 
offered to the voters in the referendum.  
This paper will explore how short- and long-term strategic and institutional 
concerns have narrowed down the choice to one between AV and FPTP. The 2011 
referendum will be analysed in a manner informed by previous electoral reform debates 
in Britain, a discussion of institutional constraints and the constraints added by the 
                                                 
1
 In the UK, SMP is more popularly known as the First Past the Post System (FPTP). Since ‘First Past the 
Post’ was used to designate Britain’s existing electoral system throughout the campaign period, FPTP will 
be used from now on to reference the existing system. 
2
 The leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, demanded the prospect of electoral reform from both 
parties during the negotiation talks. While Single Transferable Vote (STV) was his preference, in the end 
he conceded to a referendum on AV. 
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circumstance of the hung parliament that came about following the 2010 General 
Election. 
Section 2 summarises the technical differences between the status quo FPTP 
system and the AV alternative that was offered to the UK public. In section 3, literature 
on electoral reform relevant to this paper and to the case as a whole is outlined. Section 
4 explores the UK’s electoral reform debate from a constitutional perspective. Sections 
5 and 6 demonstrate a relationship between parliamentary debates on electoral reform 
and the level of disproportionality. Sections 7 and 8 focus on the aspects of the election 
campaign and coalition negotiations informed by an understanding of the main three 
parties’ attitudes towards electoral reform. Section 9 provides some conclusions and 
draws the threads of the argument together. 
2.2. The systems 
Scholars have characterized the motivations tied to calls for electoral reform through the 
theoretical lens of rational choice (Rokkan, 1970; Boix, 1999; Colomer 2005). A party’s 
electoral system preferences can be thought to be influenced by calculations of 
prospective electoral advantage (under alternative electoral systems) of the party as a 
whole and/or the aggregate prospective electoral advantage of the individual politicians 
that comprise the party. These considerations may be categorized within the triad of 
vote-seeking (Downs, 1957), office-seeking (Riker, 1962) or policy-pursuit (Axelrod, 
1970; Budge and Laver, 1986) models of elite behaviour.3 It is theoretically imaginable 
for the parties to prefer one system over another based solely on principled motivations 
without serious or successful calculations of the implications of the systems for their 
own electoral fortunes. In order to analyse the factors behind the positions taken by the 
                                                 
3
 For a full survey of the types of possible motivations behind changes to electoral institutions: Benoit, 
2004. 
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British parties, one needs to first clarify the differences between the two systems offered 
to the electorate in the 2011 referendum.4  
2.2.1. First past the post  
The existing FPTP system divides the UK into units called ‘constituencies’ where votes 
are counted and a single representative is elected from each unit. There are currently 
650 constituencies in the UK as a whole, although their number has varied over time.5 
Constituencies are supposed to correspond to ‘natural communities’, whose inhabitants 
share a great deal in common and, therefore, can be represented by a single individual 
(Weir and Beetham, 1999; Rossiter et. al, 2009). In large part, the boundaries are based 
on local government boundaries, but in some cases these boundaries cross those 
administrative units. Each of the four nations that make up the UK has a ‘quota’ or ‘ideal’ 
number of voters per constituency. The boundaries of the constituencies are 
recommended to the parliament by the four national Boundary Commissions, 
independent bodies each of which holds periodic reviews.6  
Each voter has a single vote (of equal worth), which is traditionally recorded as 
an ‘X’ against the name of a single candidate. The ‘plurality rule’ states that the ‘winner’ 
in each constituency is the candidate with the most votes (at least one more vote than 
their nearest rival). A hypothetical example of an election under FPTP rules is displayed 
in Table 1: 
  
                                                 
4
 Attitudes of the Labour party, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats on the issue of electoral 
reform are presented in section 2.7. The positions the three parties and the remaining British political 
parties took with respect to the AV referendum are presented in paper 4(4.3.1). 
5
 From 1945 to present, the number of constituencies fluctuated between 625 and 659. House of 
Commons Library Research Paper 12/43, ‘UK Election Statistics: 1918-2012’, 7 August 2012. 
6
 There are four separate boundary commissions, one each for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
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Table 1. Hypothetical election result (FPTP) 
Candidate     Votes Received   Result 
        A     2000 (18.2%)   3rd 
        B     4000 (36.4%)   2nd 
        C    5000 (45.5%)   WINNER  
 
 In this example, the winning candidate is C, since s/he has more votes than any 
other candidate. The difference in the vote totals for the winner (C) and second 
candidate (B) is informally known as the winner’s ‘majority’. In this case, the winner has 
a plurality of the vote, but this only constitutes (5000/11000) × 100 = 45.5 per cent of the 
total votes. This is not a ‘technical majority’ (i.e. 50 per cent +1) of the votes cast. 
Since each constituency is represented by a single MP, the plurality system is 
often said to enable a stronger link between the local communities and Westminster 
compared with those proportional representation systems where multiple Members of 
Parliament (MPs) represent each geographic unit and the mandate granted by the 
constituency as a whole is distributed among more than one MP. The local Member of 
Parliament is the representative of the whole of the constituency, not just those who 
happened to elect them and, in principle at least, is able to serve their constituents and 
help seek redress for their grievances (Harvey and Bather, 1982, p.78). Critics of FPTP 
maintain that it fosters an adversarial style of politics that produces poor public policy 
(Finer, 1975).  
Despite the `personal` and, arguably, `inclusive` quality of representation it is 
inclined to generate, FPTP is not a system that guarantees proportionality at the 
aggregate national level. The largest party in the House of Commons receives a 
‘winner’s bonus’ so that the seats to votes (s/v) ratio exceeds one. In some general 
elections – such as 1951 and February 1974 – the party with the most votes receives 
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fewer seats than another party.7 Under this system, third parties that have significant 
vote shares but are geographically dispersed, such as the Liberal Democrats, are 
heavily penalised. In 1983, for example, the s/v ratio for the Liberal-SDP Alliance was 
0.10.8 Even when the Liberal Democrats succeeded in targeting and converting votes 
into seats, their s/v ratio was significantly below one.9 
2.2.2. The Alternative Vote system  
The Alternative Vote system (AV) is no different from FPTP in terms of district 
magnitude. Votes for candidates are cast in single-member constituencies and the 
winning candidate is – just as in FPTP – supposed to ideally represent everyone in that 
constituency. Rather than casting a single vote for one single candidate, however, 
voters are asked to rank candidates in order of preference. The winning candidate 
needs to surpass the 50 per cent threshold. If no candidate wins this majority on the first 
preferences, the last placed candidate is eliminated and their first preference votes are 
redistributed to remaining candidates on the basis of the second preferences. The 
papers that rank the eliminated candidate as the first choice but do not express any 
other preference are eliminated also and are not taken into consideration in the 
subsequent rounds of counting. This process of eliminating the bottom candidate 
continues until a candidate wins the absolute majority of the remaining ballots. A 
hypothetical example of an election under AV rules is displayed in Table 2 below: 
  
                                                 
7
 The Conservative party won the 1951 General Election with 48.0 per cent of the UK vote share, 
corresponding to 321 seats, while the Labour party secured only 295 seats despite achieving 48.8 per 
cent share of the UK-wide vote. In the February 1974 General Election, Labour were the winners of the 
election with 4 more seats than the Conservatives despite receiving 0.6 per cent less of the national vote 
than the Conservative party’s share (Butler, 1952; Butler and Kavanagh, 1975). 
8
 Section 2.7.2 will elaborate on the Alliance’s position on electoral reform. 
9
 The s/v ratio for the Liberal Democrats for the 2005 election was 0.44. 
22 
Table 2. Hypothetical election result (AV) 
Candidate  1st Round 2nd Round  Final Vote Share  Result 
A   2000  Eliminated in the 1st round    3rd 
B   4000  130010  50.5% (5300)  WINNER 
C  5000  200   49.5% (5200)  2nd  
 
If the hypothetical elections were held under AV instead of FPTP, candidate B 
would win, since s/he would be the first to reach the 50 per cent threshold. In the first 
round of vote counting, the first preference votes received by each of the candidates are 
noted. The candidate with the least first preference votes (A) is eliminated from the race 
and his/her second preferences are distributed among the remaining candidates (B and 
C). In this example, the second choice for a large proportion of A supporters (1300) is 
candidate B. These votes, when added to B’s existing first preference votes, total 5300, 
which corresponds to 50.5 per cent of the total ballots relevant to the second round of 
counting. Although candidate C received the most number of first preference votes, 
his/her final vote tally (5000+400=5200) is less than candidate B’s votes and is below 
the 50 per cent threshold. 
It is important to distinguish AV from the two-round system which would require 
two-stage elections as is the case, for example, with the French and Turkish 
Presidential elections. AV fulfils the technical majority condition put forward by the two-
stage elections. However, under AV only one ballot is used and campaigning between 
the rounds is not possible. One can make the argument that two-stage elections (held 
                                                 
10
 In this example, 500 of the 2000 ballots that list candidate A as the primary choice are eliminated 
before the second round of counting since those 500 voters did not indicate any other preferences in 
addition to their first preference (Candidate A). These ballots are, therefore, non-transferable and are not 
taken into consideration in the subsequent rounds. If the proposed AV system was adopted, British voters 
would be free to indicate as many or as few preferences as they wished. Under the Australian type of AV 
ballots become automatically invalid if the voters fail to assign a number to each of the listed candidates. 
Australian ballots include a warning (‘Remember...number every box to make your vote count’) to remind 
voters of this requirement. See Appendix 3 for an exemplary Australian ballot. 
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on two separate polling days) are more democratic than AV since they make it possible 
for the voter to reconsider the remaining candidates against each other and modify 
candidate choice in-between the rounds.11 Second ballots are naturally more costly 
because voters may have to go to the polls twice if a majority is not obtained the first 
round.   
 The AV system, like FPTP, is not necessarily a proportional system at the 
national level. Indeed, in some circumstances, it can be less proportional than FPTP.12 
During the campaign period leading up to the 2011 referendum, the ‘No’ campaign 
characterized AV as uncommon and, consequently, unworthy.13 Yet AV is used quite 
commonly in Britain in other elections. AV has been used, for example, for electing the 
Labour party leader, deputy leader and constituency candidates (Quinn, 2012). The 
Liberal Democrats also used AV in their leadership elections (Kelly, 2015). The House 
of Commons itself uses this system to elect the Speaker of the House and the chairs of 
select committees.14 The City of London chooses its mayor using the Supplementary 
Vote (SV) system, a variant of AV which allows each voter to declare only a first and 
second choice among the list of candidates.15 Moreover, the sequence of ballots that 
the Conservative party uses in the first stage of the election of their leader is analogous 
to AV (Quinn, 2012).16 MPs within all the three largest parties in 2010 were, therefore, 
familiar with the concept as a result of their participation in those leadership elections. 
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 If, in the first stage, a candidate receives more than 50% of the valid votes, that candidate automatically 
wins the election. In this case, the need for a second stage election no longer exists. 
12
 The Independent Commission on the Voting System (1998) set up by Blair had acknowledged this and 
recommended that 15-20 per cent of the seats should be elected in a proportional manner as top-up 
seats to counteract AV leading to disproportionality at the national level. 
13
Disregarding the fact that AV or systems closely resembling AV are used commonly in the UK, David 
Cameron repeatedly stated that AV was an obscure system used only in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and 
Australia. 
14





 The main difference is that under AV candidates are narrowed down based on recounting secondary 
preferences indicated on a single original ballot. For electing the Conservative leader, MP’s vote in 
separate ballots after each round of counting until only two candidates are left. The shortlist, consisting of 
the final two, is then sent out to Party members in the form of another ballot (Kelly and Lester, 2005). 
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The wider public was unlikely to have come across the system until it was placed before 
them in 2010.17  
 AV arguably strengthens the constituency link.  A candidate supported by an 
absolute majority of preferential votes may presumably have a stronger mandate than a 
candidate supported only by a simple majority of first preference votes. This mandate 
case for AV was made by Gordon Brown and also by the Yes supporters.18 The 
Electoral Reform Society claimed that the system would ‘ensure a real mandate’ as only 
nearly one third of MPs can claim support from the majority of voters in their 
constituency.19 Figure 1 displays the decreasing trend in the number of MP’s elected by 
less than 50% of the votes cast in the constituency. 
  
                                                 
17
 Some UK citizens may have come across AV, or a variant thereof, in trade union leadership elections 
or in elections of officers in students’ unions at universities.  
18
 On 2 February 2010, in a speech to IPPR, Gordon Brown stated that ‘I hope we can move to a situation 
where every MP is able to say, as they cannot today, that when it came to the final count, they were the 
choice of an absolute majority’ - “Towards a new politics”, Speech by the Prime Minister to the IPPR (2 
February 2010). 
19
 https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/sites/default/files/introducing-the-alternative-vote.pdf, p.6. 
25 
Figure 1. Number of MP’s elected with less than 50% of constituency votes (1992-2010) 
 
The numbers are created based on data from The British Parliamentary Constituency 
Database, 1992-2005, Release 1.3 compiled by Pippa Norris and May 6th 2010 British 
General Election Constituency Results Release 5.0 by Pippa Norris. 
2.3. Literature on electoral reform 
The political science literature that examines electoral reform (e.g., Boix, 1999; Colomer 
2005; Cusack et. al., 2007; Calvo, 2009) is closely related to the vast literature on 
electoral systems (e.g., Duverger, 1954, Rae, 1967; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Lijphart 
and Aitkin, 1994; Norris and Crewe, 1994; Farrell, 1997; Farrell and Scully, 2007). The 
literature on electoral reform is extensive and diverse in itself. Some studies compare 
different cases of reform (Katz, 2005) while others focus on a single case (Renwick et. 
al., 2009) or provide regional case studies (Birch et. al., 2002). Some of the literature is 
technical and descriptive (Farrell, 2011), while some advocate reform and take a 
normative democratic position concerning which system to choose (McLean, 1991). 
Cases of non-reform and failed reform attempts have also attracted scholarly attention 
(Bowler and Donovan, 2008; Rahat and Hazan, 2011).   
 Considering the enormity of the literature on the topic, analysts studying electoral 









literature, Shugart’s theoretical framework is particularly relevant for exploring the 
systemic pressures that led to the hung parliament in the UK in 2010 and ultimately the 
2011 referendum. This section will use Shugart’s approach as a launch pad to place the 
case in a theoretical context.  
 According to Shugart’s framework, electoral reform is most likely to occur when 
vote-maximizing strategies of political actors (contingencies) coincide with normative 
evaluations (inherent conditions) of the existing system (Shugart, 2008).  Normative 
evaluations may be prompted by systemic failure or crisis. Shugart defines systemic 
failure as ‘the incapacity of the electoral system to deliver the normatively expected 
connection between the vote and the formation of executive authority’ (Shugart, 2008, 
p.18).  
Reform promises made by politicians may not always reflect a genuine 
motivation to change the system. The differences Shugart draws between ‘act-based 
motivations’ and ‘outcome contingent motivations’ is of particular relevance here. An 
act-based motivation occurs when politicians assume the role of the heroic reformer in 
order to increase their appeal to the public. Such politicians advocate reform, not 
because they anticipate benefits, but because they expect to benefit from appearing to 
advocate reform.20 Act contingency differs from ‘outcome contingency’ which occurs 
when an actor or set of actors advocate electoral reform on the understanding that 
reform would, indeed, produce better electoral outcomes for their party in the future.  
Shugart’s framework points us towards to the distinction between 
normative/systemic concerns and models that focus on party-interest. The need to bring 
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 This occurred in the run up to the 2010 general election when Gordon Brown, the incumbent Labour 
prime minister, signalled his willingness to hold a referendum on AV in order to put his party on the side of 
change. The motivation behind this step was to attract the Liberal Democrat voters and to send a positive 
signal to the leader of the party, Nick Clegg for a potential coalition deal. The fact that Gordon Brown was 
only beginning to express interest on electoral reform towards the very end of his three year term as the 
prime minister, naturally, reduced the credibility of his appeal. 
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together a variety of academic approaches to achieve a more comprehensive and multi-
dimensional understanding of the phenomena has been acknowledged by some 
scholars in the field (Rahat and Hazan, 2011). This theoretical move is imperative in 
order to avoid the risk of a reductionism which emphasizes one kind of motivation over 
others (party interest vs. self-interest vs. interest of the country as a whole). In reality, 
motivations may coexist as embedded cultural realities within political systems or within 
the public imagination. For instance, people or groups may be motivated by 
considerations about self-interest but they also need to make sure that they do not 
demonstrably trespass cultural particularities and violate the rules of civility while 
participating in politics.  Shugart’s ‘inherent conditions’ relate largely to the systemic 
failure of an electoral system – primarily in terms of the disproportionality that it 
produces.21 Contingent factors relate to the strategic considerations of immediate 
partisan advantage.  
The failure of AV in the UK is an interesting case in itself. Yet, at the same time, 
we can benefit from looking at the UK case through the lens of scholarly work on other 
cases (Landman, 2003). There have, for example, been a number of studies on New 
Zealand, which changed its voting system in 1993 following a referendum. In the New 
Zealand case, electoral reform appears to have come about as a result of party system 
dealignment and electoral disproportionality (Vowles, 2008).22  The public 
dissatisfaction with economic conditions was also instrumental in boosting support 
behind the attempts to modify the country’s electoral system (Nagel, 1998).  
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 The detection of ‘systemic failures’ may be based on subjective and normative evaluations about how 
democracies should work. 
22
 The general elections held in New Zealand in 1990 produced highly disproportional results. The 
National Party was able to win 69 per cent of the seats (67 of the total 97 seats) with just 47.8 per cent of 
the national votes, while the Labour party won just 29 (30 per cent) of the seats with 35 per cent of the 
votes. The New Labour party won 1 seat in return for 5.2 percent of the vote while the Green Party failed 
to win any seat despite their 6.8 per cent national vote share. In the 1993 election, more than 30 per cent 
of the votes went to minor parties (18.2 per cent for Alliance Party, 8.4 per cent for New Zealand First and 
2 per cent for Christian Heritage). These votes were translated into just two, two and zero seats 
respectively. 
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Vowles argues that because the reduction in the vote shares of the two major 
parties was not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in their seat shares, 
concerns were raised about the representativeness of the country’s parliament (Vowles, 
2008). According to Vowles, this development weakened accountability and the direct 
link between voters and the MPs– the two things generally assumed to be the strengths 
of plurality systems. A binding referendum on changing New Zealand’s electoral system 
was held on the same day as the 1993 General Election. The proposal was accepted as 
53.9 per cent of those taking part in that referendum voted in favour of a mixed member 
proportional system that also included provision for six members to be elected by 
members of the indigenous Maori people (who made up 15 per cent of the electorate).  
Electoral reform attempts can be characterized both in terms of a definitive 
contingent instance (the event of the referendum) as well as a path-dependent process. 
In accordance with the incremental and path-dependent evolution of the UK’s unwritten 
constitution, where precedents have been essential, the country’s electoral reform 
prospect itself can be characterized in a path-dependent manner.23 From a theoretical 
perspective, path-dependence is significant in part because political parties tend 
towards consistency or reliability (Downs, 1957). Path-dependencies may be formed 
through negotiations between parties and/or when those who initiate reforms use 
consultative bodies. Such bodies may help reformers keep the policy window open 
(Shugart, 2008).  
2.4. The British constitution and electoral reform 
As implied in the section above, the political discourse on electoral reform may be 
conditioned by rational calculations by parties pursuing their self-interest. Less 
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 As briefly mentioned in the introduction section, Philip Norton characterizes the (largely uncodified and 
unentrenched) British constitution as being ‘in flux’ (Norton, 1982). In a similar manner, the British 
debates on electoral reform and referendums have shown fluctuation. 
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obviously, and indeed less cynically, the discourse can reflect a country’s broader, and 
perhaps normatively driven, conceptions on what characterizes a ‘good’ constitution and, 
accordingly, the broader debate on constitutional reform (Finer et. al, 1995, Oliver, 
2003). These considerations may occasionally either supersede or, at the very least, 
coincide with partisan considerations.24  
Britain has a long constitutional history that one could possibly trace back to as 
far as 1215, when the Magna Carta was sealed by King John who, in order to keep his 
rule, had to part with absolute power (Barnett, 2002). In part because it lacks a 
republican framework, the current political system in Britain is founded on traditions, 
conventions and sentiments established in the earlier periods, when people doubted the 
central premise of democracy: that the people were capable of governing themselves. 
The central concern was to produce ‘strong’ rather than ‘representative’ government 
and this has generally been thought to mean single party government (King, 2001). The 
UK has not gone through a full and rapid republican conversion in the way defeated 
imperial powers like Italy or Japan went through at the end of the World War II (Finer et. 
al., 1995). These countries, unlike the UK, both have written or ‘capital C’ constitutions 
(King, 2001). The core of the British constitution, as pointed out in the previous section, 
is largely unwritten and can be said to have evolved organically and/or gradually.  
Other examples suggest that there are sometimes surprising sources of change. 
Katz, for example, explores the involvement of Canadian courts in electoral reform. He 
suggests that the courts have prioritized ‘individual rights of expression over collective 
rights of decision’ in their rulings on matters involving parties and elections (Katz, 2011, 
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 The former Liberals, for example, did not advocate electoral reform until they were replaced by Labour 
as the principle party of opposition to the Conservatives in the 1930s (King, 2007). In 1917, David Lloyd 
George – who was the prime minister and leader of the Liberals at the time - blocked a bill to change the 
system to PR (Blackburn, 1995). 
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p.602).25 The reasons behind this, Katz argues, are the principles of the Canadian 
constitution and the lack of reference to political parties therein. This opposition 
between the individual and the collective in the Canadian context echoes the tension 
between redistributive and efficiency functions of electoral systems (Tsebelis, 1990).  
Although it is thought to be traditional, FPTP has not been the only system for 
House of Commons elections in the UK. In the past, different kinds of Westminster 
constituencies had different electoral systems (Blackburn, 1995). Multi-member 
constituencies were quite common until 1885, when the Redistribution of Seats Act 
replaced many of them with single-member constituencies in an attempt to 
standardize.26 For a long time, moreover, university graduates had two votes – one for 
the constituency in which they lived and one for special university seats. 
Representatives of these special seats were elected by the Single Transferrable Vote 
(STV) from 1911 until 1945. Such ‘plural voting’ rules were abolished in the 
Representation of the People Act 1948 and graduates had just one vote from the 1950 
general election onwards (Parry, 2012). 
Britain’s constitution does not prescribe a set method regarding matters that are 
considered constitutional (Hazell et. al., 1996). Whether the electoral reform debate is 
part of a wider reform agenda or is driven mainly by partisan rationality is an important 
question that needs to be addressed in order to better understand the process of 
electoral reform itself (Blackburn and Plant, 1999). Was the real driving force behind 
electoral reform rational seat-maximization or alliance strategies, or was it based on 
                                                 
25
 Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) (1 SCR 912 [2003]) is one of the cases Katz includes in his 
analysis. The case challenged the Canada Elections Act’s requirement of political parties needing to run 
for elections in a minimum of 50 constituencies in order to maintain registered party status. In Canada, 
this status provides a number of privileges including displaying the party’s name on the ballot alongside 
its candidate. The Ontario Court ruled that the threshold was not consistent with the section 3 (on voting 
rights) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the Ontario Court of Appeal later 
reversed this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada gave the final verdict that the legislation violates 
section 3 and harms individual participants and the entire electoral process. 
26
 http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/chartists/keydates/.  
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normative/value-driven considerations with respect to the electoral system? These two 
motivations are not mutually exclusive; it is possible to break the discourse on electoral 
reform into its component parts based on the motivations of the decision-makers. Path-
dependence may be relevant for both strategic dependencies and value-oriented 
lineages in regard to enhancing the democratic quality of a political system. While, as 
suggested earlier, interests and values may become indistinguishable in the hands of 
politicians, it is still possible to draw inferences about their ‘real’ intentions based on 
their previous actions.  
2.5. Disproportionality in the UK  
Proportionality (or disproportionality) is the measure of how votes cast by voters are 
translated into seats in parliament. The principle of proportionality embodies the 
democratic proposition that all individuals are of equal moral value (Weir and Beetham, 
1999). 
In 2011, the Yes campaigners did not have the chance to make a strong case 
using the principle of proportionality since AV is not more or less proportional than the 
FPTP. Instead, both the Yes and the No campaigns utilized the word ‘fairness’ to 
support their respective arguments.27 Since at least the 1970s, ‘fairness’ has been the 
key term for advocates of electoral reform in Britain (Norris, 1995).  In relation to 
electoral systems, fairness is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Blau, 2004). Blau 
suggests that the term ‘fairness’ does not possess a fundamental quality in what/who it 
applies to. This prompts us to ask the following question: Towards what or whom should 
the electoral system be fair? The national constituency, regional constituencies, 
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 The Yes campaign characterized AV as a system fairer than the FPTP based on the premise that it 
would prevent candidates supported by less than 50% of constituency voters from winning. The No 
campaign argued that AV was not a fair system because it made possible the scenario of a candidate 
who was the first choice for the highest number of voters in a certain constituency not being elected as 
the MP of that constituency. 
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executive bodies of political parties, one political ideology at the expense of parties that 
defend alternative ideologies, individual candidates or the individual voter? While it is 
possible to extend this list, the level of the definition is crucial in answering the above. 
Blau argues that the ‘nebulous language of fairness’ can be avoided by focusing on the 
prior principles on which our assessment of fairness is based (Blau, p.175). The 
particular conception of fairness that guides the design of an electoral system may 
determine which types (citizens, politicians, parties, etc.) or sub/super-types (e.g.major 
parties, minor parties, citizens belonging to a minority ethnic group, class of MPs 
elected by the constituency ballot vs. class of MPs elected through the party list in 
mixed electoral systems) of actors are advantaged or disadvantaged (or victimized) by 
that system.28  
While the AV referendum race itself did not revolve around arguments on 
proportionality, political scientists’ interest on measures of (dis)proportionality implies 
some academic recognition of proportionality as an indicator of a political system’s 
democratic merits.29  
There are various measures of disproportionality (e.g., Gallagher’s index, Rae’s 
index, Loosemore-Hanby’s index, Saint-Lague index, deviation from proportionality (DV) 
score). Although, in theory, different methods of seat allocation would require different 
measures, the Gallagher Index (Gallagher, 1991), is generally taken to be a universal 
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 The electoral system itself can be considered an essentially contested institution, with various 
beneficiaries having direct or mediated stakes in it. According to Blau there are five common 
specifications of the concept of fairness as it is applied to electoral systems: Equality, populist, winner-
takes-all, majority and plurality. An electoral system reflecting a preference for the winner-takes-all 
specification would be advantageous towards parties with regional but biased against smaller parties with 
nationally spread supporters. The characterization of each new election as a level playing field may 
weaken the ‘fairness’ argument made in defence of territorially dispersed parties like the Liberal 
Democrats. If the Michigan Model (party identification being stable and closely tied to vote) is valid 
(Campbell et al., 1960), the level playing field argument does not hold. On the other hand, the rapid fall in 
the partisan support of Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015 contradicts the Michigan Model. The 
Model will be discussed in more detail in section four in relation to voting behaviour in the referendum. 
29
 The definition of political system here obviously excludes one-party dictatorships that have almost 
perfect proportionality (as well as very high turnout) figures. 
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measure and the best indicator of disproportionality in the general sense (e.g. 
Taagepera and Grofman, 2003). The Gallagher Index will, therefore, be used here as a 
supplement to the s/v ratio. The Index is a least squares measure based on the 
following formula:  







where, Vi is the vote share for a specific party and Si is the parliamentary seat share. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the calculated Gallagher index value for the eighteen post-WWII 
elections in the UK. The value for each election is based on the differences between the 
vote shares of five groups and their corresponding seat shares: Conservative, Labour, 
Liberal Democrats, PC/SNP and other. The Index starts off high in 1945 but declines in 
the 1950s. It then tracks upwards to 1970 and then leaps upward in February and 
October 1974, due to the increase in vote for the Liberals and also the Nationalist 
parties (the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales) (Nagel and Wlezien, 2010). It 
remains high and then leaps upwards in 1983.  The Index then declines in 1992, before 
increasing again in 1997 and 2001 and dipping slightly in 2005 and 2010.  
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Figure 2. The Gallagher Index of disproportionality for the UK, 1945-2010 
 
Index values are calculated based on election result figures taken from the House of 
Commons Library Research Paper ‘UK Election Statistics 1918-2012’ (RP 12/43, 7 
August 2012). 
Figure 2 can be roughly divided into three periods. The first, between 1950 and 
1970, is a period of low disproportionality (Index <10). The second period, between 
February 1974 and 1979, is a period of moderate disproportionality (Index <15). The 
third and final period from 1983 until 2010 has high disproportionality (Index >15). 
These figures clearly demonstrate that the UK electoral system has become 









Figure 3. Turnout and the Labour-Conservative share of the vote in British general 
elections, 1945-2010 
 
The figure is based on the House of Commons election statistics data.   
 
In addition to decreasing proportionality, another development in the political 
system has been the decline in electoral support for the two major parties that have 
governed the UK during the post-war period until the formation of the coalition in 2010. 
Figure 3 displays the joint vote share of the Conservative and Labour parties. Their joint 
share of the vote peaks in the 1950s at around 95 per cent and then tracks down, falling 
particularly sharply in February 1974 and 1983. By 2010, less than two out of three of 
the entire electorate supported one of the two major parties. Strikingly, the two major 
parties have not attracted more than four in five voters since 1979. The concern caused 
by the increasing disproportionality of the electoral system revealed in Figure 2 may 
have been offset by the fact that the major parties alternated in power. The turnover of 












Turnout Lab-Con % share of vote
36 
new one through elections. Figure 3, however, demonstrates that the two major parties’ 
hold over the electorate has declined.  
This concern is compounded by another change. As Figure 3 also shows, turnout 
has fallen from over 80 per cent to around 65 per cent. The declining share of the vote 
received by the major parties, coupled with the declining turnout, means that a 
diminishing proportion of the electorate have voted for the government over the years 
(see Figure 4). In the 1950s, this proportion was between 35 and 40 per cent. In the 
1970s, it fell to around 30 per cent. By 2005, a mere 21.6 per cent of the electorate cast 
their vote for Labour, the party that formed the government. The formation of the 
coalition in 2010 increased the proportion of the electorate supporting the governing 
parties, largely because the two coalition partners obtained a combined 59.1 per cent of 
the total vote.30 The low turnout figure of 65 per cent, however, still kept the proportion 
of the electorate voting for the governing parties below 40 per cent.  
The steady decline in both the level of public engagement in parliamentary 
elections and support for the two major parties can be deduced from the figure just 
above. Although there have been upward sparks in turnout and support in some of the 
elections, the overall trend has been downward. Voter turnout is correlated with how 
close an election result is (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Cox and Munger 
1989; Matsusaka 1993). The explanations on the causal mechanisms that underlie this 
relationship are varied. While Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) suggest 
that a higher turnout level in close elections is due to increase in the motivations of the 
voters to influence the outcome, Cox and Munger (1989) and Matsusaka (1993) offer an 
alternative explanation concerning the root cause of boosted turnout: Voters themselves 
are not the ones sensitive to the predicted competitiveness of elections; increased 
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 In 2015, this figure fell to 24.4 per cent as the Conservatives were returned to office with 37 per cent of 
the national vote on a 66 per cent turnout. 
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turnout is instead due to the efforts of political elites who decide to boost their voter 
mobilization activities in tight looking electoral contexts. Proportional systems tend to 
have higher turnout levels, but clearly one needs to be cautious about jumping to 
conclusions about causality (Blais and Aarts, 2006).  
Declining turnout and party support are contributory causes for declining 
government effectiveness in the UK (Whiteley, 2009).  ‘The expenses scandal’ of 2009-
2010 was used by campaigners on both sides during the AV referendum campaign.31 
Heath suggests that ‘the expenses scandal and the divide between voters and 
politicians that it came to symbolise inevitably cast a shadow over the 2010 election’ 
(Heath, 2011, p.133). The media response to the expenses scandal drove party leaders 
to propose measures, during the pre-election debates, which would hypothetically 
discipline the MPs of their respective parties. To be sure, the scandal had a short-term 
and limited impact on British politics (Van Heerde-Hudson, 2014). Yet, the coincidence 
between the scandal and the campaign implied that the scandal may have had some 
influence in conditioning the campaign arguments. The suggestion that voters’ ability to 
punish MP’s is bounded by rules of the electoral system should be taken into 
consideration (Vivyan et. al, 2014). The MPs scandal elevated the debate on electoral 
reform to a more central position (Renwick et. al., 2011).  
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 The media exposure of lavish MPs had raised scepticism among the UK public with regards to whether 
the tax money is being well spent. For public perceptions of the expenses scandal, see Allen and Birch 
(2011). The Yes campaign stressed the need to make MP’s more accountable by means of a ‘better’ 
electoral system. The No campaign argued that the funds needed for the proposed switch to a new 
electoral would be better for the country if it was spent on better services for the citizens.   
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Figure 4. Proportion (%) of the electorate voting for the governing parties, 1945-2010 
 
Figure is based on the House of Commons election statistics data.   
The leaders’ proposed measures included the power of recall and a more 
`competitive` electoral system. The scandal also conditioned the two opposing 
referendum campaigns. The Yes campaign argued that AV’s 50 per cent threshold 
would make MP’s more accountable and elections more competitive. The No campaign, 
on the other hand, took advantage of the heightened public sensitivity about 
irresponsible spending of public money, claiming that the switch to AV would lead to 
£250 million of public money being wasted. In short, both sides tried to associate their 
position with the cause of ‘political reform’.  
Another factor to consider in relation to increased demands for reform is 
declining trust in politicians. The proportion of the population expressing distrust has 
always exceeded the proportion expressing trust, so that net trust (per cent of the public 
that trust politicians minus per cent of the public that do not) has hovered around -50 








however, trust fell to a new low of -69 and remained at -66, two years later. This 
widespread concern was reflected in the 2010 prime ministerial debates, which devoted 
a significant proportion of the time allocated to the issue of parliamentary standards 
(Allen, Bara and Bartle, 2013). The ‘political class’ found themselves in the dock and the 
party leaders made efforts to portray themselves as the representatives of an outraged 
public (Heath, 2011). As Heath suggests, during the second half of the twentieth century 
and the first decade of the twenty-first century, the public appears to have gradually 
become more disconnected from the ‘political class’, support for the two main parties 
has declined, turnout went down and party membership declined.32  
Figure 5. The declining net trust in politicians (%), 1983-2011
 
Source: Ipsos MORI 
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 Membership figures for earlier periods are not particularly reliable, since practices varied between 










2.6. Electoral reform and the political agenda 
Electoral reform and AV has competed for attention with a large number of issues and 
are part of a wider ‘political agenda’, loosely defined as a set of issues that are under 
discussion or consideration – particularly by policy-makers. There are various ways of 
measuring the ‘agendas’ of the government, political parties and the wider public 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; John et. al, 2013). The government’s agenda, for 
instance, can be measured by looking at the content of election manifestos (Norris et. 
al., 1999) or Queens’ Speeches (Jennings and John, 2009).  
These measurements can be supplemented by frequency measurements of key 
terms used in parliamentary discourse. The level of interest in electoral reform by British 
parliamentarians has varied over time. The place of electoral reform on the British 
political agenda can, thus, be estimated by examining the official record of 
parliamentary debates and correspondence.33 Figure 6 displays the year-specific results 
of keyword searches in the Hansard database of the terms ‘electoral reform’, 
‘Alternative Vote’, ‘single transferrable vote’ and ‘voting reform’.34 This source provides 
a good indicator of the actual official debates that have taken place in the Houses of 
Parliament.35  
The two peaks for ‘Alternative Vote’ around years 1917 and 1930 correspond to 
the reform bills that were discussed in the parliament around that era. A speaker’s 
conference on electoral reform was set up in 1916 and produced its report in 1917. The 
Speaker’s Conference of 1916-17 as well as the Ullswater Committee of 1930 
recommended the Alternative Vote (Butler, 2004). The peak around 1997 mainly 
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 As paper 3 will demonstrate there is little evidence of any public interest in electoral reform. It is difficult 
to argue that the parliamentary interest reflected or was caused by wider interest. 
34
 Hansard’s online search engine’s results are labelled under seven categories: Lords sittings, Commons 
sittings, Westminster Hall sittings, Written Answers, Written Statements, Lords reports and Grand 
Committee reports. 
35
 The analysis covers the debates that took place in both the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons. For the details of the parsing status: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/volumes/ 
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corresponds to the discussions that took place at Westminster regarding which electoral 
systems to use for elections to the devolved assemblies. On the other hand, the modest 
peak for ‘electoral reform’ during World War II comes as a surprise, as one would 
expect electoral reform to be down the list of priorities during a major war.  
Figure 6. Annual frequencies of keywords in the Hansard, 1900-2005
 
The figure is based on search result data from http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ 
The same data are presented again in Figure 7 in the form of a bar chart 
demonstrating the occurrence of mentions in each decade. The bar chart groups 
electoral reform and voting reform together under a single category. The figure hints at 















to the 1950s and 1960s. In the two decades following the WWII, Britain had more 
pressing priorities than electoral reform; namely, the reconstruction of a nation that had 
suffered greatly during the war. The issue re-emerged in the 1970s with the growth of 
the Liberal and Nationalist parties (Webb, 2000), and in the 1990s after a long period of 
single party rule by the Conservatives. 
Figure 7. Frequencies of keyword search results in Hansard for each decade 1900-2005 
 
The figure is based on search results gathered from hansard.millbanksystems.com. 
Looking at these frequencies in isolation does not give us the entire picture. It is, 
therefore, essential to examine the relationship between proportionality and interest in 
electoral reform. Figure 8 displays the relationship between the Gallagher Index and 
mentions of electoral reform in the Houses of Parliament. The relationship between the 
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Wesminister. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.57 (N=24, p<0.01).36 While the 
relationship appears to be accentuated by a single case – that of 1931, when the 
Gallagher index peaks as does mention of electoral reform – the correlation between 
disproportionality and mentions of electoral reform is still moderately strong: 0.45 (N=23) 
even with exclusion of this outlier. To be sure, correlation is not causation. 
Disproportionality may cause parliamentary debate about electoral reform for two 
reasons: (a) because it increases concern about unfairness and (b) because it creates 
strategic opportunities.  
Figure 8. Relationship between disproportionality and mentions of electoral reform 
(Hansard), 1918-2005 
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 There have been 24 general elections between 1900 and 2010. 
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  The analysis in Figure 8 signals that disproportionality has an effect on the 
Westminster agenda in the same year that the election has taken place. It may, 
however, also have a delayed impact. Figure 9 displays the repeated analysis taking 
into consideration the possibility of this impact. There is again a relationship between 
disproportionality and the agenda as indicated by mentions of ‘electoral reform’. The 
Pearson’s R in this case is 0.65 (N=23, p<0.001). This once more provides evidence 
that disproportionality is associated with discourse of electoral reform in both Houses of 
Parliament. 
Figure 9. Relationship between disproportionality and average mentions of electoral 
reform in the same and the following year (Hansard), 1918-2005  
 
As paper 3 will show, electoral reform and constitutional reform do not rank 
highly on the public’s agenda. Yet, as the parliamentary records indicate, electoral 
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reform has been debated by British parliamentarians for more than a century. The 
remainder of this paper will, therefore, focus on the content of the debate at an elite 
level by looking at the parties, and in particular the Labour party. The following sections 
will demonstrate that Labour party has been pivotal in Britain’s electoral reform debate 
by coupling the Alternative Vote with electoral reform. 
2.7. The political parties’ and electoral reform  
The only UK institutions that have the power to transform a policy into legislation are 
political parties or, more specifically, those political parties that have a reasonable 
chance of forming the government. Parties may officially seek public approval for a 
policy either through the party manifesto or invite the electorate to make a direct choice 
in a referendum.  
The hung parliament environment in 2010 created the conditions to bring about 
reform since power was dispersed among the parties.37 This section elaborates on the 
electoral reform prospect from the standpoint of the three main parties with a particular 
emphasis on the Labour party.  
2.7.1. Labour  
The Labour party’s interest in electoral reform has fluctuated throughout the twentieth 
century. In the early part of the party’s history, certain factions within the party 
expressed interest in reform. The 1931 spike in Figure 6 relates to the Speaker’s 
Conference on electoral reform held during the period when Labour governed as a 
minority government. From the time Labour replaced the Liberals as the main party of 
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 This is the case since no single party had an absolute mandate in forming the government. According 
to Richard Burden MP ‘[constitutional convention] would have been a better way [to decide on this issue]’ 
(Burden, 2014).One can argue that the negotiation talks have in practice acted as an informal type of 
constitutional bargaining. 
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opposition to the Conservatives in the late 1930s, right through to the late 1980s, the 
party showed little interest in electoral reform (Morris, 2005).  
The party’s lack of engagement was largely because Labour was one of the two 
major parties throughout this period and confidently expected to alternate in power with 
the Conservatives as the political pendulum swung from right to left.38 The party 
governed from 1945 to 1951, from 1964 to 1970 and from 1974 to 1979. As Figure 10 
shows, the Labour party’s s/v ratio regularly exceeded 1, suggesting that it profited from 
the FPTP system, gaining more representation than its national vote would have given it 
in a proportional system. In 1945 and 1966, moreover, the party obtained massive 
parliamentary majorities. The 1945 government – which created the National Health 
Service, expanded the welfare state and nationalised a great deal of industry – came to 
represent the ‘ideal’ Labour government. It was widely cited as an example of what a 
Labour majority government could achieve.  
The four consecutive electoral defeats from 1979 until 1992, however, caused 
many within Labour to worry whether the pendulum would still swing back in their favour 
and stimulated increasing interest in electoral reform (Anderson and Mann, 1997). The 
growing realisation that the existing system had enabled the Conservatives to win 
elections on a minority of the vote and pursue a radical New Right political agenda 
caused Labour to reconsider its support for FPTP. At the same time, there were 
increasing demands from Scotland, Wales and some English regions to devolve power 
to protect those areas from the consequences of Conservative domination in 
Westminster (Marr, 1992).  
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 For the application of the ‘pendulum’ idea to British elections (1945-2005), see Lebo and Norpoth, 2007. 
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Figure 10. Seats to votes ratios for three major parties, 1918-2010
 
Data are based on House of Commons Library Research Paper ‘UK Election Statistics 
1918-2012’ (RP 12/43, 7 August 2012).  
At its 1990 Party Conference, the Labour party voted to set up the Electoral 
Systems Working Party, known as the Plant Commission, in order to examine the 
options for possible reform. In July 1991, the Working Party published its first interim 
report titled Democracy, Representations and Elections. In this report various possible 
electoral system options were outlined (Labour, 1992). The second interim report, which 
was published in the summer of 1992, excluded STV as an option for the Commons 
based on the reason that STV would dilute the constituency link. This second report 
recommended AMS for the proposed Scottish Parliament. In its final report, published in 
early 1993, the Working Party recommended Supplementary Vote for the Commons, a 
system that, like AV would have preserved existing single-member constituencies and 
would have likely continued to produce a majority for the largest party.39 The Party also 
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recommended a regional list system for the second chamber to replace the House of 
Lords.  
The Labour party’s commitment to holding a referendum on electoral reform 
dates back to 1993, when John Smith, the then leader, made the promise in order to 
avoid a damaging split on the issue.40 Although Smith’s promise to hold a referendum 
on the issue as soon as Labour came back to power was not realized, this commitment 
was sustained in the reviews prepared and committees established during Blair’s 
leadership.  
These changes in the policy on electoral reform coincided with other changes 
that could be categorized as constitutional change. From 1989, the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention (SCC) – made up of Labour, the Liberal Democrats, churches 
and trade unions – met to discuss devolution.41 The Scottish Labour party had narrowly 
agreed in 1990 that the new parliament would be elected by a form of proportional 
representation (King, 2007). Following John Smith’s premature death in 1994, Labour 
expressed a desire to fulfil promises on both devolution and electoral reform, partly as a 
memorial to their ‘lost leader’.42 New Labour, under Tony Blair, expressed a wider 
interest in constitutional reform and advocated policies that took the party closer to the 
Liberal Democrats. Beyond that, the two parties formed the Joint Consultative 
Committee on Constitutional Reform (JCC), comprised of representatives from both 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This Committee led to the signing of the so-called 
‘Cook-Maclennan Agreement’, which established an agreed agenda for change that 
included devolution, freedom of information, the House of Lords and the incorporation of 
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 Smith’s commitment was made at a Charter 88 event:  ‘A citizens' democracy’: speech by John Smith, 
leader of the Labour party at an event hosted by Charter 88, Church House, Westminster, Monday 1 
March, 1993. 
41
 The SCC was boycotted by the Conservatives and the Scottish National Party (SNP) were not 
interested in participating (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1999). 
42
 ‘One of Smith’s favourite ways of proceeding was to set up committees and working parties’ (McSmith, 
1994, p.329). This way of proceeding in relation to electoral reform continued under Blair. 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (Blackburn and Plant, 1999, pp. 468-80). 
The agreement stated: 
‘56. Both parties believe that a referendum on the system for elections to the 
House of Commons should be held within the first term of a new parliament. 
57. Both parties are also agreed that the referendum should be a single question 
offering a straight choice between first past the post and one specific proportional 
alternative. 
58. A commission on voting systems should be appointed early in the next 
parliament to recommend the appropriate proportional alternative to the first past 
the post system. Among the factors to be considered by the commission would 
be the likelihood that the proposed system would command broad consensus 
among proponents of proportional representation. The commission would be 
asked to report within twelve months of its establishment.’ (Blackburn and Plant, 
1999, p.476).   
Tony Blair remained far from convinced that Labour would be able to defeat the 
Conservatives at his first election as leader of his party. He, therefore, also made 
additional efforts to get the support of the Liberal Democrats through talking directly to 
their leader, Paddy Ashdown. These talks are recounted at length in the Ashdown 
diaries (Ashdown, 2002). Blair considered inviting Ashdown to join the new government 
right until the last moment, when the sheer size of Labour’s victory in 1997 made it both 
unfeasible and unnecessary. Nevertheless, in its 1997 Manifesto, the Labour party had 
expressed it was ‘committed to a referendum on the voting system for the House of 
Commons’. The careful wording of the manifesto document meant that this commitment 
was not a firm pledge (Labour, 1997). In contrast, setting up a commission early in the 
term was promised in the manifesto. In a move to keep this promise, the Independent 
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Commission on the Voting System was established by the Labour government in 
December of 1997. The Commission was chaired by Roy Jenkins, the prominent Liberal 
Democrat and former Labour chancellor and home secretary. The ‘Jenkins Commission’ 
was asked to recommend the best alternative ‘system or combination of systems’ to 
FPTP. It was asked to follow four requirements:  
 broad proportionality 
 the maintenance of a link between MPs and geographical constituencies 
 the need for stable government 
 an extension of voter choice (Secretary of State, 1998).   
The second and third bullet points were included at the insistence of the Labour Party, 
while the first and fourth criteria were demanded by the Liberal Democrats. Labour 
modified the original ‘proportionality’ requirement of the Liberal Democrats to ‘broad 
proportionality’ (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1999) As Jenkins himself wrote in the report, 
these requirements were ‘not entirely compatible’ with each other.43 
 During the preparation process of the Commission’s report, political scientists 
David M. Farrell and Michael Gallagher, commissioned by the McDougall Trust, 
published a document which evaluated seven different electoral systems based on the 
above four requirements. This was one of the many submissions received by the 
Commission. In the forward page of the submission Tom Ellis, the chairman of the 
McDougall Trust, depicted two different cultures in British politics. On the one hand, he 
suggested, that the ‘country’s oligarchic political culture’ acted as a resisting force for 
attempts for reform. Britain’s ‘social culture’ was a concept incompatible with the former. 
The submission concluded that different systems would perform best on the each of the 
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 These words are expressed in the paragraph 1 of the Introduction (Chapter One) section of the report. 
51 
criteria, but that on balance, Additional Member System (AMS) would be the best 
replacement for the current system.   
The Electoral Reform Society, the parent organization of McDougall Trust, 
prepared a separate submission to the Jenkins Commission in April 1998. The 
submission was a comprehensive report that promoted the STV system for the House 
of Commons. The report had one core section devoted for each of the four conditions 
stated in the terms of reference according to which the Jenkins Commission was set up.  
In October 1998, the Commission tried to square the circle by recommending the 
AV-plus system. This entailed 80 to 85 per cent of MPs to be elected from individual 
constituencies using AV and the remainder from regional lists in order to make up for 
potential disproportionality AV would cause. Jenkins himself warned in the report that: 
Within this mixed system the constituency members should be elected by AV. On 
its own AV would be unacceptable because of the danger that in anything like 
present circumstances it might increase rather than reduce disproportionality and 
might do so in a way which is unfair to the Conservative party. With the corrective 
mechanism in operation, its advantages of increasing voter choice and of 
ensuring that in practice all constituency members (as opposed to little more than 
half in recent elections) have majority support in their own constituencies become 
persuasive (Secretary of State, 1998, chapter 9). 
The report included a ‘Note of Reservation’ by Lord Alexander, a Conservative 
peer, who supported all the recommendations in the Report except using AV to elect the 
constituency representatives. He instead preferred to retain FPTP.  Although the report 
was received favourably by the then Lib Dem leader Paddy Ashdown and Tony Blair, it 
met with strong criticism from the supporters of the status quo.  
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During the House of Commons debate on voting systems, which took place on 5 
November 1998, Labour MPs also expressed their criticism of the Jenkins report. 
Gerald Kaufman, for instance, shared his reservations in relation to the effect a possible 
referendum would have on the Labour party. He made a link between the EU 
referendum of 1975 and the possibility of an AV referendum and accused Lord Jenkins 
for trying to split the Labour party:  
The Financial Times reported today that my right hon. Friend the Prime 
Minister will allow Cabinet Ministers to take either side of the argument in 
a referendum campaign. We had that in 1975 and the direct result was the 
split that developed in the party right through to 1980; it was Lord Jenkins 
who split the Labour party in 1980. In 1980, Lord Jenkins nearly inflicted a 
terminal split on my party and he is now trying to do that in another way.44 
Here, Kaufman reverses the proposition that referendums are mechanisms that 
parties use in order to prevent controversial issues from dividing the party as a whole by 
delegating the final decisions on those issues to the people.  
In the same debate, Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, provided a guarded 
reaction to the Jenkins Report. He suggested that electoral reform should be seen as 
one component in the government’s overall constitutional reform agenda and that the 
regional and European Parliament election experiences need to be examined in order to 
come up with a healthy recommendation for the Commons: 
The second reason for not jumping to an instant conclusion on the 
Jenkins report is that the recommendations need to be seen in the context 
of the Government's wider, far-reaching programme of constitutional 
reform. We need to see how the new election systems settle down in 
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‘Voting Systems’ HC Deb 05 November 1998 vol 318 cc1032-113. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1998/nov/05/voting-systems 
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Scotland, Wales, London and the European Parliament. It is particularly 
important that we look at the commission's proposals alongside reforms to 
the House of Lords, which will follow the removal of the right of hereditary 
peers to sit and vote in the other place. It would not be wise to embark on 
reform to the House of Commons electoral system until we are more 
certain of the changes that will take place in the other place.45 
Straw emphasized the necessity to evaluate the experience in regional 
assemblies and the system used to elect MEPs as more proportional systems 
had been used for those elections.46  
At Westminster, Labour remained divided over reform but the issue was 
largely overshadowed by both domestic issues and the Iraq War of 2003 and the 
changed security climate. The lack of action by Labour presumably contributed to 
Nick Clegg’s unwillingness to participate in a rainbow coalition with Labour and 
the smaller and regional parties after the 2010 general election. Despite the 
deterioration in relations with the Liberal Democrats, the 2001 Labour manifesto 
kept open the possibility of reform.47 It stated: 
The government has introduced major innovations in the electoral systems used 
in the UK – for the devolved administrations, the European Parliament, and the 
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‘Voting Systems’ HC Deb 05 November 1998 vol. 318 cc1032-113. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1998/nov/05/voting-systems 
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 As a result of Straw’s commitment, the Ministry of Justice published Review of Voting Systems: 
the experience of new voting systems in the UK since 1997 in 2008, when Straw was the 
Secretary of State. The report, while acknowledging some of the benefits of PR, did not sponsor 
or promote a change of the existing system. ‘The Governance of Britain – Review of Voting 
Systems: the experience of new voting systems in the United Kingdom since 1997’ Cm7304, 
Ministry of Justice, January 2008. 
47
 In 1999, Paddy Ashdown was replaced by Charles Kennedy as the leader of the Liberal Democrats. 
Change in leadership was an important factor in the change in relations between the Liberal Democrats 
and the Labour party. In a Guardian interview (21 January 2002), Kennedy expressed the intention to 
replace the ‘project’ of co-operation between the two parties with ‘a policy of equidistance’ (Russell and 
Fieldhouse, 2005, p.196). History section of the Liberal Democrats’ official website states that “from the 
outset Ashdown’s successor, Charles Kennedy, was less inclined to work with Labour, focusing instead 
on replacing the Conservatives as the principal party of opposition.”  http://www.libdems.org.uk/history 
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London Assembly. The Independent Commission on the Voting System made 
proposals for electoral reform at Westminster. We will review the experience of 
the new systems and the Jenkins report to assess whether changes might be 
made to the electoral system for the House of Commons. A referendum remains 
the right way to agree any change for Westminster (Labour, 2001, p.35). 
According to Paddy Ashdown, the actual unwillingness of the Labour leadership 
to proceed with electoral reform damaged Labour’s relations with the Liberal Democrats 
(Ashdown, 2000). In Scotland, however, the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition at 
Holyrood adopted the Single Transferrable Vote (STV) system in elections to local 
authorities from 2004. 
The 2005 Labour manifesto devoted a paragraph to electoral reform, albeit a 
shorter one: 
Labour remains committed to reviewing the experience of the new electoral 
systems – introduced for the devolved administrations, the European Parliament 
and the London Assembly. A referendum remains the right way to agree any 
change for Westminster (Labour, 2005, p.110). 
This commitment was later realized with the preparation of the abovementioned 
Ministry of Justice report sponsored by Jack Straw. At this point, it is imperative to recall 
Shugart’s theory on how electoral reform might (re)appear on the agenda: 
...the appearance on the public agenda of serious consideration of 
alternative electoral systems tends to follow systematic patterns of 
inherent conditions (the tendency of FPTP systems to generate 
normatively unacceptable outcomes) and contingent factors based on 
both a disadvantaged party’s outcome-oriented interest in reform and the 
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establishment of a public-opinion context in which the very act of 
promoting (or being seen to block) reform has electoral consequences 
(Shugart, 2008, p. 55). 
Gordon Brown’s statements in the run up to the General Election of 2010 provide 
an example confirming with this theory. In his speech at the 2009 annual Labour 
conference, Brown said that:  
There is now a stronger case than ever that MPs should be elected with 
the support of more than half their voters – as they would be under the 
Alternative Voting system. And so I can announce today that in Labour’s 
next manifesto there will be a commitment for a referendum to be held 
early in the next Parliament it will be for the people to decide whether they 
want to move to the AV (Brown, 2009). 
On 2 February 2010, shortly before the general election, Brown 
recommitted Labour to hold a referendum on AV in the subsequent Parliament in 
an article published in the Guardian. One of his main justifications was that it 
would be necessary to give the people a chance to reform politics in the wake of 
the expenses scandal. He stated:  
I believe we can now build a progressive consensus in favour of change, so we 
will bring forward legislation to hold a referendum on moving to the AV system, 
which should be held before the end of October 2011. We must act now. I am 
determined to do everything I can to take on and persuade those who want to 
deny the people the chance to decide at a referendum, and I will build support 
across the Commons, the Lords and the country. This is about giving the people 
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a choice, and it can unite those who believe in electoral reform with those who 
want to maintain a strong constituency link.48  
In the Guardian article, Brown went well beyond the electoral reform 
offering to consult more widely on whether there should be a written 
constitution:49 
I want us to address the question of a written constitution – an issue on 
which I am inviting all parties to work together in a spirit of partnership and 
patriotism. If we are to decide to have a written constitution, it would be 
fitting to complete it in time for the 800th anniversary of the signing of 
Magna Carta in Runnymede in 1215.50 
As the incumbent prime minister, Brown was in a position to structure the 
national debate on the topic. Yet, the contents of the 2009 conference speech and the 
timing of the Guardian article – just three months before the election – suggest that 
Brown was mainly motivated by naked partisan considerations. His choice of AV 
appears, to a large extent, path dependent. The Jenkins proposals were picked off the 
shelf, shorn of the plus element. While Brown seemed to have made a principled 
argument for adopting AV, the 2009 poll conducted by YouGov for Electoral Reform 
Society implied that vote maximization considerations may have also been important 
from his perspective, motivating him to behave in an ‘act-contingent’ manner.51  
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 “Towards a new politics”, Speech by the Prime Minister to the IPPR (2 February 2010). 
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 It is tempting to characterize the publication of the Draft Cabinet Manual before the end of Brown’s term 
as, perhaps, an exercise attempt towards a codified constitution. The Cabinet Manual can also be seen 
as a tool for Brown to prepare the country and the party for the possibility of a hung parliament. It may, on 
the other hand, be seen as an attempt for Gordon Brown to extend the influence of his rule beyond the 
approaching end of his turn as the Prime Minister. This is a side issue to this thesis and separate 
research needs to be done on the topic. 
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 “Towards a new politics”, Speech by the Prime Minister to the IPPR (2 February 2010). 
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 The survey measured the likelihood of voters to vote Labour in the 2010 election if Labour promised to 
bring about voting reform. It suggested that Labour would gain votes from Lib Dems if Labour initiated 
reform of the electoral system. It is logical to assume that the findings from the survey were used by the 
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Brown’s move did not prompt a positive reaction. Commentators on the left 
criticised Brown for not proposing a genuinely proportional alternative. Peter Tatchell, a 
prominent LGBT rights activist and Green Party member, said, ‘if Labour is sincere 
about a fair voting system it would hold a referendum on Jenkins’ recommendations for 
Alternative Vote Plus’ (Tatchell, 2009). Commentators on the right criticised Brown’s 
commitment as a cynical ploy (Davis, 2010) By the time of the 2009 conference, and 
certainly by the spring of 2010, Brown was well aware that the forthcoming election 
might well result in a hung parliament. In this scenario, the prospect of electoral reform 
became a major negotiation tool between the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats. 
The hung parliament created a ‘policy window’ in which Liberal Democrats and 
advocates of electoral reform found the opportunity to make their point to the wider 
public (Kingdon, 1984). 
Following Labour’s 1997 election victory, British politics had been accompanied 
with a ‘perceived lack of choice’ (Allen, 2006). Like Labour leaders before him, Tony 
Blair did not want to sacrifice the electoral system that had given him a strong mandate 
(Naughtie, 2001). The Jenkins Report, which advocated ‘AV-plus’ was effectively put 
aside although Labour promised to monitor the performance of new electoral systems in 
the devolved institutions before recommending changes for elections to Westminster 
(Labour, 2001).52 The party’s interest in reform did not increase much after the victory of 
2005, when its 35 per cent share of the vote gave it 55 per cent of seats in the House of 
Commons. This might have been taken as an indication that it was dependent on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Electoral Reform Society to demonstrate to Labour party and its supporters the electoral benefits of a 
referendum promise on voting system reform. Guardian’s cover of this survey: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/sep/06/electoral-reform-labour-general-election 
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 ‘The government has introduced major innovations in the electoral systems used in the UK – for the 
devolved administrations, the European Parliament, and the London Assembly. The Independent 
Commission on the Voting System made proposals for electoral reform at Westminster. We will review 
the experience of the new systems and the Jenkins report to assess whether changes might be made to 
the electoral system for the House of Commons. A referendum remains the right way to agree any 
change for Westminster’, (Labour, 2001. p. 35). 
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‘national lottery’ of the first-past-the-post electoral system (Weir and Beetham, 1999). 
Few in Labour expressed much concern. Governing parties understandably favour the 
existing electoral arrangements (Pilet and Bol, 2011). 
The issue came back on the Labour party’s agenda towards the end of Gordon 
Brown’s leadership, as the electoral tide turned against Labour in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2008 (Allen and Bartle, 2011). Brown repeated his electoral reform 
referendum bid in an article in the Guardian in early 2010, though he was careful not to 
personally endorse change.53 This policy was contained in the 2010 Labour manifesto. 
Although Brown’s justifications for his proposals centred on the need to restore faith in 
the system after the MPs expenses scandal by subjecting the electoral system to public 
approval, his attempts represented a move to attract Liberal Democrat voters to vote 
strategically for Labour candidates where possible and to induce the Liberal Democrats 
to join a coalition in the event of a hung parliament. Having been let down by Labour in 
the past, the Liberal Democrats expressed little belief in the substance of these 
proposals. The issue resurfaced in the first prime ministerial debate when Brown 
suggested reforming the electoral system so that MPs would be elected with more than 
50 per cent of the votes.54 While the suggestion was welcomed by Clegg, his response 
suggested mistrust. The promise of a referendum on AV was eventually included in the 
coalition agreement simply because it was the most that the Conservatives were 
prepared to offer and the least the Liberal Democrats were prepared to accept (Allen 
and Bartle, 2011).  
The move by Brown followed a long tradition of using electoral reform as a 
means of promoting a dialogue and possibly ‘progressive coalition’ between the Labour 
party and Liberal Democrats (Marquand, 1999). The history of this dialogue has drawn 






the attention of scholars. Bartle argued that the word ‘co-operation’ had negative 
connotations for many Labour members as the word is associated with MacDonald’s 
‘alleged ‘betrayals’ in 1931’ and with the ‘gang of four’ in 1981 (2001, p.231).  Bartle 
also suggested that the renewed sentiment between the two parties with Blair’s 
leadership could be seen as an indication that the parties would continue to co-operate 
in the following years. Bartle predicted that ‘Blair – or possibly a successor – may find 
that proportional representation for Westminster is the price of coalition’ (2001, p.240).  
Bartle’s prediction turned out to be wrong. A proportional system was never 
offered by Labour as it was Labour which actually determined the terms of the 
subsequent referendum. Marquand’s hopes that Labour’s victory in 1997 would 
represent ‘a much-needed marriage between social liberalism and social democracy, 
between the Labour and Liberal traditions’ (Marquand, 1999, ix) did not materialize. 
As already demonstrated, there is positive association between the 
frequency of mentions of ‘electoral reform’ in the Hansard record of 
Parliamentary debate and the level of disproportionality in general elections from 
the end of WWI until Blair’s third election win (1918-2005). During the post-WWII 
period, the issue re-emerged following the two 1974 elections, which witnessed 
the rise of the old Liberal Party and the first hung parliament in the post-war 
period. The 19.3 per cent of the national vote that the Liberals won in February 
1974 gave the party just 14 Westminster seats, while their 18.3 per cent share 
translated into only 13 seats in the subsequent October 1974 election; an 
election that produced a tiny Labour majority that disappeared after by-election 
losses in 1976.55  The low seats to vote ratio for the Liberals in these two general 




elections stimulated academic interest in electoral reform (Finer, 1975; Bogdanor, 
1981; Norton, 1982), but appeared to find little echo at the mass level.  
2.7.2. The Liberal Party, Alliance, Liberal Democrats and electoral reform 
The previous section on Labour inevitably covered the Liberal Democrats within the 
context of cross-party negotiations around the issue. It did not, however, cover all 
aspects of the Liberal stance on electoral reform. This section touches briefly on the 
Alliance and the Liberal Party.  
The Liberal Democrats were created in 1988 as a result of a merger between the 
Liberal party and the Social Democratic party (SDP) (Crewe and King, 1995). The 
Liberal party has been committed to electoral reform since the early twentieth century 
when it was overtaken by the Labour party in terms of vote share (MacIver, 1996). In 
accordance with the party’s general commitment to dispersing power and pluralism, the 
Liberal Democrats have advocated STV (MacIver, 1996). STV is often categorized 
under the list of PR systems, but it does not by default produce proportional results. 
Despite that, the system has the potential to produce highly proportional results 
especially when parties and voters manage to act strategically under its rules (Farrell 
and Katz, 2014). 
The SDP, which was formed in 1981 as a result of breakaway by moderates on 
the right of the Labour party, established an electoral alliance with the Liberal party 
immediately after its formation. The two parties formed the SDP-Liberal ‘Alliance’ that 
fought the 1983 and 1987 general elections. Although the Alliance obtained 26 and 23 
per cent of the vote in those elections, they were not successful in winning many seats 
because their votes were not geographically concentrated enough to translate into the 
same percentage of seats in the Commons (Crewe and King, 1995).  
61 
In November 1981, The Liberal/SDP Alliance Commission on Constitutional 
Reform had been established by the two parties. In July of the following year, the 
Alliance Commission published its first report on electoral reform.56 The report 
recommended a system called ‘Community Proportional Representation’ which would 
entail preferential voting (STV) in ‘natural communities’. In this system, MPs would be 
selected in boroughs and shires in a proportional manner. Each constituency would 
correspond to a community and the constituencies’ member size would correspond to 
the size of the natural communities. In calculating constituency sizes, local factors 
would be taken into consideration. It was proposed that the system to be introduced 
through the Electoral Reform Bill would determine the method of creating the new 
constituencies. The Commission concluded its report by emphasizing the importance of 
electoral reform for achieving economic welfare and social progress.57 The Report also 
stated that the Commission has decided to eliminate the Alternative Vote system from 
further consideration on the basis that AV would not solve the problem of proportionality 
at the national level.  
Seventeen years after the formation of the Liberal/SDP Alliance Commission on 
Electoral Reform, another joint commission, which would potentially have a greater 
impact, was formed. Robert Maclennan, Michael Steed and Anthony Lester from the 
Liberal Democrats became members of the Joint (Labour - Liberal Democrats) 
Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform (1997).  As mentioned earlier in the 
section, the electoral reform section of the Committee’s report paved the way towards 
the inclusion in the Labour manifesto 1997 the commitment to set up what later became 
known as the Jenkins Commission.  
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 Electoral Reform: First report of the Joint Liberal/SDP Alliance Commission on Constitutional Reform, 
July 1982. 
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 p.18, paragraph 55. The method of equating electoral reform with economic welfare has also been a 
theme utilized by the Yes campaign during the referendum campaign. 
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2.7.3. The Conservative party and electoral reform 
The Conservative party has long supported FPTP. The party, until 1997 at least, had 
some claim to be historically the most successful electoral party in the western world. 
Writing in 1994, Seldon and Ball argued that: 
The Conservative party has dominated British politics to such an extent that 
during the twentieth century that it is likely to become known as the 'Conservative 
century'. Either standing alone or as the most powerful element in a coalition, the 
party will have held power for seventy of the hundred years since 1895. For 
much of the remaining thirty their opponents had only a fragile grip upon office - 
the main anti-Conservative party has secured a significant majority in only three 
parliaments: the Liberals in 1906-10, Labour 1945-50 and 1966-70. By contrast it 
has been rare for Conservative ministries to lack a working majority in the House 
of Commons (Seldon and Ball, 1994, p.1). 
 The Conservative party was unlikely to advocate reforming a system that had 
been associated with such success and electoral hegemony. When Conservatives 
claimed that the system produced strong government, they, in effect, meant that it 
produced strong Conservative government. The logic behind Churchill’s famous 1931 
quote that, under AV, elections would be decided by the ‘most worthless votes given for 
the most worthless candidates’ was echoed eighty years later in David Cameron’s 
campaign rhetoric by means of the argument that some votes would have more worth 
than others under AV.58 Cameron claimed the Alternative Vote contradicted the one 
voter one vote principle because some people’s votes would be ‘counted’ more than 
once. Conversely, Alternative Vote can also be seen as a system that strengthens the 
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one voter one vote principle as the number of ‘wasted’ votes would diminish with 
second, third, etc. preferences of the voters being taken into consideration. The 
minimisation of ‘wasted votes’ at the constituency level does not necessarily ensure 
proportionality at the national level.  
There is a distinctive conservative philosophical argument for not reforming the 
electoral system. FPTP was seen by some to be an important part of the British political 
tradition (Heywood, 2008). Conservatives have an attachment to historic institutions 
such as constituencies (Davis, 2010). Despite these philosophical reservations, some 
conservatives have advocated electoral reform when they have been out of office and 
faced with an apparently radical Labour party. In the mid-1970s for example, Lord 
Hailsham advocated electoral reform in order to prevent a Labour government carrying 
out radical reforms on the basis of a minority of the vote. During his appearance on BBC 
One on 14 October 1976 in a Dimbleby lecture, Lord Hailsham publicly characterized 
the UK as on course towards an ‘elective dictatorship’ and proposed a written 
constitution for the country which would bring about a system of checks and balances 
(Lord Hailsham, 1976). A group called Conservative Action for Electoral Reform (CAER) 
had already been formed in 1974 with support from nearly a hundred Conservative 
MP’s (Margetts, 2003).59 
The Conservative party’s contribution to the House of Commons debate on 
Voting Systems, which was held on 5 November 1998, following the publication of the 
Jenkins Report, exemplifies the justifications for their objections to the Report. Liam Fox 
expressed his doubts regarding the independence of the Jenkins Commission:  
We must take exception at the outset to the title of the debate, which 
refers to the report of an ‘independent’ commission. It could not have 
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 CAER’s official website claims that according to public opinion polls held in 1974, 70% of Conservative 
voters supported electoral reform at that time. CAER website: http://www.conservativeelectoralreform.org/ 
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been less independent. It was a rigged commission—a sham process—
which might as well have begun with its conclusions and worked 
backwards towards its remit. That is effectively what it did. It was a plan 
for an arranged marriage between a minority party and a section of the 
governing party—a relationship in which neither side knows the outcome. 
What we can say is that the matchmaker was a self-confessed political 
colossus who was uniquely placed to judge the relationship between the 
two, having played a pivotal role in the near destruction of both. We saw 
today a bravura performance by the Home Secretary—a kicking into the 
long grass of Olympic standard, on which we congratulate him.60 
Fox also challenged the top-up component of Jenkins’s proposed system by 
claiming that it would weaken the link between the constituency and the MPs by giving 
more power to ‘party bosses’. Later on in the debate, Eleanor Laing MP used the New 
Zealand example to demonstrate that an AV top-up system for electing the members of 
the House of Commons would be both confusing and result in creating two classes of 
MPs.61 On 4 November 1998, during the Prime Minister’s Questions, William Hague, 
the Conservative leader at the time, had characterized the Jenkins Commission’s 
proposals as a ‘dog’s breakfast’.62  
The 2010 Conservative manifesto expressed little interest in electoral reform, 
though it did promise to act to equalise the size of constituencies. It stated: 
We support the first-past-the-post system for Westminster elections because it 
gives voters the chance to kick out a government they are fed up with 
(Conservatives, 2010).  








By the time of the 2010 general election the electoral system, a seven per cent 
lead in the popular vote would have given the Labour party 357 seats, whereas the 
Conservative party actually won only 306 seats (Worcester et. al., 2011). One of the 
reasons for this is that the average Labour constituency is smaller than the average 
Conservative constituency, enabling the Labour MPs to be elected with fewer votes 
(Worcester et. al., 2011). Clearly, the Conservative position on electoral reform and AV 
was based partly on vote-maximisation strategies and not only on the wish to ‘conserve’. 
Pilet and Bol (2011) suggest that time in government is a factor that lowers 
electoral reform demand of a party and the opposite for time in opposition. This was the 
case with the Labour party. It did not seem to apply, however, to the Conservatives, 
who did not show much appetite for electoral reform even after Labour’s triumphant 
decade under Blair’s premiership.  
2.8. Electoral reform and the coalition  
The underrepresentation of Liberal Democrats’ votes was emphasized by Nick Clegg 
immediately following the 2010 general election results. Clegg hinted that any coalition 
arrangement between his party and another party would be based on a promise to ‘fix’ a 
system, that was `broken` at least in part, as a result of the underrepresentation of the 
Liberal Democrats.  
The Liberal Democrats initially entered into negotiations with the Conservatives 
since they were the party with the most number of elected candidates. They then had 
brief meetings with Labour (Wilson, 2010; Laws, 2010; Adonis, 2013).The 
Conservatives needed Liberal Democrats to make a stable coalition. Labour, on the 
other hand, needed the Liberal Democrats and the minor parties to form a coalition with 
a tiny majority. Labour’s ‘rainbow coalition’ would include parties of diverse ideological 
traditions (including the Greens, SNP, Plaid Cymru and possibly the Democratic 
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Unionist Party) and would have been vulnerable on almost every division. Andrew 
Adonis has argued that Clegg and Laws were involved in talks with Labour for tactical 
reasons: ‘It was essential to bring Labour into play to put pressure on the Tories to give 
ground on electoral reform.’(Adonis, 2013, p.153) On May 7, 2010 Chris Huhne told 
other members of the Liberal Democrats negotiation team that ‘it is absolutely vital to 
strengthen our bargaining position, by making the rainbow coalition a real possibility. If 
we can do this, we might even persuade David Cameron to accept a referendum on 
voting reform.’ (Laws, 2010, p.43) At the outset, the Liberal Democrats had 
characterized the negotiations with Labour as a tactical as opposed to a principled 
matter. 
The Liberal Democrats rejected the initial offer by the Conservative party to 
establish a committee of inquiry on electoral reform. When Gordon Brown announced 
his intention to step down as Labour leader, the prospects for a rainbow coalition 
improved. The Conservative party, in return, improved its offer on electoral reform to 
include a referendum on the Alternative Vote system (Quinn et. al., 2011). 
Yet, the Liberal Democrats were not the ‘kingmakers’ in 2010 that they had 
expected to be. They could not have formed a working majority with Labour and 
arguably had no other choice but to enter a coalition with the Conservatives. To be sure, 
Labour could have produced a coalition of minority parties that would have a technical 
majority but that would have been vulnerable on each division. In the precarious 
economic circumstance of May 2010, such a coalition would have been difficult, if not 
impossible. This made the negotiating position of the Liberal Democrats in 2010 weaker 
than they had hoped. The Liberal Democrats negotiations were able to make the 
Conservative party anxious about a possible coalition with the Labour party in return for 
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AV legislation without a referendum, and this appears to have put enough pressure on 
the Conservatives to extract a promise of a referendum on AV.  
In the morning of May 10, 2010, David Cameron stated that Conservative MPs 
‘have shown that they are prepared to put aside party interests in the national interest 
by agreeing to a referendum on electoral reform’ and passed the ball to the Liberal 
Democrats. David Cameron had the impression that the Labour party had offered the 
Liberal Democrats AV without a referendum (Robinson, 2010).  William Hague also 
made a media announcement of the Conservative offer of a referendum on AV. The 
Liberal Democrats, weary of the kind of reviews the Labour party conducted them 
during Blair’s premiership responded positively to the offer. 
In the event, STV was never a real option. The Liberal Democrats had to respond 
to AV, which was placed on the table by Gordon Brown, the prime minister. The 
Alternative Vote would potentially work to the benefit of Liberal Democrats in 
subsequent elections as it would have given them the opportunity to align themselves in 
order to obtain the second preferences of major party voters on a constituency by 
constituency basis.  Although STV has long been the favoured policy for the Liberal 
Democrats, Nick Clegg may have realized the potential for the Liberal Democrats to turn 
AV to their advantage in their campaign activities. AV ensured that the MP gained 
support of an absolute majority of the voters of the constituency. For a party which 
defies the traditional left-right distinction and rather promotes the diffusion of the liberal 
ideology into the entire political landscape, the Liberal Democrats could have taken the 
opportunities provided by AV to their advantage (MacIver, 1996).  
2.9. Conclusion 
The referendum on AV became the mutually acceptable meeting point between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats as the negotiation talks approached their end. 
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Yet neither AV nor the commitment to holding a referendum on electoral reform was in 
the manifestos of either party. The coalition adopted the policy of AV and referendum as 
this was already proposed by the outgoing government. 
The Liberal Democrats argued for a specific type of electoral reform because its 
obvious benefits for the party accordingly fell under the outcome contingency category.  
Outcome contingent motivations are serious motivations towards actual reform. Yet, 
according to Shugart, such motivations are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
initiating a process of electoral reform (Shugart, 2008).  
 AV has had a central position within Britain’s electoral reform debate for more 
than a century. Looking at the reviews prepared on electoral reform during the 
preceding Labour government, the long tradition of parliamentary debate on the topic 
and Brown’s overture to the Liberal Democrats in the period leading up to the 2010 
General Election, the UK case conforms to Shugart’s theory.  Rational considerations 
may have driven the parliamentary (legislative) activity on the topic, but the debate also 
reflected other factors and a more remote cause. Yet, the actors also had to think about 
the health of the political system as a whole.  
The next paper shifts the attention from the content of the reform proposal to the 
agreed means to reach it: the referendum. In a similar manner, it will demonstrate the 




3. REFERENDUM AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 
3.1. Introduction 
The first part of this thesis examined the narrowing down of the UK’s electoral reform 
prospect to a choice between the First Past the Post (FPTP) and the Alternative Vote 
(AV) systems. This paper now analyses the factors leading to the decision to make the 
proposed reform conditional on a nation-wide post-legislative referendum.1 
In 1993, John Smith had promised to hold a referendum on electoral reform in 
Labour’s first term. Although no referendum on AV was held under Labour, the findings 
of the reviews and the recommendations of multiple committees throughout the Labour 
party’s thirteen year-term maintained a commitment to the referendum as the proper 
method to decide on the issue. The idea of electoral reform became bundled together 
with the referendum mechanism.2 Gordon Brown’s pre-election overture to the Liberal 
Democrats fused at the end of Labour’s term in office. Brown’s statements structured 
the 2010 coalition negotiations around the Labour party’s proposals.  
This paper will demonstrate that the referendum pathway was chosen due to two 
main reasons:   
1. The British constitution has been in a state of flux and referendums are used 
more often because some public input is now thought to be essential in settling 
constitutional issues.  
                                                 
1
A deliberative democracy method such as citizens’ assembly could have instead been chosen by the 
coalition as the pathway to electoral reform. It could have also been formally acceptable if the political 
system reformed itself via a parliamentary vote only. 
2
 From a normative democratic perspective, the international trend towards more frequent use of 
referendums makes it instinctive to assume that the modification of the rules of the democratic game 
needs direct approval of the electorate. Yet, this was not at all inevitable. For instance, during Blair’s 
premiership, proportional representation was adopted for elections to the European Parliament (EP) 
without the referral of the issue back to the people. The European Parliament Elections Act 1999, which 
changed the English, Scottish and Welsh electoral systems for electing members to EP from FPTP to a 
regional closed list system, was legislated without a referendum. 
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2. The referendum exports policy controversies outside the parliament and is 
thought to prevent controversial issues ruining the harmony within the coalition.3  
The central concern of this thesis is to explore the intervening steps between the 
original causes which condition the viable reform options (strategic, historical, 
contextual, institutional factors and the effect of previous reform attempts) and the 
outcome of the reform demand.4 Manifesto texts, reports on electoral systems and the 
memoirs of politicians provide the evidence that enables us to make causal links.   
It is impossible to dispute the claim that partisan self-interest plays a big role in 
successful or failed electoral reform. Yet, the complexity of electoral reform processes 
and the multiplicity of the actors necessitate the consideration of previous commitments 
made by UK parties or governments. Furthermore, one must take into account the 
international trend towards the increasing use of referendums. In this environment, the 
limits of acceptable reform content or blocks on the routes towards reform have for the 
most part been predetermined.  
The paper begins by examining the previous referendums that have taken place 
in Britain and their place to the British constitution. Referendums are associated with 
attempts to manage intra-party dynamics and may not necessarily result from 
consideration for the quality of democratic decision-making at the mass level. In the 
case of the coalition government, the referendum exported this major policy division 
outside the coalition and gave the coalition partners an opportunity to differentiate 
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 This does not, however, necessarily mean that the outcome will be as intended. For example, Gerald 
Kaufman MP argued that referendums lead to deeper divisions within parties. Kaufman’s point of view is 
included in the previous paper. 
4
 For more on intervening conditions, see Collier et. al., 2010. 
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themselves.5 This resulted in only the second instance of an ‘agreement to disagree’ in 
British political history (Silkin, 1989). 
3.2. Referendums in the UK 
It can be argued that the referendum can supplement representative democracy 
(Saward, 1998; Budge, 1996; Budge 2001). It can also be argued, on the contrary, that 
referendums subtract from the authority of representative institutions. The place of 
referendums in the UK constitution has been debated in Westminster since at least 
1885.6 The following sub-section examines the referendums held in the UK before the 
AV referendum. 
3.2.1. Previous examples of referendums  
The referendum does not have an indispensable or established role in the UK’s 
democratic tradition.7 On occasion, political questions have been handed to public in the 
national, regional or local contexts, but exercises in direct democracy have been the 
exception rather than the norm.  
During the 38 year period between 1973 and 2011, the UK witnessed one nation-
wide and nine regional referendums.8 Four of these ten referendums were held within 
the 13 months that followed 2 May 1997, the day New Labour came into power under 
Tony Blair’s leadership. In addition to the ten referendums, local polls have been 
conducted by different local authorities throughout the twentieth century.9 The only 
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 Hazell and Yong (2012) emphasize the desire of the coalition partners to differentiate themselves from 
each other while keeping harmony within the government. 
6
 The word `referendum` appears in Hansard records for the first time in 1885. 1885 also happens to be 
the publication year of the first edition of A.V. Dicey’s seminal work (Dicey, 1885), in which he advocated 
referendums. 
7
 This claim is a logical derivative of the rarity of its usage. In Switzerland, for example, multiple national 
referendums are held yearly and referendums are commonly used in the canton and local levels. 
8
 This list leaves out the 2011 AV referendum and local referendums held in accordance with the Local 
Government Act 2000. 
9
 The Temperance (Scotland) Act of 1913 gave Scottish localities the right to hold polls on the prohibition 
or restriction of alcohol usage. This right was later revoked with the enactment of the Licensing (Scotland) 
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nation-wide referendum held prior to the 2011 AV referendum was on the continued 
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC).10 The most significant 
referendum before the EEC referendum was the ‘Border Poll’ of 1973, which asked the 
public of Northern Ireland whether they wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom or 
join with the Republic of Ireland.11  
On 1 March 1979, residents of Scotland and Wales voted in two separate post-
legislative referendums on the issue of devolution in their respective regions. Yes voters 
marginally outnumbered the no voters in Scotland (51.6% vs. 48.4%), but since the Yes 
vote fell well-short of 40% support of the eligible electorate required by the Scotland Act 
1978 the proposal did not go through. The Welsh devolution proposal was also 
emphatically rejected – by 79.7% of the Welsh voters.12 
The EEC referendum, the Irish, Scottish and Wales referendums of the 1970s 
have all been advisory. They were not preceded by an act of government that would 
automatically change statute based on results. The AV referendum on the other hand 
was a post-legislative referendum that would not have required further legislation had 
the Yes side won.  
The 18 years of Conservative rule, 1979-1997, under Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major did not witness any national or regional referendums. Margaret Thatcher 
opposed referendums in principle. This was based in part on a commitment to 
representative democracy and on the lack of any clear rules or conventions about when 
                                                                                                                                                             
Act of 1976. Similarly, the Licensing Act 1961 gave local Welsh communities the right to initiate 
referendums on whether to maintain the Sunday alcohol usage ban. The Sunday Closing (Wales) Act 
1881 had originally introduced this ban. 
10
 67.2% of the voters voted yes in that referendum, resulting in the United Kingdom to remain part of the 
EEC. 
11
 98.9% of the votes expressed a desire to continue the union with Britain. However, the legitimacy of the 
referendum was questionable due to the fact that the referendum was boycotted by a significant portion of 
the Roman Catholic population. This boycott resulted in a low turnout figure of 59%. BBC on 9 March 
1973: ‘Northern Ireland votes for union’. 
12
 For detailed figures on the Scottish and Welsh referendums: Dewdney, R (10 November 1997). Results 
of Devolution Referendums (1979 % 1997), Research Paper No97/113. Social and General Statistic 
Section, House of Commons Library. 
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referendums should be held. The British government’s ability to call referendums only 
when it suited their political purpose was why Thatcher, as herself stated, did not favour 
holding them (Thatcher, 1975).  
The referendum made a return to British politics as soon as the Labour party 
returned to power. Labour’s 1997 election manifesto had contained a clear commitment 
to hold referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales by the autumn of 1997 
(Labour, 1997). Soon after Tony Blair became the Prime Minister, these referendums 
were held as promised. The referendum held in Scotland on 11 September 1997 asked 
for voters’ consent on the devolution and tax-varying powers. Both proposals were 
accepted, leading to the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. The referendum held in 
Wales one week later led to the establishment of the Welsh Assembly. In their 1997 
manifesto, the Labour party had also promised to hold a referendum in London 
regarding the governance structure of the city. The Labour party complied with the 
promise and held a referendum on the issue on 7 May 1998. Seventy-two per cent 
voted Yes and resulted in the establishment of the Greater London Authority, made up 
of a directly elected mayor and a separately elected assembly.  
Although there was no explicit commitment to a referendum on Northern Ireland 
in Labour’s 1997 manifesto, it acknowledged the ‘general acceptance that the future of 
Northern Ireland must be determined by the consent of the people as set out in the 
Downing Street Declaration’. The Downing Street Declaration, which had been issued 
on 15 December 1993 by John Major and the Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds, 
introduced the self-determination rule on the condition that any alteration to the political 
status of Northern Ireland would be founded on the majority support of the people of 
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Northern Ireland.13 Similar to how the AV referendum was dependent on the path set by 
previous policy work on electoral reform, the Northern Irish referendum on the Good 
Friday Agreement reflected the decisions taken during the term of the previous 
government. 
 On 10 April 1998, less than a year after Tony Blair became the Prime Minister, 
the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland signed the Good 
Friday Agreement. The agreement included a proposal to amend the Republic of 
Ireland’s constitutional claim on Northern Irish territory and enabled the move towards 
devolution in Northern Ireland, followed by the decommissioning of paramilitary forces in 
the two years following the referendum, provided that the agreement would receive the 
support of majorities in both Northern Ireland and the Republic. On 22 May 1998, the 
referendum on the Good Friday Agreement was held separately in Northern Ireland and 
in the Republic of Ireland. The Agreement became a reality as 71.1% of Northern 
Ireland public voted in support of it and the Republic also accepted the proposal in a 
simultaneous referendum which produced 94.4% majority support for the Agreement.  
Fewer referendums were held in the following years. The only referendum 
between 1999 and 2011 was the North East referendum of 2004, which asked residents 
in the northeast of England whether to set up an elected assembly for the region.14 
A series of referendums on the introduction of directly elected mayors were held 
in various cities, in accordance with the Local Government Act of 2000. On 3 March 
2011, a regional referendum was held in Wales on increasing the legislative power of 
the Welsh Assembly to cover a wider range of issues. The Yes side won the 
referendum. 
                                                 
13
 The majority requirement was loosely defined in the Declaration. It was not clear from the document 
itself whether the majority referred to the majority of the electorate or simply the majority of the voters in a 
referendum. Downing Street Declaration: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm 
14
 This proposal was defeated 22.1% vs. 77.9%. For a detailed analysis of this referendum: Sanford, 2009. 
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3.2.2. Referendums and the British constitution 
Although large scale referendums (at the national or regional level) did not take place in 
the United Kingdom until the 1970s, the debate on whether referendums should be 
used in British politics has rumbled on for a long time. At the turn of the twentieth 
century referendums were discussed in Westminster in relation to resolving highly 
contentious issues such as the Irish Home Rule and Tariff Reform. These two were 
cross party issues that caused divisions within parties. In both cases the referendum 
was considered as the method of resolving them (Bogdanor, 1978, 1981).  
The year 1910 was a year of particularly intense discussions on the value of 
referendum as a method of governmental decision-making. At the Constitutional 
Conference of 1910, the Unionists proposed that referendums should be used when the 
House of Lords disagreed with the House of Commons. In particular, the Unionists 
demanded a UK-wide referendum to settle the issue of Home Rule for Ireland.15 This 
never took place.  
Many supporters of the referendum not only saw it as a constitutional tool but 
also as the essential device for settling constitutional reform demands. A convention 
appears to have been emerging in Britain since the 1970s that fundamental changes to 
the constitution are preceded by referendums. There are, however, cases where 
reforms have not been subject to public consultation in the form of a referendum. The 
Human Rights Act, Freedom of Information Act and House of Lords reforms were not 
made the subject of a referendum. Nevertheless, there appears to have been an 
emerging presumption that major constitutional reform should involve the people. It is 
informative to consider why the public were not consulted when Proportional 
Representation (PR) was adopted for the EU elections, for the Lisbon Treaty and when 
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 In contrast, the devolution referendums held in the 1970s and 1990s were all held solely in those 
regions that were directly affected by the proposals. 
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the Human Rights Act 1998. This consideration provides a better understanding of the 
relationship between referendums and constitutional changes.16 
 The House of Lords Constitution Committee’s 12th Report on Referendums 
noted that political scientists disagree about the advantages and disadvantages of 
referendums. The Report, nevertheless, supported the use of the referendum for 
electoral reform. The Report states the following sub-conclusion:   
94. Notwithstanding our view that there are significant drawbacks to the 
use of referendums, we acknowledge arguments that, if referendums 
are to be used, they are most appropriately used in relation to 
fundamental constitutional issues. We do not believe that it is possible 
to provide a precise definition of what constitutes a ‘fundamental 
constitutional issue’. Nonetheless, we would consider to fall within 
this definition any proposals: 
• To abolish the Monarchy; 
• To leave the European Union; 
• For any of the nations of the UK to secede from the Union; 
• To abolish either House of Parliament; 
• To change the electoral system for the House of Commons; 
• To adopt a written constitution; and 
• To change the UK’s system of currency. 
This is not a definitive list of fundamental constitutional issues, nor is it intended 
to be.17 
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 The definitive answer to this question can be the subject of another research project. 
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 ‘Referendums in the United Kingdom, 12
th
 Report of Session 2009-10’, p.27. Author: Select Committee 
on the Constitution, House of Lords. 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/99/99.pdf 
77 
The 1975 referendum entrenched Britain’s position within Europe. Accordingly, 
the decision not to hold referendums on EU issues like switching to PR for EP elections, 
the Lisbon Treaty and the Human Rights Act of 1998 could be justified by the belief that 
the 1975 referendum represented public consent for Britain’s commitment to Europe as 
a package. It was only in 2014, nearly forty years after the referendum, that the 
government agreed to consult the public again over the UK’s place in the European 
Union.  
The Salisbury Convention holds that the unelected chamber should not block 
legislation that was in the election manifesto of the governing party.18 AV had not been 
proposed in either of the coalition parties’ manifestos. During the negotiations, The 
Conservative party was careful to consider the future dynamics of the Parliament and 
the need to maintain harmony with the House of Lords as well as his own Commons 
backbenchers. The Political Reform section of the Coalition Agreement (section 24, p. 
26) stated that the members of the coalition parties would be whipped in both Houses to 
pass the referendum bill.19 It is, however, perfectly probable for Westminster politicians 
to defy their whips.20  
From a democratic perspective, the coalition had to deal with the problem of 
legitimacy considering that the voters of neither of the parties technically gave consent 
to the Coalition Agreement, which included the plan to hold the AV referendum. The 
Conservatives had not mentioned electoral reform in their manifesto. The 2010 
manifesto of the Liberal Democrats promised a ‘more proportional’ electoral system 
without mentioning the referendum as a pre-condition (Liberal Democrats, 2010, 
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 The Convention discourages the House of Lords from adding wrecking amendments or voting against 
manifesto bills in the second or third reading.  For a bill to be considered a manifesto bill, it would have to 





 For an account of revolts and rebellions during Blair’s premiership, see Cowley (2002). 
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p.88).21 The Labour party was the only party, among the largest three, that had 
promised a referendum on AV as a 2010 manifesto commitment, and it did not form the 
government.  
It was argued by life peer Baroness D’Souza that only policy issues common to 
the manifestos of both coalition partners should be subject to the Salisbury 
Convention.22 The coalition’s mandate on holding the referendum was strengthened as 
the agreed deal matched Labour’s manifesto promise. While this was not technically 
enough to satisfy the manifesto condition from the perspective of the House of Lords, it 
certainly gave the coalition a more powerful argument in defence of the process of 
electoral reform.  Even if the Lords had doubts on the legitimacy of holding a 
referendum on AV, Labour could hardly vote against its own commitment. This factor 
enhanced the democratic legitimacy of the decision. In the Westminster system, the 
party with a majority in the House of Commons is almost omnipotent and is very 
powerful over government policy.  
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) established 
the Electoral Commission, the UK’s governing body for election, party finance and the 
monitoring of election administrators.23 The Electoral Commission is responsible for the 
conduct of national and regional referendums in the United Kingdom. While how 
referendums should be conducted has been outlined by this Act, no article defining 
which issues should be subject to the referendum has been included in it in an explicit 
manner. Nor does PPERA provide general written criteria concerning the conditions 
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Even if AV was adopted, this would not have necessarily been in harmony with the Liberal Democrats’ 
manifesto commitments. Nick Clegg had shifted from dismissing AV as a ‘miserable little compromise 
thrashed out by the Labour party’ before the 2010 General Election  to promoting it as ‘a baby step in the 
right direction’ during the campaign period. Considering, however, that it was not, in theory, guaranteed 
that elections under AV would have been more proportional and representative, Nick Clegg’s shifting 
discourse was incompatible with the Liberal Democrats manifesto. 
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Baroness D'Souza’s blog article, 17 November, 2010: http://lordsoftheblog.net/2010/11/17/is-the-
coalition-agreement-a-manifesto/ 
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 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents  
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under which a referendum should be used to settle a specific issue. The Act sets out 
campaign expenditure limits in relation to referendums, which may influence the 
decision on whether or not to hold a referendum. 
The traditional British constitution was founded on the twin principles of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. These two principles largely co-existed 
but there are tensions between them. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is not 
necessary to consider either the rule of law or its relationship with parliamentary 
sovereignty. It is the relationship between popular sovereignty, its instrument being the 
referendum, and the parliamentary sovereignty that is at issue here. 
The standard definition of parliamentary sovereignty was provided by Dicey, the 
legal constitutional theorist: 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, 
namely that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right 
to make or unmake any law whatever: and, further, that no person or body is 
recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament (Dicey, 1885, p.38). 
 One difficulty in using referendums in the UK is that they are incompatible with 
the parliamentary sovereignty principle and the Burkean view of representation.24 In the 
UK, like any other representative democracy, MPs are elected through competitive 
elections.  In a general election, the winning party is given the mandate to govern based 
on the policy package as summarised in its party manifesto. Although the relationship 
between a constituent and his or her representative may continue throughout the term 
of a parliament, there is nothing to guarantee that the representative’s parliamentary 
votes will reflect the ‘public will’.  
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 Burke, contrary to the delegate view, argues for a role of the representative as the trustee of the 
constituents. 
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The principle of parliamentary sovereignty pre-dated the emergence of modern 
democracy and the extension of the franchise to the industrial working class and women. 
This principle has survived until today. In contrast with other systems, such as the US, it 
has never been suggested in the traditional British constitution that the people were 
sovereign.25 In Britain’s system of representative democracy, the citizen’s role was 
limited to choosing representatives to Parliament (the House of Commons) in free and 
fair elections (Harvey and Bather, 1975). The people’s representatives made policy and 
were then held accountable in subsequent elections. Lincoln’s conception of democracy 
as ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’ was very different to the 
traditional view of democracy in Britain.26 Democracy in the traditional British 
constitution was government ‘for the people’ but not ‘by the people’ and only distantly ‘of 
the people’.27  
The traditional British constitution did not bar referendums or exclude other forms 
of direct democracy. A referendum was thought to be merely advisory and could not 
bind the parliament (King, 2007). It was thought that the parliament would not ignore the 
will of the people expressed in a referendum because it would suffer electoral 
consequences. This provided another reason for the political elites to ignore or deflect 
demands for wider participation in referendums. Once the people had spoken, they 
would be impossible to ignore. They might advocate various kinds of practices – such 
as capital punishment – that the political elite either knew would be wrong or thought 
wicked. Like the founding fathers in the US, many members of the British elite worried 
about the mob-like tendencies of the public (King, 2012). 
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 The US Declaration of Independence begins with ‘We the people...’. 
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 The transcript of the Gettysburg address can be found at: 
http://www.nps.gov/liho/historyculture/gettysburgaddress.ht 
27
 L.S. Amery as quoted in King (2001, p.32): “Our system is one of democracy, but of democracy by 
consent and not delegation, of government of the people, for the people, with, but not by the people”.  
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 Although there was no bar on referendums under the traditional British 
constitution few politicians ever advocated their use. Those politicians that did advocate 
referendums were labelled ‘populists’ or ‘rabble rousers’. Few Conservatives advocated 
references to the people because government was thought to be best left to those who 
were educated and trained to govern.  
John Stuart Mill was one of the few people who advocated greater participation 
and thought that it would make better citizens. In On Liberty, he wrote: 
... in many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on 
the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it 
should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own 
mental education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their 
judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they 
are thus left to deal. This is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of 
jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular and local municipal 
institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary 
associations (Mill, 1859).    
Few liberals took up John Stuart Mill’s demand for wider participation by the 
people in the process of government. Even Labour, the ‘People’s Party’, did not 
advocate experiments in direct democracy. Socialism was to be developed by the party 
and managed by bureaucrats. In 1911, the Fabian Society published a pamphlet titled 
`The case against referendum` which questioned the `intrinsic worth` of the referendum 
as an instrument of democratic governance by claiming that referendums were tools 
that could be manipulated by the rich and the elite (Sharp, 1911). The pamphlet argued 
that the referendum would transfer the control from principled politicians to the interest 
of the wealthy who would be able to manipulate the opinions of the public more easily 
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than they could ‘any reasonably honest and public-spirited representative assembly’. 
These concerns are addressed in PPERA, which sets campaign donation limits.28 This 
perspective clearly prioritizes parliamentary democracy to populism. Referendums 
cannot be seen as mechanisms to improve democracy. On the contrary the referendum 
device can turn into a weapon of capital interests. `A mere count` of heads would not 
mean that the decision would be better than the one taken by a smaller group of well-
informed representatives (Sharp, 1911). 
 In the UK, elections are the primary legitimizing and checking mechanism for 
parliament. The mandate is transferred from the people (principal) to parliament (agent) 
(Harvey and Bather, 1982, p.49). In an ideal democracy, one can expect such changes 
(to the way elements of that system communicate with each other) to be made 
conditional on the endorsement of the principal (the people).  
The Fabian pamphlet dwelt on the distinction between public and popular opinion 
and made a case against referendums by suggesting that legislation often gathers 
popular support after its implementation. Based on this perspective, the opinions of the 
people are not pre-determined but are a reaction to governmental behaviour. The 
pamphlet quoted Ramsay MacDonald; who said that discovering the will of the people 
‘is the task of the statesman who knows how far expressed desire is not real desire, 
who understands how he is to speak for what is in the heart but not on the lips of the 
people, and who, without mandates, and even against mandates, does what the people 
really want.’ (Sharp, 1911, p.15)  
In 2010, the uncertainty of a hung UK parliament in the depths of the Euro debt 
crisis meant that the negotiations needed to be concluded as soon as possible for the 
‘national interest.’ The Liberal Democrat leader, Clegg, did not have enough time to 
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 Financial limits on referendum campaigns are outlined in Part 7 Chapter 2 of PPERA.  
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push for electoral reform without a referendum from either of the other two parties (Laws, 
2010. David Cameron, however, was led to believe that AV legislation without a 
referendum was offered by Gordon Brown (Wilson, 2010). David Cameron said that he 
had ‘had a conversation with Nick when [he’d] argued very vigorously that you couldn’t 
do Alternative Vote without a referendum— it would be wrong’ (Robinson, 2010).  
 Some countries lack a real culture of democratic deliberation. Democracy is often 
equated merely with the procedure of elections and referendums have often presented 
themselves as propaganda tools for populist leaders to further justify their positions and 
legitimize their power. Some MPs worried that referendums would make government 
impossible and compel ministers to implement policies made by the people (King, 2007). 
For these reasons, it is safe to say that referendums have rarely been advocated and 
those politicians that did advocate them were viewed with suspicion. 
Just like electoral reform, the 1970s witnessed the democratic case of holding 
referendums gaining momentum in some circles. The Conservative MP Philip Goodhart, 
Liberal MP Jo Grimond and Labour MP Tony Benn supported referendum for its intrinsic 
democratic value (Norton, 1982). These contributions did not cohere into a demand for 
wider reform.  
The change in the status of referendums in Britain can, in part, be explained by 
the technological advances of the century. With exposure to more varieties of media 
channels and heightened ability to reach and consume information, it can be argued 
that people are more aware of politics and are more qualified to decide on detailed 
issues (or at least they have better means to find information when they need to). Yet, 
there is little evidence that voters are better informed today. Nevertheless, the level of 
political awareness is a function of the level of democracy that exists within a specific 
political context. Evidence from the European Union and Switzerland suggests that 
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citizens become better informed politically when avenues for their political participation 
are extended (Benz and Stutzer, 2004). This finding is in accordance with J.S. Mill’s 
point on the benefits of political participation. Benz and Stutzer further suggest that 
citizens’ political knowledge is endogenous to the systems they live in. They maintain a 
positive relationship between the frequency of referendums and the general level of 
public awareness on politics. Moreover, giving the public the chance to modify the 
electoral rules may create the opportunity for ingrained learning on the political system 
itself. 
Those British politicians who provided a principled justification for a move 
towards direct forms of democracy have been a small minority. It should be noted that 
few politicians suggested that the public have a right of initiative of the kind used in the 
US or Switzerland where citizens have the power to initiate the proposals. From this 
perspective, which issues are referred to the electorate and when remains a matter 
entirely for politicians. The following section examines these in more detail and 
considers the reasons for the first national referendum on Britain’s membership of the 
Common Market in 1975. Similar considerations underpinned the decision to have a 
referendum on AV. 
Figure 1 illustrates the increasing importance of referendums by displaying the 
frequency of mentions of referendums in Hansard records. The increasing number of 
references to referendums displayed in Figure 1 appears, in part, to be the result of 
social change as the spread of education promoted increased self-belief on the part of 
younger generations that they could contribute to the government of the country (King, 
2007). It may also have been a consequence of increasing disillusionment with the 
political system and pessimism about the ability of elected representatives to either do 
the right thing or do what voters wanted them to do. And, finally, it may have also have 
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represented a response to the failures of government or political scandals such as 
Watergate, which prompted increasing cynicism about the political elites and a decline 
in deference (Allen, 2006). The MPs’ expenses scandal was used by both the Yes and 
No side in the AV referendum as a campaign strategy in 2011. The No campaign 
claimed that the move to AV would cost the taxpayer around £300 million, in order to 
convince the public that this would represent yet another example of poor management 
of public funds. The Yes campaign, in contrast, argued that the switch to AV would 
ensure greater accountability of MP’s who would need to win over an absolute majority 
of the electorate in order to get elected.  
3.2.3. Hansard search data 
Because the Parliament is supreme, the debate that has taken place within its walls 
should enable us to provide a useful characterization of the overall debate and attitudes 
towards the issue.29 Accordingly, this section will briefly illustrate the Hansard record of 
parliamentary debates in order to determine the frequency that the word ‘referendum’ 
has been mentioned in the Parliament. The analysis covers the entire publicly available 
online archive of Hansard – between 1803 and 2005.30   
 When the search suggested the use of the word more than once in the same 
member’s speech, it was counted as many times as the word appeared unless it was 
redundant. This was easy to detect in most cases as the search results are grouped 
accordingly when the searched word is used more than once in the same proximity.  
The figure illustrates the upward trend in the frequency in which referendum is 
talked about in the Houses of Parliament. No referendums were held during Thatcher’s 
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 It would be informative to consult the documentary record about the discourse of referendum within 
government. Since these documents are not available in electronic form, it is not possible to conduct an 
analysis of mentions of referendums among the executive. However, given the executive’s influence over 
Parliament there is likely to be a relationship between the two. 
30
 Though, it was not until 1885 that the word referendum began to be used in a way so that its meaning 
corresponded to a plebiscite. 
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premiership (1979-90), but the frequency of parliamentary deliberation on referendums 
was also low. The Blair years witnessed an increase in interest towards the topic. 
Figure 1. Frequency of the keyword referendum in Hansard   
 
Source: https://hansard.millbanksystems.com. 
3.2.4. Why did parties increasingly advocate referendums? 
Given that there are no written requirements regarding when a referendum should be 
held, it is necessary to consider why parties, and particularly governing parties, should 
advocate referendums. According to the Norwegian political scientist Bjorklund, a 
referendum can either act as ‘a weapon of the minority’, a ‘mediation device’ or a 
‘lightning rod’ (Bjorklund, 1982, p. 247). More specifically, he suggests that:  
...when a party or a government is divided on an important issue, it can be in 
danger of breaking up....In such a situation a party may embrace the referendum 
as a mediating device (Bjorklund, 1982, p. 248).31  
The mediation device motivation is evident in the case of the 1975 referendum 
on the Common Market. In this case, the referendum was used to unite the Labour 
party that was bitterly divided over the issue. Pro-European section of the Labour party, 
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led by Roy Jenkins, opposed the idea of holding a referendum on Britain’s membership 
of the Common Market bearing in mind that anti-Europeans would win in such a 
referendum. The anti-European section of the Labour party largely wanted a 
referendum because they believed they would win. King argues that: 
‘the decision to hold the 1975 referendum, like the decisions to hold all 
subsequent referendums in Britain, was in no way a deliberate cross-party 
decision. In this case, the decision was taken entirely by, and within, the Labour 
party as a straightforward consequence of Labour’s intra-party divisions over the 
European issue’ (King, 2007, p.283) 
The case of the 1975 referendum differs from the AV referendum in the sense 
that the call for the referendum received the support of the coalition partners –Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservatives as well as the Labour party, albeit indirectly. There 
was unspoken agreement by all the major parties that referendum would be the right 
way forward with it considering that referendum has been coupled to reform during the 
two decades preceding the decision to hold the referendum.  
The 1974 Labour manifesto had also promised a referendum on the issue of 
Europe. However, a special Labour conference voted two-to-one in favour of withdrawal, 
in defiance of the party’s national leadership and broadcasted divisions to the public. An 
‘agreement to differ’ was proposed by three members of the Wilson Cabinet – Michael 
Foot, Tony Benn and Peter Shore –  who argued that the differing views within the 
Cabinet would not make possible an executive decision on the issue.32 This allowed the 
left of the party, including Michael Foot, Peter Shore, Barbara Castle and Tony Benn, 
free to advocate British withdrawal. It also allowed the right of the party and party 
leadership, including Wilson, James Callaghan, Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins, free 
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 House of Commons Library Research Paper (04/82) 15 November 2004. Also see Silkin (1989). 
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to campaign for continued membership (King, 1975). Harold Wilson and the Labour 
cabinet seized on the device of the referendum to defuse the issue that threatened to 
tear Labour apart.33  
The result of the 1975 Common Market referendum has been used by 
successive governments as a way to settle the argument over Europe.  Roy Jenkins, 
the Home Secretary at the time, said that the Common Market referendum ‘puts the 
uncertainty behind us. It commits Britain to Europe; it commits us to playing an active, 
constructive and enthusiastic role in it.’34 Tony Benn, as mentioned above, was against 
the Common Market but was enthusiastic about holding a referendum: 
when the British people speak everyone, including members of Parliament, 
should tremble before their decision and that’s certainly the spirit with which I 
accept the result of the referendum.35 
A referendum can also be used as a ‘lightning rod’ to decouple an issue from 
electoral choice. A referendum is likely to be used in those cases where voters feel 
particularly strongly about an issue and may abandon their long-term party loyalties 
(Butler and Stokes, 1974). If a policy is made conditional on obtaining the consent of the 
electorate in a referendum, then voters can vote for a party that advocates a position 
that they disagree with in the knowledge that they can vote against the policy later. This 
way, the issue can decouple itself from the general election vote.  
The lightning rod consideration became stronger in relation to the European 
issue by the late 1990s as the emergence of the Eurosceptic United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) gave Eurosceptic voters an electoral choice. The 
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 The Norwegian Labour party’s demand to hold a referendum on the EEC in 1972, represented a similar 
attempt to hold the opposing factions of the party together (Bjorklund, 1982). 
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 BBC on 6 June 1975: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm  
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 Ibid.  
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Conservative party’s decision to advocate referendums in relation to the Treaty of Nice 
–signed in 2001- appears to have been an attempt to reduce the appeal of the Euro-
sceptic party UKIP. A similar consideration may have influenced Labour’s decision to 
promise a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Single Currency and 
the proposed European Constitution. In the event, neither of these referendums took 
place. Britain never satisfied the five economic tests for British membership of the single 
currency laid out by Gordon Brown. Thus, the government never recommended British 
membership and the issue was never put to the public (Rawnsley, 2001). This lightning 
rod was not a plausible explanation in 2011. Few people felt strongly about electoral 
reform. Even fewer felt strongly about AV. After Britain ratified the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2008, the legal attempt to compel the Labour government to hold a referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty failed.36  
The link between the party affiliation of citizens and their vote choice in the AV 
referendum will be demonstrated in section 4. Although referendums formally pass the 
decision from the political elite to the public they are often guided by ‘their’ parties. The 
BES survey data show that citizens, especially Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, 
who were united in opposing or supporting AV, appeared to follow their respective 
parties’ stances on the issue. The Yes campaign expressed considerable 
disappointment with the fact that the terms of the electoral reform debate were 
determined by the party politicians according to partisan considerations rather than 
democratic principles (Interviewee A, 2013). 
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 Wheeler v. Office of the Prime Minister (2008): http://lexisweb.co.uk/cases/2008/june/r-on-the-
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Another campaign organizer from the Yes side argued that ‘major constitutional 
change since New Labour got into power is determined through public referendum.’37 
However: 
referendums aren’t actually a particularly good way of determining the outcome 
of something as complex as electoral reform, mainly because there is a huge 
information deficit for the public and there is not a level playing field with the 
mass weight of the media which is the main information tool in these situations 
and I think that it’s a very imperfect way of getting people to understand what is 
essentially to change in the way our democracy works (Interviewee B).  
While referendums can be characterized as democratic procedures that transfer 
the decision making process from the politicians to the people, they can be used by 
politicians as another type of political tool. Morel groups governments’ motivations for 
referendum initiation into four categories (Morel, 2001, p.48). These are ‘plebiscitary 
motivations’; ‘tension resolving motivations’ that aim to resolve internal party divisions or 
divisions within a coalition government; ‘legislative motivations’ in order to pass 
legislation that is not possible to pass through normal means; and ‘de facto obligatory 
legitimation referendums’ that require people’s approval of the policy in order to 
maintain the legitimacy of the decision.  While these four categories can easily overlap 
with each other, the 1997 referendums in Scotland, Wales and the 1998 referendum on 
the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland predominantly fall into the categories of 
‘de facto obligatory legitimation’ and ‘plebiscitary motivations’. When we look at the AV 
referendum using Morel’s categories, we can group it under more than one category. 
The AV referendum included tension resolving motivations so that the policy divergence 
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 While this statement may reflect a general understanding of the function of the referendum device, it 
does not take into consideration major constitutional change like Human Rights Act, Freedom of 
Information Act and House of Lords Reform, none of which were made conditional on a referendum. 
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within the coalition would be outsourced to the public. The possible scenario of a 
parliamentary vote on electoral reform (as opposed to a vote on holding a referendum 
on the issue) facing rebellions by the Conservative backbenchers had been a constant 
source of concern for the Conservatives during the hung parliament talks (Laws, 2010; 
Wilson, 2010). David Cameron was all too well aware that many of his backbenchers 
blamed him for not winning outright in 2010 and had little love for the Liberal Democrats. 
Electoral reform legislation that bypassed a referendum would be unlikely to get enough 
Conservative support in the Commons and could not be offered in order to form the 
coalition.  
3.3. Attitudes of political parties towards the referendum method 
The attitudes of main parties towards referendums have fluctuated throughout the 
twentieth century.  This section elaborates on the place of the referendum device for 
each of the major parties.   
3.3.1. The Labour party 
The Labour party has consistently included commitment to participation in its party 
manifestos and linked the issue of electoral reform with referendums. On 15 July 1994, 
Tony Blair said in BBC Radio 4’s Today programme that he believed `a referendum is 
right so that people can decide what is the best electoral system for the country`.38 
Under Labour’s rule, post-legislative referendums preceded devolution to 
Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland Assembly/Good Friday Agreement, GLA/London 
Mayor, directly elected mayors, North East Assembly. The Labour party’s manifestos 
(1997-2010) contained commitments to consider electoral reform or hold a referendum 
on it. These can be summarized as: 
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 Blair articulated these words on  BBC Radio 4 Today on 15 July 1994: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3750847.stm 
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1997 manifesto – Commitment to a referendum on a more proportional system 
2001 manifesto – Monitor 
2005 manifesto – Monitor 
2010 manifesto – Holding a referendum on AV  
Again, we can see that when the Labour party feels electorally less safe, electoral 
reform becomes more important and the associated issue of a referendum re-emerges. 
In 1997, Blair did not know that his party would with a huge landslide and that the 
existing electoral system could be key for Labour’s continued success. In 2010, the 
electorally vulnerable Gordon Brown, went back to the same tactic of courting Liberal 
Democrats, publicly in his conference speech and in the Guardian article authored by 
him. In between 2001 and 2005, when Labour felt confident of victory, the issue of 
reform and referendum was put off the agenda.   
3.3.2. The Liberal Democrats 
According to Interviewee A, ‘Even if the Liberal Democrats had been a majority 
government, they wouldn’t be able to make this change through legislation. People 
would have challenged it.’(Interviewee  A, 2013). Although the Liberal Democrats had 
proposed STV without a referendum, they saw some virtue in obtaining popular consent 
in order to entrench the reform and introduce a broader debate. They also realised that 
neither Labour nor the Conservatives would accept any reform without a referendum 
because it threatened their electoral prospects. Like all the other parties, moreover, they 
found it increasingly difficult to argue with the proposition that ‘the people’ should have a 
say. The Lib Dems were in favour referendum on EU membership and single currency. 
The Liberal Democrats, having historically been committed to the STV system, had to 
settle with a referendum on AV. The inclusion of referendum in previous Lib Dem 
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manifestos meant that it would not have been appropriate if a referendum was not held 
on the issue.  
3.3.3. The Conservatives 
The attitudes of Conservative politicians towards the use of referendums have 
fluctuated throughout the party’s history.  
The Conservative party had proposed in 1910 the referendum to be the method 
to solve disputes between the two Houses (Bogdanor, 1978). After WWII, Winston 
Churchill suggested to hold a referendum in order to continue the war-time coalition until 
Japan officially surrendered. As stated previously, Margaret Thatcher was not keen on 
referendums – even on those issues like hanging where the public sided with her.39 
Under Cameron’s leadership, the Conservatives began to see the referendum as 
an opportunity to put issues off the table. This was the case with electoral reform. The 
Conservatives could be seen to have used the power of the referendum device to kill 
the debate on electoral reform. Similarly Interviewee A argued that ‘a referendum, is 
kind of a way to kill something as well.’(Interviewee A, 2013).  
The Conservative party’s 2010 manifesto included a section under the heading 
‘Restore democratic control’ on the use of referendums in relation to the transfer of 
power to the EU. A ‘referendum lock’ would serve as a safeguard against the approval 
of the British people over further transfer of powers from the UK to the EU. 
Referendums arguably advantage the status quo (Butler and Ranney, 1978).  As 
a party that is resistant to change, the Conservatives believe that referendums can be 
used to maintain the status-quo. The AV proposal presented itself to the Conservatives 
as something they can easily defeat through a referendum and settle the issue which 
would in turn enhance the unity of the coalition. AV was a system Conservatives could 




defeat by reiterating arguments from the past. David Cameron’s campaign speeches 
slightly resembled, Winston Churchill’s depiction of the Alternative Vote as a worthless 
system.  
Guy Lodge from the IPPR suggested that: 
..it was accepted on the part of political parties that referendum was a quite 
important precondition for certain constitutional change...constitutional change 
where parties are divided...the sort of the key party in all of this the Labour party 
and they’ve been heavily divided over the issue of electoral reform forever 
(Lodge, 2013).  
Matthew Elliott, the head of the No campaign said: 
They [the Conservatives] certainly wouldn’t have gone for a parliamentary vote 
on AV because they would fear that basically Labour and the Lib Dems and an 
assortment of small parties would cling together to vote in favour of it. Or indeed 
amend that bill so that it basically became a parliamentary vote on proportional 
representation. So they wanted to keep it as tight as possible. And by sort of 
saying, okey we’ll give you a referendum on AV, that is actually matching 
Labour’s pledge on that issue (Elliott, 2013). 
Denver and Hands (1997) and Whiteley et. al. (1994) argue for the incumbency’s 
advantage in winning newer elections. The Conservative party agreed to a referendum 
in the belief that they would be able to defeat AV. And if they were wrong, it was by no 
means certain that they would have been disadvantaged by the new system.   
3.4. The 2010 coalition negotiations and the referendum      
Bogdanor characterizes the place of referendum in Britain as a safeguard that could be 
introduced as an added layer of security if need arises (Bogdanor, 1978). The 
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referendum in this case can be seen as part of a check and balance system for cases in 
which the Parliament is unable to act or decide on an issue. Referendums provide as an 
added layer of check on the parliament, especially when it is altering the constitution. 
The UK constitution does not say anything about how the constitution should be 
amended. Referendums can, therefore, be seen as a safeguard of the constitution.  
The Government, in defence of the Coalition Agreement, justified the introduction 
of the bill based on the ‘importance to give people the chance to choose’.40 The 
coupling of the AV referendum with the equalization of constituency populations under 
the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 was a tactical move that 
appealed to Conservative critics of AV in the House of Commons and strengthened the 
government’s position when the bill faced scrutiny in the House of Lords. The bill has 
been criticized by Labour MP’s who argued that it fitted well with the ‘ragbag character’ 
of the coalition. Labour’s negative reaction to the bill was expected as the boundaries 
had traditionally favoured the Labour party (Johnston et. al. 2009; Worcester et. al., 
2011). 
The voting reform bill enacted by the coalition, as opposed to Brown’s proposed 
bill, was a package bill. The Alternative Vote referendum was coupled with a reduction 
of the constituency boundaries in a single bill. This gave Labour sufficient warrant to 
vote against it in the House of Commons. The Lords, however, did not vote against the 
bill. The modification of constituency boundaries was in the Conservative manifesto. 
The Liberal Democrat manifesto also included a statement about reducing the number 
of MPs by 150 (though the Constituencies and the Voting system bill would only reduce 
the number of MP’s by 50). Therefore, an argument could be made to defend the bill in 
                                                 
40
 Government response to the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s Report on the Parliamentary 
Voting System and Constituencies Bill.  Cm8016. February 2011. 
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the Lords by means of the Salisbury Convention. The House of Lords delayed the bill 
during the committee stage.  
3.5. Conclusion 
This paper investigated why electoral reform became ‘bundled together’ with the 
referendum pathway. Referendums have moved to centre-stage in British politics. The 
question ‘why hold a referendum on X’ has increasingly been replaced by the question 
of ‘why not hold a referendum on X’? (King, 2007). The coalition government justified 
holding a referendum by accepting that the electoral reform is a constitutional issue 
which requires a referendum. On the eve of the 2009-2010 MP’s expenses scandal, the 
referendum was seen as a way to bring public back into politics and build up public trust 
of the political process. It was not only about changing the electoral system but about 
earning the public’s trust. In this way, however, the referendum turned into a second 
order election.  
The paradox is that while tools of direct democracy like the referendum may be 
good mechanisms to promote the inclusion of the public in important decisions, when 
looked at it in another way it signals to that the existing political class is so out of touch 
with public preferences that they actually need a referendum to find out what their 
preferences are.  
In a parliamentary democracy, such as the UK’s, the electorate transfers the right 
to legislate to the representatives. The referendum is a mechanism that may risk 
pushing a country towards a populist system, something which is somehow foreign to 
Britain’s liberal system which values individualism and has safeguards against the 
tyranny of the majority. 
One can argue that referendum is seen as a natural solution for political parties 
to solve controversial issues for two reasons: 1) to get rid of the responsibility of making 
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a decision on highly controversial issues. 2) by exporting the decision-making outside of 
the parliament, the parties can keep factions united. This logic was evident in David 
Cameron’s acceptance of the Liberal Democrat demands to hold a referendum on AV. 
Since both parties were free to campaign on either side in relation to AV, this enabled 
the parties to maintain their positions on AV while keeping the coalition together.  
The puzzle has been the reasons why the Conservatives agreed to a referendum 
on AV. It was a compromise the Conservatives made in return for Liberal Democrat 
support of the constituency boundaries review. The Conservatives thought that they 
could defeat the proposal in a referendum. Finally, they might also have reasoned that if 
they lost the referendum, it would not be too bad for them. AV was not, after all, very 
different from FPTP. Refusing a referendum on AV would have opened up the 
possibility for the Lib-Lab coalition. The referendum on AV was a small price to pay. 
AV was the alternative given to the people based on different reasons by 
different parties. The same was true with the referendum. This was accepted by the 
Conservatives for practical reasons. It was accepted by the Liberal Democrats because 
it fitted with their ‘principles.’ Nick Clegg wanted to extend the negotiations in order to 
secure a better deal from the Conservatives, electoral reform without a referendum. 
Holding a referendum on AV was crucial to legitimize the policy attempt. The 
referendum was also a good opportunity to promote the vision of public choice. AV was 
also promoted based on the justification that it would lead to more choice.  
‘Choice’ was also a key word Clegg used throughout the Yes campaign. The 
coalition’s agreement to hold the referendum gave people the chance to choose 
between the status quo and the alternative determined during the negotiations. 
However limited it was, the electorate was given the final choice. Furthermore, if AV 
was adopted it had the potential to create a multi-layered democratic environment in 
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which the voters would have the chance to support more than one candidate. The 
coupling of the choice the referendum offered and the choice AV would have offered (if 
adopted) created a harmonic tune that rang in the background in the period between the 
2010 General Election and May 2011. This tune was not, however, enough to convince 
a sufficient proportion of the British public. It is to that issue that I turn in the third paper. 
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4. THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL VOTE DECISIONS IN THE REFERENDUM 
4.1. Introduction 
This paper examines the factors influencing voting behaviour in the 2011 AV 
referendum. The British public were not directly involved in determining the choice that 
was put before them. Nevertheless, the referendum gave the final say on the matter to 
`the people’. Electoral reform processes can be characterised as either citizen- or elite-
driven. Voting behaviour in a referendum can be conceptualized to reflect either the 
public’s genuine attitudes towards the issues independent of partisan cues or 
considerations or their response to the cues given by the leaders and/or the parties they 
support.1  
The analysis in this paper aims to reveal whether individual vote decisions in the 
2011 AV Referendum were based on the issues raised by electoral reform itself or by 
partisan considerations using the best data available. By analysing the voting behaviour 
of the electorate based on British Election Study (BES) AV Referendum survey data, I 
will explore whether the referendum should be seen as a celebratory example of direct 
democracy that reflected ‘genuine’ opinions or interest on electoral reform, or as an 
extension of partisan politics and pure electioneering. These are vital questions to 
address and have wider implications about the suitability of referendums for deciding 
these issues.2 The findings suggest that, while British citizens, for the most part, voted 
in line with the positions of the leaders they trusted, arguments put forward during the 
campaign also influenced individual vote preferences and mediated the effect of 
partisanship.3 Controlling for partisanship and other variables endogenous and 
                                                 
1
 See Reif and Schmitt (1980) for the distinction between first and second order elections in the context of 
the European Union. 
2
 Instead of alternative methods of public approval such as deliberative polls or citizens’ assemblies. 
3
 Regression model 5 estimates the influence of the positions taken by the political leaders. 
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exogenous to the model, voters’ opinions with respect to a series of campaign 
arguments – for and against AV or FPTP – proved to be strong indicators of their vote.   
4.2. Popular opinion on electoral reform 
In the United Kingdom, electoral reform has been the subject of intermittent debate at 
an elite level. Whenever the issue of electoral reform has gained prominence, it has 
been driven by developments at this level. The issue has not attracted the same level of 
attention at the mass level. To be sure, there have been campaigns by organizations 
that sought to reform the political process. The Electoral Reform Society, for instance, 
has advocated proportional representation since its founding in 1884. More recently, 
Charter 88 has campaigned for electoral reform and for broader constitutional reform 
since 1988.4 These campaigns largely escaped the attention of the general public and 
attracted the attention of a relatively small group of activists. 
More recently, the MPs expenses scandal of May 2009 enhanced the visibility of 
pre-existing demands for political reform (Heath, 2011). Exactly one year after the 
scandal surfaced in the media, the disproportional result at the 2010 General Election 
stimulated some media and public interest on the issue.5 Whilst coalition negotiations 
between party leaders were underway, Take Back Parliament, a coalition of groups 
including Power2010, Unlock Democracy and the Electoral Reform Society, gathered 
over 3000 people in six simultaneous rallies across the UK to demand reform of the 
voting system. The campaigners produced pamphlets asking for ‘Fair Votes Now’ and 
                                                 
4
 Charter 88 has merged into Unlock Democracy from 2007 onwards. The original Charter 88 declaration 
called for a new constitutional settlement that would create, among others, `a fair electoral system of 
proportional representation`. 
 
Although this declaration did not result in a complete constitutional 
settlement, it has been argued that Charter 88 has had impact on the voting system reform in Britain 
(Dunleavy, 2009). ‘The Original Charter 88’ can be accessed at 
http://www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk/pages/the-original-charter-88. 
5
 The most recent hung parliament prior to 2011 was in February 1974. The Labour party, under Harold 
Wilson, served as a minority government until the follow-up election in October of the same year. 
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collected 50,000 signatures – rather fewer than the number of people who voted in the 
contemporaneous Big Brother programme.6  
For most people, most of the time, however, electoral reform has been of little 
significance. There is considerable polling evidence suggesting that electoral reform 
and the broader issues of constitutional reform are not very important to British voters. 
Ipsos MORI’s Issue Index data, for example, enable us to examine the issue priorities of 
British people over time. The Issue Index is generated by compiling the answers survey 
respondents gave to the following two questions: ‘What would you say is the most 
important issue facing Britain today?’ and ‘What do you see as other important issues 
facing Britain today?’ Responses to these questions are coded into general categories. 
Given that `Electoral Reform` is not included in this list of categories, one can presume 
mentions of electoral reform are coded either under the category ‘Scottish/Welsh 
Assembly/ Devolution/ Constitutional Reform’ or as ‘Other’. Figure 1 displays the 
average importance of issues from 1974 to 2013, revealing the unimportance of the 
issue of electoral reform to voters.7 Issues like the economy, NHS, unemployment, 
education, defence or crime – which have the most direct effect on a citizen’s life – are 
invariably rated ‘most important’. ‘Scottish Parliament/Welsh Assembly/Devolution and 
Constitutional Reform’, have averaged a mere 0.25 per cent, and this category includes 
a number of other constitutional issues, so we can infer that only a small portion of this 
is actually concerned about electoral reform. The ‘Other’ category, which may possibly 
include some responses pertaining to electoral reform, averages 4.74 per cent, but, 
                                                 
6
 http://www.power2010.org.uk/blog/entry/bristol-take-back-parliament-says-yes-to-voting-reform/  
7
 The item was asked 359 separate times between 1974 and 2013. Since the raw score made available 
by Ipsos MORI includes both ‘most important’ and ‘other important issues’, the original scores sum to 
more than 100%. This provides an even clearer indication of the relative unimportance of constitutional 
issues in general and electoral reform in particular. 
102 
again, only a tiny portion of these results will be about electoral reform. Based on this 
evidence electoral reform is off most people’s ‘political radar’.8 
The aggregation of the Ipsos-MORI survey data supports the claim that voters do 
not think about electoral reform as important to themselves or consequential for their 
fellow citizens. The issue is complex and only remotely related to the things that matter 
to themselves and their families – such as the economy and public services. A closer 
look at the responses reveals that there has been no greater interest in the issue even 
after the hung parliaments of February 1974 or 2010 or those elections that produced 
landslide majorities on the basis of minority votes in 1983, 1987, 1997 and 2001. The 
issue of electoral reform has never been anything but peripheral. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 There is evidence that responses to the ‘most important issue’ question may not reflect importance of an 
issue to the individual but their perceptions of the extent to which that issue either divides the parties, is 
prominent in the media or influences other people (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Clements and Bartle, 2009; 
Bartle and Laycock, 2012). Psychological studies suggest that while individuals are less good at 
identifying what matters to them, they have a better idea of what matters to other people (Nisbett and 
Wilson, 1977).  Perhaps for these reasons, responses to the ‘most important issue’ are a good indicator 
of what matters to the electorate as a whole (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). 
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Figure 1. Average importance of issues (1974 -2013): most important + secondary 
importance  
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4.3. Campaign Discourse and Public Opinion9  
Various people have already sought to explain what influenced votes in the 2011 AV 
referendum. According to some, the unpopularity of the Liberal Democrats as coalition 
partners was a factor that deterred some elected politicians from supporting reform 
(Seawright, 2013). Following the AV Referendum and the local elections which were 
held on the same day, the Campaigns and Communications Committee (CCC) of the 
Liberal Democrats conducted two separate reviews, one each on the local elections and 
the referendum. The review on the referendum argued that there were two main 
reasons for defeat in the referendum. Firstly, the review argued, the Labour leader Ed 
Miliband had refused to share the same platform with the Leader of the Liberal 
Democrats Nick Clegg and placed ‘local election point-scoring above unity in the Yes 
campaign’ (Liberal Democrats, 2011). The second reason, according to the review, was 
that the Conservatives united their party against reform.   
Others have pointed to differences in the quality of the two campaigns (Renwick 
and Lamb, 2013). Taking into consideration the potential aversion of the electorate 
towards pessimistic campaign messages, one might suspect that voters were put off by 
negative campaign strategies and tactics.10 The No campaign, assumed the opposite by 
emphasising the risk and uncertainty that change would bring.11 They used images 
showing a premature baby or a soldier in their campaign in order to make the argument 
that there were more vital things on which to spend the money than adopting a new 
electoral system.12 The No campaign appealed to the ‘small c’ conservatism of the 
public by emphasizing that FPTP was traditional. The Yes campaign, by contrast, was 
                                                 
9
 For a discussion of the difference between popular and public opinion, see Nisbett (1975). 
10
 The public’s negative opinion of politicians at the time of the campaign led to the low turnout figure of 
42 per cent in the referendum (Bowler and Donovan, 2013). 
11
 The head of the No Campaign said: ‘The best thing is to talk about the cost of change. So hence, 
talking about the cost of changing the electoral system. And of course, with the background of austerity 
and financial crisis what have you, the cost argument was key’ (Elliott, 2013).  
12
 See Apendix 2 for an exemplary campaign image. 
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less confident and was less likely to campaign negatively. It focussed on the 
hypothetical effect that AV might have on the behaviour of MPs. To the disappointment 
of some, it did relatively little to criticise the FPTP or make the argument for 
proportionality (Gottfried, 2013). This feature of the Yes campaign, however, can be 
attributed to the fact that AV would not take the UK closer to the ideal of proportional 
representation. Not surprisingly, many electoral reformers found it difficult to make a 
strong/convincing case for the AV system.   
LeDuc, by making a comparison between voting in referendums and general 
elections, usefully emphasizes the distinction between predispositions and the 
campaign in determining vote decisions (LeDuc, 2002). According to LeDuc, 
referendums usually concern topics that are new to the voters (if not new to the political 
elites). The learning process initiated by the campaign can be expected to have more 
weight on the result than the already existing stable predisposition variables like 
partisanship or education. The Swiss referendum experience in the last two decades of 
the twentieth century suggests that uninformed voters tend to vote for the status quo 
(Christin, et. al., 2002). According to Whiteley (et. al., 2012), this tendency was present 
in the AV referendum. Voters with higher levels of political knowledge were more likely 
to vote in support of AV compared to voters with lower levels of political knowledge 
(Whiteley, et. al., 2012). Evidence on EU referendums indicate that the general level of 
cueing is a function of the ‘informational context’ in which the referendum takes place 
and that voters with higher levels of awareness tend to rely less on partisan cues 
(Hobolt, 2005). Interviews with campaigners on both sides indicate that there was a 
general understanding that this was the case. Uninformed voters tend to stick with the 
status quo.13  
                                                 
13
 This was reflected in interviews with Guy Lodge and Glen Gottfried of IPPR, Matthew Eliot of the No 
Campaign and two anonymous interviewees. 
106 
While predispositions like party identification played a role in conditioning the 
attitudes towards the two opposing campaigns, statistical controls can help us to isolate 
the effect of the campaign. This paper examines the influence of five aspects of 
campaign discourse on the vote in the 2011 referendum: i.) partisanship,14 ii.) attitudes 
towards the key arguments on AV and FPTP, iii.) contact by the campaigns, iv.) 
evaluations of the campaigns and v.) endorsements of the party leaders.  The 
distinction between these ‘types of discourse’, of course, is sometimes difficult to 
maintain. Some arguments about the merits of AV and FPTP were, for example, made 
by party politicians. This overlap between argument and party makes it difficult to isolate 
the unique effect of both with certainty (King et. al., 1994).15 The only way of doing so, 
of course, is by conducting a properly controlled experiment (Norris et. al, 1999). In the 
absence of this evidence, the best we can do is examine the available survey evidence. 
Nevertheless, in order to give justice to the different features of the referendum 
campaign, it is necessary to include these indicators with the aim of identifying the 
unique effect of each.  
 It is reasonable to presume that the relationship between party ID and specific 
campaign arguments is unidirectional. The Issue Index evidence from Figure 1 in 
section 2 suggested that British people are more concerned with political issues that 
directly influence their livelihood: the ‘bread and butter’ issues of health, economy, 
education, immigration and security. They do not appear to think and develop rehearsed 
opinions about constitutional issues. It is unlikely, moreover, that voters will feel so 
strongly about these issues that it will lead them to think of themselves as being 
                                                 
14
The declared stance of the main British newspapers matched the declared positions of the political 
parties they had supported in the 2010 General Election, suggesting that the media had crystallised 
partisan attitudes in its coverage of the referendum (Seawright, 2013). The Financial Times, which sided 
with the Yes campaign despite supporting the Conservatives in the 2010 General Election, is, however, 
an exception to this trend. 
15
 King (et. al., 1994) emphasizes that uncertainty is an endemic feature of scientific inference. 
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‘Conservative’ or as being ‘Labour’. Opinions on issues like constitutional reform are 
likely to be caused by partisanship, but such opinions are unlikely to alter partisanship.  
4.3.1. Parties and party identification  
Information shortcuts help voters with low information levels to emulate the voting 
behaviour of well-informed voters (Lupia, 1994). There is considerable evidence that 
partisans tend to adopt the positions advocated by their parties, especially on those 
‘unimportant’ issues that do not cause partisanship (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Clarke et. 
al, 2009; Denver and Hands, 1996). Accordingly, the following sections examine the 
stances of the main political parties on the AV referendum.  
4.3.1.1. The Conservative Party 
The previous papers have established that the Conservative party was strongly 
opposed to AV. In a cross-party No to AV event in 18 April 2011, David Cameron called 
on voters to reject AV, arguing that ‘AV is obscure, unfair and expensive’.16 On 1 May 
2011, he argued:  
A No vote is the right answer for this country because our current system is 
simple, it’s well-understood, it’s fair because every vote counts the same and it’s 
effective – you can get rid of government you don’t like...why swap that for a 
system only used for Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea? It’ll be a huge 
mistake for this country.17 
 Cameron also maintained that the first-past-the-post system was traditional. For 
Conservatives, this constitutes an argument in its favour, since those institutions that 
have endured are assumed to have demonstrated their worth (Heywood, 2008). The 
                                                 
16




 ‘David Cameron on Marr and No2AV campaign’: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hN9xpMB2wI 
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Conservative party almost unanimously opposed AV and campaigned in favour of the 
FPTP system. To be sure, some Conservatives did campaign for AV.18 This group was 
small and the ‘signal’ the Conservative party gave their followers was clear. 
4.3.1.2. The Labour party 
Labour had advocated a referendum on AV in its 2010 manifesto, but had not promised 
to support AV, because the party was deeply divided on the issue. Some senior figures, 
including Ed Miliband, the newly elected leader of the party, supported the Yes 
campaign.19 In the Guardian on 16 February 2011, Miliband said: ‘The very fact of 
having to gain the majority support of the voters will increase political accountability.’20 
Ironically, although he declined to share a campaign platform with Nick Clegg, Miliband 
still attempted to revive the idea of a ‘progressive coalition’: 
AV will also force parties to admit where there is agreement between them, 
prising open our confrontational system so that similarities sometimes become as 
important as differences. It could be the beginning of a transformation in political 
debate.21  
The persuasiveness of Miliband’s message to Labour supporters must be 
doubted. He had only been leader for one year after winning a tightly fought election 
against his own brother. A small group in the party thought him illegitimate because he 
had won with the support of trade union affiliates and lost among both MPs and ordinary 
party members (Interviewee A, 2013). Many more knew little of him.  Many other senior 
                                                 
18
 John Strafford the blogger for ‘The Campaign for Conservative Democracy’ founded The Conservative 
Yes Campaign (CAER), see http://copov.blogspot.co.uk/p/archive-2011.html 
19
 Ed Miliband had won the Labour party’s 2010 leadership election under the Alternative Vote. Had the 
party leadership race been held under the First Past the Post system instead, Ed Miliband’s brother David 
Miliband would have won the leadership. David Miliband had received 37.78% of the first preference 







Labour figures such as John Prescott, John Reid22 and Margaret Beckett, campaigned 
actively for a No vote.23 Given their trade union background and seniority in the party, 
these figures might collectively be thought to better represent the ‘Labour tradition’ than 
the young new leader. These ‘mixed messages’ presumably reduced the Labour 
leader’s influence. Angry Labour identifiers, moreover, may have felt that voting ‘No’ 
was the best way of damaging the Liberal Democrats and the coalition. The significance 
of anti-Liberal Democrat feeling in AV voting preference was expressed in interviews 
with the campaigners. According to Guy Lodge of the progressive think-tank IPPR:  
The politics were toxic and stacked massively against those advocating Yes.....In 
2011, there was a real sense in the Labour party that they were not prepared to 
do anything to help the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats had betrayed 
the cause of progressive politics by [collaborating] with the Tories in an unholy 
coalition in 2010, pushing these horrific economic policies and all the rest of it. 
The sense in the Labour party was ‘if Clegg goes down on AV, the Lib Dems go 
down with him…..why should we do anything whatsoever to stop that?’ The view 
was firmly that Labour should seize this opportunity to exact revenge on the 
Liberal Democrats.......The Labour backbenchers were just consumed with anger 
about the Liberal Democrats (Lodge, 2013).  
 The mixed messages that Labour sent to its supporters made it difficult to 
predict how Labour partisans would vote in the AV referendum. While the Conservatives’ 
and, to some extent, Liberal Democrats’ vote decisions can be based on partisanship, it 
                                                 
22
 John Reid even shared the same platform with David Cameron in a No to AV campaign event held on 
18 April 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/apr/18/voting-for-av-backward-step-warns-
cameron 
23
 The Labour campaigner for AV noted that advocates of a Yes vote were looked on with suspicion by 
traditional Labour voters and members of the bureaucracy (Interviewee B, 2013). 
110 
would be reasonable to think that Labour voters were more unpredictable than the 
followers of the other two parties. 
4.3.1.3. The Liberal Democrats 
The Liberal Democrats unambiguously supported AV, although AV was not the Liberal 
Democrats’ preferred system. Indeed, the party had long advocated the Single 
Transferrable Vote (STV) for Westminster elections. Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat 
leader, had characterized AV as ‘a miserable little compromise’ during the 2010 election 
campaign – a comment that was thrown back at the Yes campaign numerous times.24 
Later he argued that the adoption of AV would be a vital win for progressive politics, in 
an attempt to reach beyond party politics and attract Labour voters.25 On 1 May 2011, 
he defended AV on Andrew Marr Show:  
 It’s not a bad thing in a democracy to get politicians to try to get a majority of 
people in their constituencies on their side and that’s of course what AV will do.26  
Clegg’s argument was half-hearted. Describing a system as ‘not a bad thing’ 
hardly constitutes a strong endorsement. Although the Liberal Democrats would have 
gained extra seats had the 2010 General Election been held under AV (Sanders et. al., 
2010), there was also some resentment about the fact that AV was not proportional and 
a fear that, if adopted, AV would kill moves towards proportional representation.27 By 
the time of the referendum, moreover, public enthusiasm for the Liberal Democrats had 
declined. The coalition compromises, such as accepting increases in undergraduate 









 This point came across in the interview conducted with Interviewee A.  
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tuition fees, led to disillusionment among some supporters.28 Even had Clegg’s 
endorsement been stronger, it is unlikely to have much impact on individuals or sway 
many voters. The post-election BES survey indicated that 14 per cent ‘thought of 
themselves’ as Liberal Democrats in June/July 2010. By the time of the AV referendum, 
this figure had fallen to 8 per cent.29 By 2011, Clegg was addressing a much smaller 
band of Liberal Democrat supporters or sympathisers.  
4.3.1.4. The minor parties 
The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) supported the Yes campaign. It was largely 
unenthusiastic about reform for elections to Westminster since the party was focussed 
on the Scottish Parliament elections. It strongly opposed holding the referendum on the 
same day as elections to the Scottish Parliament (Interviewee A, 2013). Alex Salmond 
said that ‘[t]here really hasn't been an AV campaign in Scotland because, 
understandably, Scottish politicians are wholly occupied with the Scottish election’. He 
went on: ‘We warned Nick Clegg right at the very start of this, a year ago, not to have 
them on the same day. He seemed to think it was a smart manoeuvre’.30 Clegg had 
insisted on holding the referendum on the same day as regional and council elections in 
order to enhance turnout and, as a result, boost the Yes vote. In response to the 
criticisms on the timing of the referendum, in line with their austerity goals, the 
government stated that holding separate polls on the same day would save the 
government £30 million.31 Although the turnout in the referendum naturally rose due to 
the concurrence of the elections and the referendum, this boosted the No vote instead, 
as individuals who did not like Nick Clegg were more mobilized to go to the polls to 
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 Nigel Wilmot, ‘Lib Dems are to blame if AV is rejected’, Guardian, 5 May 2011: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/05/lib-dems-av-coalition 
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 Government response to the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s Report on the Parliamentary 
Voting System and Constituencies Bill. Cm 8016. February 2011. 
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punish the Lib Dems than the small section of the electorate who supported him 
(Stevens and Banducci, 2013).   
The Welsh Nationalists, Plaid Cymru, were also unhappy about the referendum 
taking place on the same day as the elections to the Welsh Assembly. Even though the 
Party supported a Yes vote, they did not actively campaign for it, as their members were 
preoccupied with the regional elections at the time.32  The Green Party, on the other 
hand, emerged as one of the most vociferous supporters of AV. Emphasizing the 
incremental nature of political reform, the deputy leader Adrian Ramsay argued: 
A Yes vote would bring a step in the right direction and demonstrate an appetite 
for change. Greens and others who want a fair, inclusive proportional way of 
voting will then continue to campaign for further reform.33  
The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) also supported a Yes vote in 
the referendum. Its leader, Nigel Farage, said at a Yes campaign event that: 
...FPTP is seen to be by a younger generation to be completely bankrupt and 
democracy is losing the younger generation in this country....I see voting Yes as 
a very important first step [towards proportionality].34  
Farage argued that AV would enable people to vote for their first choice and 
reduce ‘tactical’ voting. He also warned supporters not to be confused by the No leaflets 
that had a design very similar to the UKIP’s leaflets for the 2009 European Parliament 
elections.35 Although this can be considered a clever move by the No campaign to grab 
the attention of UKIP sympathisers, there is not enough data to enable us to quantify 
the effect of this specific strategy on the outcome of the referendum. The negative 










coefficient in Model 1 (see Table 4) indicates that UKIP supporters overall were inclined 
to vote against the official recommendation of their party. The frequency figures are in 
accordance with this effect indicator. 
In contrast, the British National Party (BNP) opposed AV on the grounds that it 
would be even more unfair to small parties than the existing system and supported a 
proportional system that they believed would enable them to send representatives to 
Westminster.36 
4.3.2. Attitudes towards the campaign arguments  
The second type of discourse concerns the survey respondents’ evaluations of various 
arguments that have been uttered during the campaign period. The BES survey 
includes ten agree-disagree questions which ask respondents’ opinions on statements 
concerning the nature of the FPTP and AV systems.37  
The official Yes Campaign made various key arguments in favour of AV. They 
maintained that the system was fairer at the constituency level, because it guaranteed 
that the MP would be able to claim the support of a real majority (50 per cent plus one 
of the electorate).  They also claimed that this would make MPs work harder, because 
they would no longer be able to depend on gaining a plurality and would instead need to 
attract broader support. The comedian and film actor Eddie Izzard, a visible advocate 
for a Yes vote, claimed: ‘It will mean MPs will have to work harder to get your vote 
because not only do they have to talk to their core support, but also to other people to 
get them down as a second choice’.38 




 All agree-disagree questions suffer from acquiescence bias – the tendency of respondents to agree 
with any statement put to them (Schuman and Presser, 1996). This bias may reduce the validity of the 






The No campaign, on the other hand, claimed that first-past-the-post produced 
efficient and stable single party governments that could be held to account by the 
electorate. They further argued that AV would give too much power to small parties 
(particularly the Liberal Democrats) and would be too complicated. Labour party MP 
Margaret Beckett described AV as an ‘expensive and complicated’ system.39 Similarly, 
Matthew Elliott, the director of the ‘No to AV’ campaign, said, in defence of the FPTP: 
Our current system, which gives one person one vote, is easy to explain, 
understand and is fair. Even the independent Electoral Commission, who are 
overseeing this referendum, struggle to explain the Alternative Vote. The 
message for May 5 is simple: vote no to keep our simple, fair system of one 
person, one vote.40 
Matthew Elliott maintained that the No side’s most effective argument against 
reform was linked to a strategy of communicating to the voters the monetary costs of 
updating the voting system (Elliott, 2013). This was a simple argument and appealed to 
the innate conservatism of some voters. The No campaign claimed that first-past-the-
post was traditional, had served Britain well and there was no reason to change. This 
was an argument that Cameron continuously made throughout the campaign period. He 
claimed that the FPTP ‘is enshrined in our constitution and integral to our history – and 
AV flies in the face of all that because it destroys one person, one vote’.41 He also drew 
an analogy with the Olympic athlete Usain Bolt losing a running race even when he 
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crosses the line first, in order to make the case that under AV who comes first does not 
necessarily win the election.42   
 Some arguments used by the two sides in the campaign seemed more 
contentious – and presumably weaker – than others.43 The Yes Campaign’s claim that 
AV would result in a House of Commons which better reflected public opinion, for 
example, was debateable. For some people, taking into account voters’ second or third 
preferences was not their idea of democracy.44 Naturally, on the other side of this 
argument was the claim that AV would remove the possibility of electing candidates that 
a majority of the electorate opposed. Similarly, the No Campaign’s claim that AV would 
make hung parliaments and coalitions more likely can be considered questionable, 
given that the 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition was formed via the 
existing FPTP system.45  
4.3.3. Contact by the campaigns 
The third type of explanatory variable the paper looks at is simply whether the 
respondent was contacted by the Yes or No campaigns. If individuals have positive 
attitudes towards people, arguments or positions and are then being personally 
exposed to a campaign or to its message, this may have positive effect towards that 
campaign.46 Following this logic, someone who is contacted by one side or another can 
be expected to be more likely to vote for it, ceteris paribus, than someone who is not 
contacted. Several studies have stressed the effectiveness of personal appeals in 
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stimulating participation and mobilising potential voters (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 2006; 
Denver and Hands, 1996; Schier, 2000; Jemal, 2007).47 Local campaigning has a 
positive effect on electoral success (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Denver and Hands, 1992; 
Johnston and Pattie, 1995). One can expect that exposure to the simplest campaign 
message ‘Please vote Yes or No’ influenced behaviour on the day of the referendum 
and that, other things being equal, people were more likely to vote for one side or 
another simply because they were asked. 
The No Campaign thought carefully about its use of leaflets:  
Now what we did I think quite cleverly, was, of course, in a household of let’s say 
three people, you can do three address labels. And rather than sending the same 
leaflet three times to the household, we did one big mailing where the first person 
in the electoral register in the household, got our main leaflet. And in the final 
week of the campaign, we did a mailing to the second person listed in the 
household. And that was more of a sort of get out the vote leaflet (Elliott, 2013).  
The No campaign was able to make use of the free of charge mailings of 
campaign material more so than the Yes campaign. While the Yes campaign’s free 
mailings had a total of £1,459,894.07, No to AV sent free mail equivalent to 
£6,687,686.15 in postage fees.48 
 Since most of the political parties took a position on the AV referendum, it is 
necessary to examine whether contact by both the Yes and No campaigns and the 
parties had an effect. It is reasonable to distinguish between the nonpartisan campaign 
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teams and the parties for two reasons. The Yes and No campaigns were the ‘official’ 
campaigns and were supposed to be ‘above’ party. Their appeals had a different quality 
to the party appeals. The political parties, moreover, were fighting local elections on the 
same day as the AV referendum. Interviews with the Yes campaigners suggested that 
the parties were more focused on local election campaigns than the referendum. The 
Labour party and the Liberal Democrats were competing against each other in the 
elections, while at the same time, in theory, trying to campaign for a Yes vote, though 
Labour in particular, was split and not all local branches were supportive of AV. Thus, 
the local and regional elections caused both relative neglect of the referendum 
campaign by the parties and a contradiction between party competition and campaign 
coalition, especially within the Yes campaign, that had to perform the more challenging 
task of convincing the public of the necessity of a change to the system as opposed to 
guarding the status quo.  Contact by the parties is likely to have had a different effect 
compared to the effect of the ‘official’ Yes and No campaigns. 
It is necessary to say at this point that like-mindedness is not necessary for 
cueing effect to take place (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Vote choice can be based on 
cues coming from both the elites voters favour and those they disapprove (Carmines 
and Kuklinski, 1990). Voters can distinguish between the two types of cue sources 
(Kuklinski and Hurley, 1994). The analysis section will consider the possibility of 
negative campaign effects.  
4.3.4. Evaluations of the campaign  
Another factor that might have influenced voters is the conduct of the campaign itself. 
Just as some jurors may make up their minds by judging the strength of the lawyer’s 
argument rather than the facts of the case, so it is reasonable to suggest that some 
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people may have made up their mind on how to vote in the referendum on the basis of 
their evaluations of the campaigns themselves: how well each side made their case.  
Respondents to the BES surveys were asked to choose as many words from the 










One might expect that those who found the Yes Campaign, ‘strong’, 
‘ ‘informative’, ‘positive’ and ‘interesting’ are more likely to vote Yes than those who 
found it ‘weak’, ‘not informative’ , ‘negative’ and ‘boring. Conversely, those who found 
the No Campaign ‘strong’, ‘informative’, ‘positive’ and ‘interesting’ are more likely to vote 
No than those who found it ‘weak’, ‘not informative’ , ‘negative’ and ‘boring’. By 
extension, those who found everything about the Yes Campaign appealing and 
everything about the No Campaign unappealing should be the most likely to vote Yes. 
Likewise, someone who found everything about the No Campaign appealing and 
everything about the Yes Campaign unappealing should be the most likely to vote No.  
 For some respondents ‘negativity’ may have signified merit. A strongly articulated 
‘negative’ message may itself be received positively and contribute to the success of a 
campaign. The AV campaign, as expected, depicted the status quo negatively while 
focussing on the positive traits of AV. The No side made use of negative messages to 
express their disapproval of the proposed voting system, as well as focusing on the 
positive characteristics of the existing system. As mentioned in chapter 3, however, the 
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Yes side was less likely to campaign negatively in comparison to the No campaign. The 
BES data confirms that the difference between the two campaigns in terms of the 
‘magnitude’ of disseminated negative messages was reproduced in the respondents’ 
evaluations of the two campaigns. 5024 people corresponding to 23.5 per cent of 
survey respondents characterized the No campaign as ‘negative’, while 3025 people 
corresponding to 13.7 per cent of the entire sample size characterized the Yes 
campaign as ‘negative’. Although the words yes and no intrinsically carry positive and 
negative connotations respectively and may have contributed to a wider gap between 
these two sets of figures, the figures nevertheless imply that the UK public was at least 
moderately aware of the distinctions between the narratives of the two camps.  
4.3.5. Trust in the party leaders  
Since opinions on electoral reform and the AV issue were not crystallised for most 
people, it makes some sense to suggest that they followed the lead provided not just by 
the parties but also the party leaders, who are usually the most visible and recognised 
party politicians.49  
The suggestion that people act on signals from party leaders is not new. It has 
been claimed that voters in the 1975 referendum on membership of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) were influenced by the popularity of politicians on both 
‘sides’ (King, 1975). More recent studies of voting behaviour have suggested that voters 
may use their evaluations of party leaders as a ‘heuristic’, helping them to decide how to 
vote (Clarke et. al., 2004, 2009, 2013).  Accordingly, the final two models include 
controls for trust in the three party leaders. Those who trust Cameron should be less 
likely, ceteris paribus, to vote Yes. Those who trust either Clegg or Miliband should be 
more likely to vote Yes. One can, however, expect that Miliband has less effect 
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June 2010 to April 2011. The high percentage of undecided voters throughout this period also hints at this. 
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considering the mixed signals about AV coming from other Labour figures and the fact 
that he was an inexperienced leader at the time of the referendum.  
4.4. Methods 
This paper applies an ‘improved prediction’ strategy in order to estimate the apparent 
effect of various styles of discourse on the ‘typical’ or ‘average’ respondent to the BES 
survey (Miller and Shanks, 1996, Crewe and King, 1994; Bartle, 2003).50 It makes use 
of survey data specially designed and well-suited to assess the forces shaping 
individual vote decisions.  
4.4.1. Data 
The BES Alternative Vote Referendum Study is based on an online survey conducted 
by YouGov on a large and representative sample of the British population. Respondents 
were surveyed in two waves –before and after the referendum. This pre-post design 
enables us to measure changes in vote intentions during the campaign, make 
assumptions on causal order and, thus, estimate the effect of the campaign controlling 
for pre-campaign vote intentions. 
The pre-campaign wave of the survey was administered over the 30 day period 
preceding 5 May 2011, the day of the actual referendum. In each of the 30 days, a 
random sub-sample of respondents was surveyed. The average daily sub-sample size 
is 792. The total size of the pre-campaign wave is N=22,124. The post-referendum 
wave data was collected from the day after the referendum. The post-referendum wave 
had a total of N=18,556 respondents. The pre/post retention rate is, thus, 83.9 per cent. 
The study contains a large number of questions, ranging from the respondents’ 
long-term social and political characteristics, through to their evaluations of the 
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campaign and whether or not they were contacted by the Yes and/or No campaigns. 
This makes it possible to control for a number of socio-economic and other types of 
variables that may have influenced vote decisions. Such controls give us the ability to 
focus on the effect of the campaign on the referendum result in a precise manner.  
4.4.2. Causal assumptions underlying the vote models 
In order to establish the effect of discourse in an ideal research design, we would have 
to carry out a controlled experiment. We would measure vote intentions (Y) before the 
experiment, expose the subjects to campaign discourse (X), and then measure vote 
intentions again. Since every other factor would be ‘controlled’ in this experimental 
design, any change in the dependent variable can be conclusively demonstrated to be 
the result of the stimulus (X), which can be manipulated by the researcher (Norris et. al., 
1999). 
 Experiments have been conducted for the 2011 referendum (Vowles, 2013). The 
Vowles study provides evidence on the considerations that influenced voters in the 
2011 referendum based on three waves of a panel survey from a sample which is not 
closely representative of British voters.  Yet, it is not certain that such findings can be 
generalised from the laboratory to the ‘real world’. First of all,  in real campaigns some 
messages make some people more inclined to say ‘Yes’ and others to say ‘No. These 
effects presumably offset each other and the extent of that offset will depend on the net 
balance of messages. The effects uncovered in experiments are likely to be larger than 
those in the real world, where messages have a net impact. 
The approach in this paper makes use of survey data. This, by definition, cannot 
provide direct evidence about the effect of particular messages or discourse, but it can 
provide clues. If we know that party X advocated a Yes or No vote, for example, we 
might expect people who ‘think of themselves’ as X to follow the lead of their party. 
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Similarly, people’s opinions on the issues may have been influenced by their exposure 
to elite discourse (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Someone who agreed that AV was too 
difficult to understand, for example, or that it would result in permanent coalition 
government may have picked this up from the campaign debates. To be sure, they may 
also have picked up this argument from conversations with friends, neighbours and 
workmates. Yet these individuals are, in turn, may have picked up the argument from 
the political elite. The original source of the opinion is, therefore, uncertain. 
In order to examine the factors that may have influenced vote in the referendum, 
this paper imposes certain assumptions and applies statistical rather than experimental 
‘controls’ (Davis, 1985).  It is, however, useful to keep the experimental ideal in mind 
when assessing the plausibility of the inferences drawn from the models. It is also useful 
to recognise that the plausibility of the estimates depend on the plausibility of the 
underlying assumptions (Bartle, 2003). Accordingly, we must attach some uncertainty to 
estimates of causal effect (King et. al., 1994). 
 In order to estimate the impact of variables on the vote decision this paper 
assumes that there is a causal order among the explanatory (X1 …n) variables. Some 
assumptions are not problematic (Davis, 1985). It is, for example, safe to assume that 
sex (male or female) is a potential cause of both vote in the referendum and other 
potential causes of behaviour – but is not caused by referendum vote or those other 
variables. Education may be influenced by age (older people will have likely had less 
opportunity to pursue tertiary education), race (non-white people on average have 
statistically lower levels of education) and sex (in some cultures women are 
discouraged from pursuing education). It may also be influenced by other variables that 
are not measured in the BES survey – such as parental education. Similarly, education 
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causes (and is not caused by) political interest, personal income and partisanship – 
variables that might, in turn, influence referendum vote. 51 
As we turn attention to psychological characteristics, such as partisanship or 
attitudes towards issues raised by the campaigns, the situation becomes more complex. 
In studies of voting behaviour, there is a concern that reported preferences and 
evaluations might represent rationalisations of decisions taken for possibly ‘other’ 
reasons and that the causal arrows flow from the dependent to the independent 
variables. It might be supposed, for example, that someone who has voted for X (or 
reported voting for X earlier in an interview) might bring their evaluations into line with 
their behaviour and report that X is the most competent, most caring party or that it has 
the best leader.  
There have been various responses to this possibility.52 This paper follows the 
approach taken in The New American Voter, which applies ‘the funnel of causality 
heuristic’ used to analyse votes in US presidential elections (Shanks and Miller, 1990; 
Miller and Shanks, 1996). Applying controls for a large number of variables reduces the 
effects of ‘feedback’ from the vote decision (see Figure 2).  The ‘funnel of causality’ 
recognises that there are many influences on behaviour, ranging from social 
characteristics (which change slowly as a result of social changes), to long-term 
predispositions (which change slowly in response to political developments) and short-
term preferences and evaluations (which are, by definition, variable). It assumes that 
the more stable variables precede the less stable variables (Davis, 1985; Bartle, 1998, 
2003).  Having sorted the variables into the most plausible causal order, an ‘improved 
prediction approach’ is used to estimate the impact of those variables (Crewe and King, 
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 Some scholars have tried to model the ‘feedback’ from vote using non-recursive causal models 
(Jackson, 1975; Markus and Converse, 1979). 
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1994). This assesses whether knowledge of a particular variable adds to the ability to 
predict the vote of a ‘typical’ individual. 
Miller and Shanks make a whole series of assumptions that can be challenged 
(Bartels, 2002). In particular, they assume that party identification is stable and is not 
altered, either by current preferences and evaluations, or by the vote itself. On the other 
hand, it has been argued by the revisionists that party identification at the individual 
level is not stable and that it is updated continuously (Fiorina, 1981). It has been also 
suggested that party identification at the aggregate level (‘macropartisanship’) varies as 
a function of the evaluations of the incumbent president (MacKuen et. al., 1989). There 
is less concern here. Someone’s vote decision in the AV referendum, or their opinions 
on electoral reform, is unlikely to alter their enduring sense of partisanship. Few people 
are likely to have had strong attitudes towards these issues of the sort that might be 
supposed to shape enduring partisanship. The model created in this paper follows Miller 
and Shanks’ assumed casual order (Figure 2).  
Since evaluations of the Yes and No campaigns were recorded after the 
referendum result was known, there is the danger that recorded evaluations will 
represent ‘rationalisations’ of the outcome rather than the genuine evaluations that they 
held before the result became known. Someone, for example, who knew that the Yes 
campaign had lost might infer that it must have been ‘weak’, ‘not informative’, ‘negative’ 
and/or ‘boring’. This risk is reduced by controlling for pre-campaign party identification 
and pre-campaign vote intentions.53 These controls reduce the effect of rationalisations 
and produce more plausible estimates of the effect the two campaigns had on the 
‘typical’ voter. 
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Miller and Shanks type model. 
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Although this model imposes assumptions about causal order, other models may 
make different assumptions. Accordingly, the estimates from a series of other models 
are also reported so that the implications of different assumptions are uncovered. It 
should be noted that the final model does not impose any assumptions about the causal 
order and represents the ‘direct’ or ‘unmediated’ influences of variables (Shanks and 
Miller, 1990). Analysts who are uninterested in strong causal assumptions– or who 
doubt whether strong causal assumptions are useful – focus on these kinds of models. 
Reliance on such models, however, risks ‘biased’ estimates of causal impact that fail to 
capture the indirect effects of variables located earlier in the causal order. The changes 
in the causal impact can be roughly estimated by taking into consideration the changes 
in coefficients as we move from one model to the next (Table 4). 
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4.4.3. Statistical assumptions 
The statistical models developed in this paper do not attempt to model turnout – the 
decision of whether to vote or not – in the referendum.  Instead, they focus on vote 
choice in the referendum. This is a dichotomous dependent variable (scored 1 if 
someone voted Yes in the referendum and 0 if they voted No). OLS models are 
inappropriate in such cases because; (1) they can lead to problems of data admissibility 
(predicting probabilities less than 0 or greater than 1); (2) linear relationships are 
implausible; and (3) the standard errors are unreliable. The models are estimated using 
logistic regression techniques that constrain probabilities within their natural bounds 
(between 0 and 1), are inherently non-linear and produce reliable standard errors 
(Aldrich and Nelson, 1984).  
Logistic regression coefficients are slightly more difficult to interpret than OLS 
coefficients. The sign and significance of the coefficient has the same meaning as in 
OLS. However, the logistic regression model is both non-linear and non-additive and 
this makes it somewhat more difficult to estimate the effect of explanatory variables on 
the dependent variable (Liao, 1994). Where appropriate, therefore, estimates of the 
effect of variables on the probability of voting Yes for the ‘typical’ individual will be 
produced.54  
4.5. Analysis 
Before estimating the models outlined above, the distribution of the independent 
variables in the models and their association with vote in the referendum are examined. 
The analysis incorporates the interpretation of the coefficients and their signs as they 
move down the models. Probability distribution charts demonstrate the likelihood of a 
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typical individual voting Yes or No as a function of a variable of interest (e.g., campaign 
statements s/he agrees with or the campaigns the individual is contacted by). 
4.5.1. Partisanship  
The first hypotheses relate to the influence of partisanship. I assume that those people 
who generally think of themselves as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and so on, 
are likely to follow the cues provided by those parties. More specifically, Conservative 
and BNP identifiers are more likely to vote No than non-identifiers, while Liberal 
Democrat, Green, SNP, Plaid Cymru and UKIP voters are more likely to vote Yes 
compared with the same base category. Given the mixed signals produced by Labour, 
there are no clear expectations about how identifiers with that party should behave. 
 Table 1 displays recorded party identification at the time of the AV campaign. By 
March/May 2011, there were an almost equal number of Conservative and Labour 
identifiers. As previously noted, the Liberal Democrats lost a great deal of support 
during the twelve months between the general election and referendum. Thus, by May 
2011, only 20.6 per cent of electorate identified with parties that advocated a Yes vote 
(Liberal Democrats, Greens, SNP, Plaid Cyrmru and UKIP), compared with 32 per cent 
that identified with parties that advocated a No vote (Conservatives and BNP). 
Moreover, this statistic may understate the extent of the Yes campaign’s disadvantage. 
5.7 per cent of respondents ‘thought of themselves as’ UKIP and this party’s 
recommendation of a Yes vote is at odds with the assumed conservative political mind-
set of its supporters. Labour identifiers by this stage were 31 per cent of the electorate, 
but were not given clear signals by their party.55 A further 16 per cent expressed no 
partisan identity and must be presumed uninfluenced by party cues. 
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 This discussion assumes that responses to the relevant BES question do indeed measure long-term 
loyalties. There are reasons to doubt this proposition. See Bartle and Bellucci (2009). 
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 Table 1 also displays the relationship between party identification and vote in the 
AV referendum. The differences in the row percentages suggest that the parties differed 
in their ability to get their supporters to toe the party line. Fully 89 per cent of 
Conservative identifiers followed their party and voted No. Similarly, 80 per cent of 
Liberal Democrat and 83 per cent of Green identifiers lined up with their party and voted 
Yes.56 Among the Nationalist party identifiers the position was very different. A small 
majority of SNP identifiers supported AV, while the position was reversed among those 
who considered themselves to be Plaid Cymru, with a small majority voting No. Fully, 66 
per cent of BNP supporters voted No, in line with their party’s official position. Among 
UKIP identifiers, roughly two-thirds voted No in contrast with ‘their’ party’s position. This 
may reflect the assumed conservative attitudes of UKIP voters despite Farage’s 
advocacy of AV. As mentioned above, this may also be due to the success of the No 
campaign’s tactic to model the campaign fliers on the yellow and purple coloured brand 
of UKIP. 
 Labour identifiers divided roughly half and half between Yes and No. The Yes 
vote among Labour respondents, however, was higher than non-identifiers suggesting 
that they may have been more likely to vote Yes. Whether any effect is statistically 
significant is something assessed in the multivariate analyses. 
 The evidence in Table 1 can be used to gauge the aggregate impact of 
partisanship by simulating the outcome of the referendum if every party had been just 
as successful as the Conservatives in getting ‘their’ people to support the party’s policy. 
If the partisans of all the parties had lined up with their party to the same extent as the 
Conservatives and the non-identifiers’ behaviour remained unaltered, simulation 1 
suggests that the outcome of the referendum would have changed: with 56.9 per cent 
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 The lower portion of Liberal Democrats following their party may reflect the lack of enthusiasm for AV of 
the sort expressed by Clegg. 
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voting Yes and 43.1 per cent No. Moreover, simulation 2 suggests that the outcome of 
the referendum would have also changed if only Labour identifiers had voted equally 
strongly in favour of AV as the Conservative identifiers voted against. Even in this 
second scenario, Yes narrowly wins by 51.5 per cent. 
 These simulations must be treated with a degree of caution. The BES sample 
contains a higher proportion of Yes voters compared with the actual referendum results 
and it assumes a very strong partisan ‘Labour effect’.57 Nevertheless this provides an 
indication of the impact of partisanship in the AV referendum.  
4.5.2. Respondents’ attitudes towards campaign arguments  
Before examining the relationship between the discourse variables and the vote, it is 
useful to examine the marginal distribution of responses to the issues. Table 2 displays 
the responses to the ten issues examined in the models. The statement that attracted 
the most agreement (a net score of +34 points) was the proposition that first-past-the 
post made it easier for voters to know who to credit for policy success, or to blame for 
failures. This was followed by the proposition that coalitions are a good thing, which was 
strongly rejected (a net score of -17points). Yet, the proposition that AV would make 
MPs work harder also gained net support (+14 points). There was also net agreement 
for the proposition that AV would give small parties too much power (+9). All the other 
statements divided opinion with no clear leads for either ‘side’. The electorate were 
divided on whether AV was an important part of the political tradition, whether AV was 
‘fairer’ and whether it would better represent public opinion.58  
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a big political party on your side to win a referendum. You need other players as well and that comes with 
the political party. The circumstances, it was unwinnable.’(Interviewee A, 2013).  
58
 Future research could possibly examine whether opinions on each of these statements were affected 
by prior partisanship. If opinions are regressed on prior variables (including partisanship) it is possible to 
calculate the difference between the predicted score on that variable and the actual score for each 
individual and, by aggregating the differences, for the sample as a whole (Miller and Shanks, 1996; 
Bartels, 2002). 
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Overall, the pattern of responses provides evidence to the fundamental 
ambivalence of the electorate on the substantive issues (Zaller, 1992; Zaller and 
Feldman, 1992). Neither side fully won the argument. The electorate as a whole were 
ambivalent about the issue.  
Table 3 displays the relationship between responses to the opinion questions 
and vote in the referendum. The size of the association can be simply gauged by 
comparing the size of the Yes vote in the strongly agree and strongly disagree 
categories. All the differences are correctly signed. Nevertheless, the size of the 
differences (in absolute terms, ignoring the signs) varies, suggesting that the variables 
differ in their association with the vote. The largest differences relate to agreement or 
disagreement with the proposition that FPTP is an important tradition, whether AV better 
reflects public opinion and whether AV is fairer. All of these questions are associated 
with differences of around 90 points in the Yes vote.59 By contrast, variations in 
response to the proposition that AV would lead to permanent Liberal Democrat 
participation in government is associated with a 48 point difference in the Yes vote. It 
remains to be seen whether these differences are statistically significant once controls 
are added to prior variables.  
                                                 
59
 As Table 3 shows, the tradition argument scores 90 in the negative direction while the other two 
statements score positively confirming a consistent aggregate association between the corresponding 
campaigns each statement favours and the vote. In this respect, the signs are also consistent for all of the 
remaining 7 statements. 
132 
 
Table 1. Party identification and AV referendum vote, real and simulated 
 
Actual vote Simulated 
N Per cent N 
Yes No Total Yes No Simulation 1 Simulation 2 
     
Yes No Yes No 
Labour 2232 2399 4631 48.2 51.8 4135 496 4135 496 
Conservative  502 4181 4683 10.7 89.3 502 4181 502 4181 
Lib Dem 1110 273 1383 80.3 19.7 1235 148 1110 273 
SNP 267 213 480 55.6 44.4 429 51 267 213 
Plaid Cymru  32 34 66 48.5 51.5 59 7 32 34 
Green 268 54 322 83.2 16.8 288 34 268 54 
UKIP 250 610 860 29.1 70.9 768 92 250 610 
BNP 53 103 156 34.0 66.0 17 139 53 103 
Other 98 94 192 51.0 49.0 98 94 98 94 
None 867 971 1838 47.2 52.8 867 971 867 971 
Don't know 210 316 526 39.9 60.1 210 316 210 316 
          Total N 5889 9248 15137 
  
8608 6529 7792 7345 
          Total per cent 38.9 61.1 100 
  
56.9 43.1 51.5 48.5 
Simulation 1: Supporters of every party votes as strongly in the cued direction as the Conservative supporters voted against AV. 
Simulation 2: Only Labour supporters vote in favour of AV as strongly as the Conservative supporters voted against it.
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Table 2. Responses to various statements concerning the issue, 2011 
 
SA A N D SD DK Net  
First past the post good for responsibility* 14 38 19 14 4 10 34 
AV makes MPs work harder 9 33 22 17 11 8 14 
AV gives power to small parties* 14 26 20 23 8 9 9 
FPTP is an important part of political tradition* 21 20 17 19 17 5 5 
If AV adopted Lib Democrats in power all time* 3 27 27 21 4 18 5 
AV means no majority* 9 24 22 24 8 13 1 
AV is fairer 8 28 17 21 19 8 -4 
AV better reflects public opinion 10 27 15 22 18 7 -3 
AV is too hard to understand* 6 28 20 27 13 5 -6 
Coalitions are a good thing 3 20 34 26 14 4 -17 
Key: SA= Strongly Agree, A = Agree, N= Neither Agree nor Disagree, D=Disagree, SD= Strongly disagree 
* Statements that are in favour of retaining the status quo.  
Percentages are rounded to their nearest whole numbers and may not add up to exactly 100 in every row. The ‘Net’ column displays 
the differences between the percentage that the agreed (SA+A) and the percentage that disagreed (D+SD) with each statement. This 
table displays the aggregate picture of where the respondents from the sample stand in relation to the argument items.  
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Table 3. Relationship between opinions and Yes vote in the 2011 AV referendum  
 
SA A N D SD Differ 
First past the post good for responsibility* 6 28 55 75 71 -67 
AV makes MPs work harder 83 63 28 12 5 +78 
AV gives power to small parties* 4 13 41 76 80 -76 
FPTP is an important part of political tradition* 2 9 28 74 92 -90 
If AV adopted Lib Democrats in power all time* 10 23 41 61 58 -48 
AV means no majority* 7 16 40 66 71 -64 
AV is fairer 92 76 33 9 3 +89 
AV better reflects public opinion 92 76 31 8 3 +89 
AV is too hard to understand* 9 19 30 53 77 -68 
Coalitions are a good thing 70 56 43 23 26 +44 
Key: SA= Strongly Agree, A = Agree, N= Neither Agree nor Disagree, D=Disagree, SD= Strongly disagree   
* Statements that are indirectly in favour of retaining the status quo.  
For each opinion item cell entries represent the percentage that voted Yes in the referendum. The ‘Net’ column displays the 
differences between the percentage of Yes voters among that strongly agreed with a particular statement and the 
percentage of Yes voters among that strongly disagreed with that same statement. 
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4.5.3. Contact by the campaigns 
The frequency distributions for contact by the campaigns suggest that the No campaign 
contacted more people than the Yes campaign (70 versus 56 per cent). This may have 
given them an aggregate advantage. Nevertheless, those who were contacted by the 
No campaign were only slightly more likely to vote No than those who were contacted 
by the Yes campaign (57 to 55 per cent). The very large sample size and influence of 
prior variables may mean that this difference is statistically significant and larger once 
appropriate controls are added. An important difference between the campaign 
strategies of the two camps was that the No campaign worked actively to deliver its 
message to as many potential voters as possible while the Yes campaign had a micro-
targeting strategy which focused on key geographical areas with residents projected 
prone to voting Yes. This micro-targeting strategy involved opening regional offices and 
spending £100,000 pounds on the conduct of a customized ICM survey to identify these 
target areas where get out the vote campaigns could potentially be conducted efficiently 
(Elliott, 2013; Interviewee A, 2013; Interviewee B, 2013). 
4.5.4. Evaluations of the campaigns 
Respondents’ evaluations can be simply tallied to summarise evaluations of the two 
campaigns overall. Figure 3, which displays this index, shows that most respondents 
viewed the campaigns equally positively and are clustered around the neutral 0 point on 
the scale.1 Nevertheless, the distribution is slightly skewed towards the negative (left) 
scores, showing that respondents on average evaluated the No campaign more highly 
than the Yes campaign. 
                                                 
1
 This is due in no small part to the large number of respondents who provided no evaluations of the 
campaigns. The BES practice of allowing respondents to respond ‘don’t know’ to such questions reduces 
the reliability and validity of survey instruments. See Krosnick et. al. (2002). 
136 
 
Individual scores on the index range between -6 and +6. Among those who 
evaluated the No campaign comparatively the highest (i.e., scored -6) only 1 per cent 
voted Yes. Among those who evaluated the Yes campaign the highest, 88 per cent 
voted Yes. This provides an indication that evaluations of the campaign had an effect on 
individual vote. These two polar groups, however, are quite small (N=261 and N=91, 
respectively). It remains to be seen, whether these effects persist once controls are 
added for prior variables – this is addressed in the multivariate models. 
Figure 3. Comparative evaluations of the Yes and No AV campaigns, 2011
 
4.5.5. Trust in the party leaders 
It has been suggested that voters will follow the advice of leaders they trust (Miller et. al., 
1986; Pillai et. al. 2003) Political trust is highly variable over time and responsive to 
political ‘shocks’. It can be built up over many years and disappear very quickly. Trust 
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has been characterized as a key mediating variable between leadership perceptions 
and voting behaviour (Pillai et. al). For these reasons, it is assumed that the variable is 
located very ‘near’ to the vote decision.  
The fickleness of public trust in their politicians is illustrated by comparing the 
findings of the 2010 post-election BES survey with the AV survey one year later. When 
BES respondents were asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of the three party leaders 
on a ten-point scale in the post-election survey, Cameron scored 4.9, Clegg 4.6 and 
Brown 4.3. One year later, Cameron’s rating rose to 5.4, perhaps reflecting his 
increased prominence as prime minister. Yet, although Clegg was more prominent as 
deputy prime minister, his personal trust rating fell to 4.4. This may reflect 
disappointment with some former supporters about his decision to form a coalition with 
the Conservatives and/or reflect coalition actions that were ‘a betrayal’ of Liberal 
Democrat promises, such as the decision to increase tuition fees. 
Miliband, the new Labour leader, scored 4.5 on trust in May 2011. This was 
higher than Brown’s score but still low compared with the prime minister. It is fair to 
suggest that, as a new character, Miliband’s recommendation may have carried less 
weight than either the prime minister or deputy prime minister, even after controlling for 
prior partisanship. In Table 4, looking at the coefficients for trust in Cameron, we can 
deduce that his high rating also transformed into a higher effect on the vote in 
comparison to the other two leaders.   
4.5.6. The Vote models 
This section estimates the impact of the explanatory variables. It is possible that the 
effect of variables differs from individual to individual or group to group (Bartle, 2005). 
There are grounds for thinking that the effects of discourse will be particularly strong 
among the voters with medium levels of awareness, since they are more likely to 
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receive elite messages than the less aware, but do not have such strong predispositions 
when these messages are screened out. These issues are not explored here since they 
are not central to the question of the impact of campaign discourse on the ‘typical voter’ 
in the 2011 referendum. 
4.5.6.1. Control variables 
Before considering the association between the discourse-related variables and vote in 
the 2011 referendum, the relation between vote and control variables should briefly be 
mentioned. Controlling for prior variables but none of the discourse-related variables, 
the analyses suggest that: 
 Men were more likely to support AV than women (p<0.05).2 
 Those with higher levels of education were more likely to support AV than those 
with lower levels of education (p<0.05). 
 Londoners were more likely to support AV than people in the south east (p<0.05). 
People living in the south west and Yorkshire and Humberside were also more 
likely to support AV than the rest of the country.3  
 More knowledgeable voters, those who expressed interest in the AV campaign 
and those who thought they had some influence on politics were all more likely to 
support AV than less knowledgeable (p<0.05).  
 Those who expressed trust in parties and politicians and paid attention to politics 
were less likely to support AV (p<0.05). 
It should be noted that those who expressed a preparedness to take risks were 
no more or less likely to support AV than those who were less risk-prone.4 Nor were 
                                                 
2
 All tests are two-tailed. 
3
 Sex and region are exogenous variables that may cause behaviour. These two variables are included in 
the model so that we can test whether or not they have any influence. Including these variables does not 
do any harm to the model as there is no missing data. 
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there any significant differences between those who did and those who did not pay 
attention to the referendum campaign.  
4.5.6.2. Discourse-related variables 
Adding the discourse-related variables to the model suggests that campaign discourse 
did have an effect on individual vote decisions. The first column of coefficients in Table 
4 reports the ‘apparent effect’ of party identifications on vote choice in the referendum. 
The base or reference category in each case is non-identifiers. The results suggest that 
partisanship exerted a considerable influence on vote in the referendum. Those who 
thought of themselves as Conservative were, as expected, less likely to vote Yes than 
non-partisans (as shown by the negative coefficient, b=-2.04)); while Liberal Democrats 
(b=1.46), Greens (b=1.59) and Scottish Nationalists (b=0.48) were more likely to vote 
Yes than non-identifiers (as indicated by the positive coefficients). 
 According to the estimates in Table 4, Labour partisans were more likely to vote 
Yes than non-partisans (b=0.18), controlling for prior variables. The effect of Labour 
partisanship is significant, but it is smaller than those for the other parties. This reflects 
the party’s mixed signals and its internal division concerning electoral reform. It may 
also reflect a determination by some to punish the Liberal Democrats for their part in the 
coalition. UKIP partisans were significantly less likely to vote Yes than non-partisans 
(b=-0.76), even though Nigel Farage had advocated a Yes vote. Again, this may reflect 
ignorance about that party’s position among its partisans, Farage’s surprising support 
for AV, or the generally right-wing conservative attitudes of their identifiers that 
predispose them to prefer the status-quo. 
For supporters of the Labour party, Conservatives and the Green party, the 
effects of partisanship are considerable and persist even when further controls are 
                                                                                                                                                             
4
 The motivation for testing this is the expectation that risk-prone people would be more likely to vote No 
as risk often accompanies prospect for change. 
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added for all other variables (in columns 2 through to 6). In Model 6, the direct effect of 
the Liberal Democrats loses significance as pre-campaign vote intention is added into 
the equation. However, taken as a whole, these findings suggest that – as expected 
given the remoteness of the issue to most people – party discourse influenced individual 
votes in the referendum. In short, when the public were given a chance to make a direct 
policy decision on electoral reform, they tended to follow the lead of those parties that 
they identified with. 
 Evaluative responses to specific campaign arguments are the next variables 
added to the improved prediction model. Nine of these variables are significant, 
controlling for prior partisanship. Eight of the nine variables, moreover, remain 
significant once controls are added for all remaining blocks of variables. Although 
partisanship influenced votes in the referendum, attitudes towards the statements 
uttered during the campaign period mattered, too. As a result, the votes in the 
referendum have reflected personal beliefs on the topic, though some of these beliefs 
were undoubtedly based on misunderstandings about both systems. Voters with lower 
awareness levels may have drawn erroneous cognitive links between the vote and the 
cues implicated by each statement. However, the coefficient signs imply that 
respondents, as a whole, voted in harmony with the vote hint entrenched in each 
statement.5 
This pattern of results also implies that vote decisions reflected personal opinions 
in relation to various statements made throughout the campaign. Agreement with the 
proposition that FPTP is an important part of the British political tradition was associated 
with a reduced probability of a Yes vote (b=-2.87). Those with conservative beliefs 
                                                 
5
 Significance levels stay intact for 8 campaign statements through all models. The statement ‘AV makes 
MPs work harder’ loses significance only in the last model due to pre-campaign vote intention control. 
The statement ‘AV favours Liberal Democrats’ is insignificant in all 5 models. Signs stay intact for all 
statements across the models 2-6.  
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appeared to respond to such discourse even controlling for prior partisanship. On the 
other side, agreement with the proposition that AV was fair was associated with an 
increased probability of a Yes vote (b=2.03).  And agreement with the more complex 
assertion that AV better reflected public opinion was also associated with a higher 
probability of a Yes vote (b=1.87). Other issues, such as whether AV would make MPs 
work harder, appeared to have less effect on the typical voter.6 Nevertheless, the 
statistical significance of most of the argument-driven variables suggests that decisions 
were characterised by a fair degree of engagement with the issues and rationality. 
Logistic regression coefficients are fairly easy to interpret in terms of their sign 
and statistical significance (Liao, 1994). It is more difficult to interpret the substantive 
effect of variables since the probability of voting yes depends on where on the logit 
function a voter is and the value of other variables. The inherently non-linear and non-
additive nature of the models means that it is difficult to convey the impact of any given 
variable. For this reason, it is conventional to calculate the impact of a variable for a 
‘typical individual’ who has ‘average’ characteristics (modal social characteristics and 
average opinions and evaluations). Figure 3, for example, displays the impact of 
agreement with the statement that AV is fairer for a fairly typical respondent (a Labour 
identifier with average opinions and evaluations). This suggests that someone who 
strongly agreed with the proposition that AV is fairer had a probability of voting yes of 
over 0.90. By contrast, someone who strongly disagreed with the proposition had a 
probability of voting yes of about 0.78. Similarly, Figure 4 displays the impact of 
agreement with the statement that FPTP is traditional. If the representative individual 
strongly agreed with the proposition they had a probability of voting yes of about 0.28. 
                                                 
6
 These findings raise interesting questions such as how ‘fairness’ was defined in the minds of the 
respondents. Was it fairness at the constituency level or national level? This difference is left out of the 
analysis as there was no BES item on this.  
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By contrast, someone who strongly disagreed with the proposition had a probability of 
voting yes of about 0.70.  
Figure 4. Impact of agreement with the proposition that AV is fairer on probability of a 
Yes vote 
 
It is worth stressing that these figures provide an indication of the impact of 
opinions on vote in the AV referendum. It is possible to produce other figures for 
different types of voter. Some would suggest a stronger impact. Others would suggest a 



















Figure 5. Impact of agreement with the proposition that first past the vote is traditional 
on the probability of a Yes vote 
 
The next set of variables relates to contact by the Yes and No campaigns and 
the political parties. Column 3 shows that contact by both the Yes and No campaign had 
an effect on the typical voter compared with the base category, those who were not 
contacted by either ‘side’. Those who were contacted by the Yes campaign were more 
likely to vote Yes than those who were not contacted by the Yes campaign (b=0.33). 
Similarly, those who were contacted by the No campaign were more likely to vote no 
than those who were not contacted by the No campaign (b=-0.28). It may, of course, be 
possible that the ones who already had a leaning towards voting No were contacted by 
the No campaign and the ones who already had a leaning towards Yes were contacted 
by the Yes campaign.7  
                                                 
7
 This can be the topic of another research project. The aim of this research is to determine effects on the 
















Party contacts, on the other hand, had little apparent effect on the typical 
individual in the referendum. Indeed, only one of the party contact variables is 
statistically significant and it is incorrectly signed. Contact by the Liberal Democrats, 
controlling for prior variables, reduced the probability of a Yes vote. It appears that this 
party’ campaign efforts may have boomeranged. This may be the result of their 
unpopularity, though the effect persists when controls are added for trust in Clegg. As a 
campaign official from the Yes side has expressed in relation to campaign funding, 
‘there was Liberal Democrat activity, but frankly at that time they were so unpopular that 
Liberal Democrats funding the campaign wasn’t a good idea.’ (Interviewee B, 2013). 
Figure 6 again displays the impact of Liberal Democrat canvassing for the typical 
respondent (again a Labour identifier with typical characteristics. This suggests that this 
individual had a probability of about 0.65 of voting yes if not contacted by the Liberal 
Democrats. The same individual had a probability of voting yes of about 0.55 if 
contacted by the party. It should be stressed, however, that few people were canvassed 










                                                                                                                                                             
inclined to vote Yes and contacting peopled who resided in them. Due to this fact, Yes campaign 
coefficients (even when they are significant) should be evaluated with caution. 
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Figure 6. Impact of Liberal Democrat contact on probability of a Yes vote 
 
 The next variable in the equation is comparative evaluations of the Yes and No 
campaigns. This kind of variable carries with it a risk of retrospective rationalisation of 
the cast vote. Accordingly, the individual’s pre-campaign vote intention, measured in the 
first wave of the survey, is also controlled for. Pre-campaign vote intention as expected, 
has a strong association with final vote (b=1.18), even after controlling for this variable – 
so do evaluations of the qualities of the campaign (b=0.37). This coefficient does not 
decrease once controls are added for trust in the party leaders. This again provides 
reassurance that the effects are plausible. 
 The final variables added into the equation measure trust in the party leaders, as 
measured in wave 2. These appear to be associated with vote in the referendum, even 
after controlling for pre-campaign vote. Those who trusted Cameron were less likely to 

















more likely to vote Yes. The figures indicate that trust in the prime minister and the 
deputy prime minister has a larger impact than trust in the leader of the opposition. The 
Labour leader was both young and inexperienced and may not have had time to build 
enough personal following or credibility to influence the typical voter in 2011. 
Accordingly, his recommendation appears to have counted for less. 
These analyses indicate that campaign discourse had an influence on individual 
vote decisions in the AV referendum. The conclusions hold even if we only focus on the 
direct effect of variables in the final column of Table 4. This provides support for the 
adoption of a multivariate and multi-stage causal model and support for the contention 
that all five types of campaign discourse had an influence on vote decisions. Indeed, the 
only real threat to the models arises from the survey data and the possibility of omitted 
variable bias — this is not something that secondary users of the data can do anything 
about.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The results suggest that even when the issue of electoral reform was finally put to the 
people they were powerfully influenced by their party loyalties. When people were given 
the chance to practice direct democracy, they seem to have deferred to their 
representatives. This seems to contain a lesson for electoral reformers. Not only must 
they secure the support of the government to achieve another referendum, they must 
also obtain their support for a Yes vote. In present circumstances, this means that they 
must continue to target Labour and hope that this party, once converted, can try to lead 
its partisans to support reform.  
 Despite the effect of partisanship, the outcome of the referendum was also 
influenced by voters’ agreement with issue-related propositions points towards the 
campaign arguments that were a powerful influence on vote decisions. Again this 
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contains a lesson for electoral reformers: they must be able to make a case for reform 
to the wider public, many of whom have little interest in the issue. These findings also 
suggest that simple arguments work. If they are to counter conservative arguments 
about tradition they must find a way of connecting the issue electoral reform to things 
that people value, in particular the economy and public services. As Guy Lodge put it: 
‘No one really knew what the Alternative Vote was the answer to and what’s the 
problem it was addressing. That was a fundamental problem’ (Lodge, 2013). 
The Yes campaign was not able to demonstrate to the voters that the AV was the 
next step for democratic advancement, rather than a simple technical change. If the 
alternative on offer is a genuinely proportional system this may make the case more 
powerful, though this may also be offset by the public’s experience of coalition between 
2010 and 2015. In addition, electoral reformers must find some way of contacting more 
voters and produce a more engaging campaign. Of course, if Labour unites around 
reform, this will provide electoral reform with greater organisation. It may well be that 
reformers will feel more enthused if the alternative is a genuinely proportional system.   
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     Party identification (Model 1) 
     Labour 0.18 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.27 0.28 
     Conservative -2.04 -1.10 -1.10 -1.05 -0.80 -0.82 
     Liberal Democrats 1.46 0.45 0.47 0.37 0.31 0.25 
     SNP 0.48 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.24 
     Plaid Cymru 0.12 -0.38 -0.45 -0.42 -0.54 -0.83 
     Green 1.59 1.07 1.07 1.02 0.89 0.95 
     UKIP -0.76 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.20 -0.27 
     BNP -0.12 -0.43 -0.46 -0.48 -0.46 -0.25 




           
Opinions on campaign 
arguments (2) 
 
     AV produces no majority 
 
-0.63 -0.66 -0.58 -0.58 -0.42 
     FPTP is traditional 
 
-2.87 -2.88 -2.82 -2.75 -1.92 
     AV gives small parties power 
 
-1.28 -1.27 -1.17 -1.15 -0.65 
     AV is fairer 
 
2.03 2.04 1.94 1.94 0.98 
     AV better reflects opinion 
 
1.87 1.89 1.78 1.78 0.67 
     AV makes MPs work harder 
 
0.87 0.87 0.86 0.82 0.36 
     AV favours Liberal Democrats 
 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.15 -0.16 -0.06 
     FPTP makes party responsible 
 
-1.16 -1.14 -1.08 -1.02 -0.70 
     AV is too hard 
 
-0.62 -0.62 -0.50 -0.49 -0.45 
     Coalition is a good thing 
 
0.81 0.83 0.87 1.13 0.84 






           
Contact (Model 3) 
      No campaign 
  
-0.28 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 
     Yes campaign 
  
0.33 0.21 0.21 0.27 
     Conservative 
  
0.01 0.05 0.09 0.16 
     Labour 
  
0.11 0.07 0.03 -0.01 
     Liberal Democrats 
  
-0.30 -0.32 -0.34 -0.39 
     UKIP 
  
0.22 0.13 0.11 0.09 
     BNP 
  
0.12 0.10 0.16 0.27 
     SNP 
  
0.28 0.42 0.45 0.53 
     Plaid Cymru 
  
-0.20 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 
       
   
 
 
           
Evaluations of campaigns 
(Model 4) 
      Comparison of Yes and No 
campaigns 
   
0.37 0.36 0.37 
 
  
     
   
 
 
           
Trust in Leaders (Model 5) 
      Trust in Cameron 
   
 -1.19 -1.15
     
149 
 
Trust in Clegg 
   
 0.62 0.60 
     Trust in Miliband 
   
 0.47 0.50 
     Pre-election vote intention (6) 
     
1.18 
       
     
          
Constant -2.76 -1.46 -1.45 -1.40 -1.56 -1.28 
     Cox-Snell R2 0.26 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.616 
     -2 log likelihood 15202 5127 5111 4717 4658 4339 
     N 14718 11015 11015 11015 11014 11014 
       
           Response variable: Vote in the AV referendum  
     As each model is introduced, a new variable or set of variables is added into the 
analysis, enabling us to distinguish between layers of causal mediation.      
Cells with darker background indicate 95% significance. 




Electoral systems are a fundamental component of representative democracies. They 
influence the character of representation and shape the behaviour of parliamentarians 
(Norris, 2006; Farrell and Scully, 2007). They may also function as gatekeepers that 
prevent or moderate the development of new or extreme parties  (Golder, 2003). In 
industrial democracies, the electoral system is a determinant of the level of 
proportionality, which in turn influences turnout figures (Jackman, 1987). There is a 
positive relationship between higher turnout and higher government effectiveness in the 
UK (Whiteley, 2009). Higher levels of citizen satisfaction with democracy are associated 
with higher turnout figures (Clarke et al., 2004; Birch, 2010) This body of academic 
literature taken as a whole implies that nations would achieve higher levels of 
democracy – if not necessarily better quality of government – if their electoral systems 
produce proportional results.  
Although the aim of this thesis is not to come up with normative conclusions on 
democracy, the nature of the topic necessitates consideration on the practical 
implications of the results. Just like Britain’s dynamic and organic constitution, the 
electoral system will need continued re-examination and modification to match the 
democratic demands of the future (Norton, 1982). The process by which this re-
examination is carried out is crucial. Even when a reformed electoral system would 
represent a step towards reaching the democratic ideal, the legitimacy of the reform 
may be undermined if the process restricts choice and is based on misunderstandings. 
The 2011 AV referendum has, to some extent, ensured the inclusion of the public in 
deciding the controversial and fundamental issue of electoral reform. The people were 
able to express their preference over two systems. Yet, this was the limit of their direct 
influence over the issue.  
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The papers in this thesis illustrated the agenda-setting influence of Britain’s main 
political parties. Path-dependencies with roots in mainly in the Labour party structured 
the terms of debate and the terms of the coalition negotiations following the inconclusive 
2010 general election. The coalition leaders saw the referendum, among many things, 
as an opportunity or a recipe for tackling the issue of public disengagement with politics. 
Formally, the decision was made by the public. This thesis provides evidence that, 
within the context of the UK’s 2011 AV referendum, the voters followed the lead 
provided by the leaders they trusted and the political parties they supported. The voters 
chose from the menu but had little influence over what was on the menu. Moreover, the 
menu only included two dishes and the choice was a binary one. When the issue of 
electoral reform was put to the public, it was framed around the Alternative Vote system 
as a result of choices made by Labour – the opposition party that was widely regarded 
as having lost the moral right to govern. It was the outgoing government that influenced 
the outcome of the coalition talks of 2010. As the simulations have shown, Labour 
party’s low-profile stance on the topic during the referendum campaign was also 
instrumental in the rejection of the proposal by the public. 
Paper 1 has looked in detail at both the long-term and short-term past of Britain’s 
electoral reform debate and has outlined the factors which caused Britain’s political 
elites to keep a certain level of interest in AV. When the latent demand for electoral 
reform was matched by the contingency of the highly disproportionate results of the 
2010 general election and the problem of the hung parliament, the way towards a 
referendum on the issue was paved. 
Paper 2 has provided an analysis on the place of referendums in the British 
constitution especially in relation to matters involving constitutional reform. The reasons 
why the issue of electoral reform had consistently been coupled with the referendum 
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pathway was examined in detail.  This bundling of the issue of electoral reform with a 
referendum was far from inevitable. Yet it is difficult to see how a government could now 
alter the system for election to Westminster without a referendum. If this analysis is 
correct than new convention seems to have been added to the UK’s changing 
constitution.1 
In addition to the account presented in the first two papers, the polling evidence 
from paper 3 and the evidence from the interviews conducted with campaign officers 
revealed the highly partisan nature of the AV referendum campaign. In short, it was 
party politicians – rather than democratic reformers – that dominated public discourse 
on the issue. Scaremongering tactics were utilized by both camps and this reduced the 
quality of the debate in relation to the concepts of representation and democracy. The 
low quality of the AV referendum debate raises the question of whether referendum is 
the appropriate method to decide on systemic but technical changes. It might be argued 
that shifting the decision from a small group to a large group produces a better ‘decision’ 
as a result of the ‘wisdom of crowds’. There are circumstances, however, where the 
benefits of aggregation are reduced (Surrowiecki, 2004; Landmore and Elster, 2008). 
The public debate in relation to the AV referendum was characterized by lack of passion. 
Reformers were tempted to support the change in the belief that it would pave the way 
for further reform and the eventual adoption of a genuinely proportional system. In the 
event, they had to support a system that would not really change politics that much and 
one that risked hampering further reforms.  
Paper 3 has looked at the opinions of the British public on the issue of electoral 
reform in general and the 2011 AV Referendum in particular mainly based on the British 
Election Study (BES) data. The quantitative analysis has pointed to the importance of 
                                                 
1
 However, it would be wise to bear in mind that the British constitution is what happens (Griffith, 1979). 
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discourse and partisanship in explaining the outcome of the referendum. There is little 
reason to believe that the importance of discourse in politics will change much the future. 
The importance of discourse is something that campaigners for reform will have to take 
into account in the future. It is not enough simply to obtain a referendum. They must 
formulate arguments that persuade voters and the parties that they identify with. 
The 2014 Scottish Independence referendum offered, without much doubt, a 
deeper constitutional reform proposal that would have resulted in a fundamental shift in 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The AV Referendum did not receive the 
same level of attention as the Scottish Independence Referendum where the issue was 
presented as more salient manner as it involved national identity. The argument that the 
shift to AV would have solved the more fundamental problems facing the British public 
(e.g. unemployment or immigration from EU member-states with lower GDP’s) was not 
very strong. The Yes campaign was not able to make a convincing case as to how 
exactly a new electoral system would have dealt with these fundamental problems. 
While there was reason to believe that the absolute majority required under AV would 
have made MP’s responsive to a broader audience within their constituencies, this 
would not necessarily guarantee a more responsive Westminster at the aggregate 
national level. Both campaigns in the Scottish Independence Referendum, on the other 
hand, were able to make strong links between the result of the referendum and the 
future of the region’s economy. The higher level of attention the Scottish Independence 
received in comparison to the AV referendum was also reflected in the turnout figures. 
The Scottish Independence Referendum had a turnout figure of 84.6 per cent, more 
than double that of the AV Referendum, which only had 41 per cent. 
The recent electoral successes of new ‘right-wing’ political parties in Britain and 
elsewhere in Europe necessitates a renewed emphasis on how radical ideologies make 
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use of existing political structures and are adjusting to the ‘rules of the game’.2 Although 
the democratic ideal continues to be a strong anchor for today’s political systems, 
totalitarian sub-elements that exist within liberal democracies are learning how to use 
the democratic framework to gain real power.3 In the hands of real democrats, 
referendums are perhaps powerful and efficient tools to reach a higher level of public 
inclusion and, thus, well-being. Yet, referendums may also turn into dangerous tools at 
an era in which populist politics can be said to be on the rise again in Britain (King and 
Stoker, 1996).  
A number of studies that look at the 2011 AV referendum case in and of itself 
have recently been published (Whiteley et. al., 2012; Renwick and Lamb, 2013; Vowles, 
2013). This is the first study that ties in the pre-history of the AV referendum, as well as 
examining how the issue of electoral reform became tied to a referendum. From a more 
practical perspective, the 2011 AV referendum represents a failed attempt at reform and 
is a critical case that campaigners may draw practical lessons from. The electoral and 
political systems need to be made more relevant to the public in order to tackle the 
problem of public disengagement from politics. The outcome of the referendum of 2011 
may have reflected the public will of the time but should, by no means, be considered a 
binding conclusion about the electoral system. 
One could argue that Britain is approaching a convention that reform to electoral 
rules will require the authority and consent of the British electorate. It is sensible to 
suggest that the impetus to change electoral rules will be intensified in the years to 
come. Reformers need to reflect on how they can best present their case to the wider 
public when they get the chance to do so. To some extent they may be able to draw on 
                                                 
2
 For an analysis of the rise of these parties: Eatwell and Goodwin, 2010. 
3
 Such groups may have the tendency to see democracy mainly as a useful tool towards achieving the 
power to exercise anti-democratic ideologies. The opposite of this is the view that democracy is an 
intrinsic cultural value in itself, i.e. promoting and practicing democracy for democracy’s sake and as an 
end in itself is what is important. 
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the unpopularity of the existing major parties (Allen, 2006).  Nevertheless, as the polling 
evidence considered in the final paper suggests, they still have to convince the public of 
the virtues of electoral reform. In particular, they need to demonstrate some link 
between the abstract issue of electoral reform and the issues that most people care 
most about: the ‘bread and butter’ issues of the economy, public services and national 
security. In 2011, they failed to do so.  
The citizens who voted in the referendum largely followed the cues provided by 
the main parties. This implies that reformers must continue their efforts to persuade one 
of the ‘major’ parties to support reform. Assuming that the issue of electoral reform will 
continue to be a partisan one owing to the high stakes involved, proponents of electoral 
reformer would also need to convey to the politicians the principled, tactical and 
practical value of their reform proposals. For all practical purposes, the Conservative 
party seems unlikely to support any change. The best strategy for reformers would 
appear to be to target the Labour party. Ironically, reform prospects may be best served 
by the continued electoral defeat for Labour.  
Although AV would have been arguably ‘fairer’ at a constituency level, it was less 
likely to produce a more proportional outcome nationally than the existing plurality 
electoral system (Sanders et. al., 2010). To the immense frustration of those who 
advocated electoral reform, they were compelled to advocate an alternative system that 
few liked very much at all. This may account for the relatively lacklustre campaign 
fought by the Yes Campaign in the referendum as documented in the final paper. Yet it 
remains the case that the issue of electoral reform– given the domination of the parties 




Given the crystallised opinions of the Conservative and Liberal Democrats – in 
favour and against electoral reform –the Labour party will likely remain the crucial focus 
of lobbying by electoral reformers. To that extent the future of electoral reform debate is 
likely to resemble the past. In particular, Labour is only likely to contemplate change if it 
either is defeated or sees no prospects of winning an election in its own right. 
Paradoxically, the existing electoral system may also play a part in this. It, however, 
unlikely that the pro-FPTP members of the party will be convinced by arguments made 
based on democratic principles but are unable to demonstrate any prospect of added 
electoral advantage a new system might bring.  
There have been eighteen general elections in post-war Britain, two of which 
produced hung parliaments. The general election of February 1974 produced a minority 
Labour government that soldiered on as a minority until the follow-up election in October 
of that year. The 2010 general election produced another hung parliament but the 
parliamentary arithmetic was such to make any outcome other than a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat implausible. Thus, when a hung parliament occurred it did not allow 
the Liberal Democrats to bargain for wider electoral reform. They felt obliged to settle 
with the referendum offered by the Conservatives. This matched Labour’s offer and 
came from a party with a better claim to have ‘won’ the election. The plurality electoral 
system may still produce a genuinely balanced parliament in which a third party can 
form a coalition with either the Conservatives or the Labour party. In such scenario, the 
third party may be able to extort a promise of electoral reform, presumably from Labour. 
Those people who were contacted by either side were more likely to vote for it 
and those who evaluated the campaigns more highly were similarly influenced by these 
perceptions. It may well be that if the electoral reform activists campaigned for a system 
that they preferred, the campaigners would have greater motivation to mobilise the vote. 
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Of course, it is also the case that supporters of the existing system will also feel more 
motivated by the greater ‘threat’ (as they perceive it) of a more proportional system. 
During the referendum process, various arguments were put forward regarding 
the effect of the AV referendum results would have on the prospect for further electoral 
reform following the refusal or acceptance of the AV system. While some have argued 
that a Yes victory could settle the debate, there were other political actors who believed 
that the Yes vote would settle the question of electoral reform for a long time and would 
prevent more comprehensive future reform. Advocates of greater proportionality will 
have to think long and hard about how best to achieve their objectives. 
The electoral reform was presented by the Liberal Democrats as a solution to the 
ills of the political system. The referendum was seen as a way to include the public in 
solving those ills. The choice of the alternative system and the referendum pathway was 
done in a path-dependent way that also rang the tone for the Labour – Liberal Democrat 
negotiation principle of the earlier periods.  
‘If the referendum is held, the people will decide the issue at hand, not because 
anyone has decided that they have a moral or constitutional right to decide the 
issue but because the political leaders have decided, in their own interests, to 
give the final say to the people’ (King, 2007, p. 295). 
Could electoral reform be seen as ‘Turkeys voting for Christmas?’ In an 
atmosphere of public dissatisfaction with politicians and politics in general, the 
referendum has tried to ‘bring the public back’ to political decision-making. All parties 
calculate what would be good for them before taking action on anything, but the 
changing face of the electorate means that they are not always able to predict what 
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Appendix 2. No campaign poster 
    
160 
 




Appendix 4. Change in support for AV, 2010-11 
In the twelve month period between the formation of the coalition and the day of the AV 
referendum, a number of polling organizations kept track of the public support for AV. 
Each of the nine separate surveys I have looked at showed an upward trend in public 
support for the No side. The most comprehensive of them is the survey conducted by 
YouGov for Sunday Times. For this survey, YouGov asked the following question to 
random samples of the British public 26 times over the period from 14/6/2010 until 
1/4/2011: 
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat government are committed to holding 
a referendum on changing the electoral system from first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) to the alternative (AV). At the moment, under first-past-the-post 
(FPTP), voters select ONE candidate, and the candidate with the most 
votes wins. It has been suggested that this system should be replaced by 
the Alternative Vote (AV). Voters would RANK a number of candidates 
from a list. If a candidates wins more than half of the ‘1st’ votes, a winner 
is declared. If not, the least popular candidates are eliminated from the 
contest, and their supporters’ subsequent preferences counted and 
shared accordingly between the remaining candidates. This process 
continues until an outright winner is declared. If a referendum were held 
tomorrow on whether to stick with first-past-the-post or switch to the 
Alternative Vote for electing MPs, how would you vote? 
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Figure A.1. Times/YouGov, vote intentions in AV referendum, 2010-11* 
 
Source: Graph is produced based on the AV referendum voting intention survey data made available by ukpollingreport.co.uk 
                                                 
*
The blip in February 2011 may be related to a possible increase in the perceived confidence of the Yes campaign and the positive media coverage it received in 










Figure A.1 excludes the voters who responded ‘would not vote’ or ‘I don’t know’ 
to the survey questions. The upward trend of the No campaign and the overall 
downward trend of the Yes campaign is quite visible in this figure. According to the 
YouGov data, AV had a 10 point lead in June 2010 over FPTP. One day before the 
referendum the situation was fundamentally modified and the status quo secured a 12 
point lead. Over a period of less than a year, the YouGov poll swung 22 points in the 
direction of FPTP. We can see one major exception to Yes’s downward trend and No’s 
upward trend in 8 February 2011, where Yes 37% support, only 1% below No which 
had 38% support on that day. This was only 6 days before the House of Lords passed 
the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 and only 8 days before 
the bill received Royal Assent on 16 February.  
The other eight AV surveys, results of which are available through the 
ukpollingreport.co.uk website, showed a similar upward trend for No. These shorter time 
series are less informative than the lengthier YouGov series but, together with the 




Appendix 5. Wording of issue opinion agree/disagree items (Pre-Election Survey) 
6. If Britain adopts the Alternative Vote system for general elections, then no party could 
ever get a majority of seats in the House of Commons. 
 
7. The Alternative Vote electoral system is fairer because it produces a closer 
correspondence between parties' percentage share of votes and the number of seats 
they get in Parliament. 
 
8. The Alternative Vote electoral system gives too much influence to small political 
parties. 
 
9. The Alternative Vote system will produce election outcomes that more accurately 
reflect the political opinions of the British public than the present First-Past-The-Post 
electoral system does. 
 
10. The Alternative Vote electoral system makes MPs work harder for their constituents 
because they need the support of a majority of them to get elected. 
 
11. The First-Past-The-Post electoral system should be kept because it is an important 
part of Britain's political tradition. 
 
70. If Britain adopts the Alternative Vote electoral system, the Liberal Democrats will 
always be part of the government. 
 
71. The First Past the Post electoral system helps voters to know which party is 
responsible for policy success or failure. 
 
72. The Alternative Vote electoral system is too hard for the average person to 
understand. 
 
73. Thinking generally about coalition government, do you think that coalition 






Appendix 6. Coding of data in SPSS file 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
RECODE dq1 (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_eastanglia1. 
RECODE dq1 (2=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_eastmids1. 
RECODE dq1 (3=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_london1. 
RECODE dq1 (4=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_north1. 
RECODE dq1 (5=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_northwest1. 
RECODE dq1 (6=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_scotland1. 
RECODE dq1 (7=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_southeast1. 
RECODE dq1 (8=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_southwest1. 
RECODE dq1 (9=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_wales1. 
RECODE dq1 (10=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_westmids1. 
RECODE dq1 (11=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_yorkshire1. 
 
RECODE dq5 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.25) (4=0) (ELSE=0.5) INTO av_interest1. 
 
RECODE dq6 dq7 dq8 dq9 dq10 dq11 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) 
(ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO av_nomajav1 av_fairer1 av_smallparty1 av_reflectopinion1 
av_makempswork1 av_fptptradition1 . 
 
RECODE dq13 (1=1) (2=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO decide_av_vote1. 
 
RECODE dq16 dq17 dq18  (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.25) (4=0) (5=0.5) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO trust_cameron1  trust_miliband1 trust_clegg1 . 
 
RECODE dq19 dq20 dq21 (0 thru 10=copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO like_miliband1 
like_cameron1 like_clegg1 . 
 
RECODE dq14 (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_ref_voteyes1a. 
RECODE dq15 (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_ref_voteyes1b . 
RECODE dq14 (2=-1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_ref_voteno1a. 
RECODE dq15 (2=-1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_ref_voteno1b . 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE scale1 = (av_nomajav1 + av_fptptradition1 + av_smallparty1 +  av_fairer1 + 
av_reflectopinion1 + av_makempswork1)/6 . 
 
COMPUTE like_miliband1b = (like_miliband1)/10 . 
COMPUTE like_cameron1b = (like_cameron1)/10 . 
COMPUTE like_clegg1b = (like_clegg1)/10 . 
 









RECODE dq24 dq25 dq27 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO notvote_neglect_duty1 political_active_benefits1   
political_active_group_benefits1. 
 
RECODE dq26 (1=0) (2=0.25) (3=0.5) (4=0.75) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
political_active_time1. 
 
RECODE dq28 dq29 dq30 (0 thru 10=Copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO like_labour1 
like_conservative1 like_libdem1.     
 
RECODE dq36 dq37 dq38 dq39 (1=0) (2=0.25) (3=0.5) (4=0.75) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO ret_personal_finances1 ret_national_econ1 prosp_personal_finances1 
prosp_national_econ1. 
 
RECODE dq41 (1=1) (2 thru 4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO econ_lab_best1. 
RECODE dq41 (1=0) (2=1) (3 thru 4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO econ_con_best1. 
RECODE dq41 (1 thru 2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO econ_libdem_best1 . 
RECODE dq42 (1=1) (2 thru 4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO econ_miliband_best1. 
RECODE dq42 (1=0) (2=1) (3 thru 4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO econ_cameron_best1. 
RECODE dq42 (1 thru 2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO econ_clegg_best1 . 
 
RECODE dq43 dq44 dq45 dq46 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO govt_treat_me_fairly1 big_gap_expectations1 citizen_vote_duty1 
friends_vote_waste1. 
 
RECODE dq47 dq48 (0 thru 10=Copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO people_trusted1 
people_take_advantage1. 
 
RECODE dq49 (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_lab1. 
RECODE dq49 (2=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_con1. 
RECODE dq49 (3=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_libdem1. 
RECODE dq49 (4=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_snp1. 
RECODE dq49 (5=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_pc1. 
RECODE dq49 (6=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_green1. 
RECODE dq49 (7=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_ukip1. 
RECODE dq49 (8=1) (ELSE=0) INTO pid_bnp1. 
 
RECODE dq54 dq55 dq56 dq57 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO  feel_satisfaction_vote1 people_too_busy_vote1 most_people_vote1 
feel_guilty_not_vote1. 
 
RECODE dq58 dq60 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
satisfaction_life1 satisfaction_democracy1. 
 
RECODE dq59 dq62 dq63 (0 thru 10=Copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1. 
 






RECODE dq64 (1=0) (2=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO group_contact1. 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE dq65a dq65b dq65c dq65d dq65e dq65f dq65g dq65h dq65i (1=1) (2=0) 
(ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO contact_no_to_av1 contact_yes_to_av1 contact_conservative1 




COMPUTE contact_yes =contact_yes_to_av1 + contact_libdem1 + contact_ukip1 + 
contact_snp1 + contact_pc1 . 
EXECUTE . 
 
RECODE dq67 dq68 dq69 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.25) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
attention_newspapers1 attention_tv1 attention_internet1. 
 
RECODE dq70 dq71 dq72 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO ifav_libdems1 fptp_responsible1 av_too_hard1 . 
 
RECODE dq73 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
coalition_goodthing1. 
 
COMPUTE scale2 = (av_nomajav1 + av_fptptradition1 + av_smallparty1 +  av_fairer1 + 
av_reflectopinion1 + av_makempswork1 + ifav_libdems1 + fptp_responsible1 + 
av_too_hard1 +coalition_goodthing1)/10 . 
 
RECODE dq80 dq81 (0 thru 10=Copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO trust_parties1 
trust_politicians1. 
 
RECODE dq82 dq83 dq88 dq89 (1=1) (2=0) (ELSE=0.5) INTO know_polls_close1 
know_libdems1 know_miliband1 know_postal_vote1. 
 
RECODE dq84 dq85 dq86 dq87 (1=0) (2=1) (ELSE=0.5) INTO know_minage1 
know_commonwealth1 know_forty1 know_conservative1. 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE attention1 =(attention_newspapers1 + attention_tv1 + attention_internet1)/3 . 
COMPUTE trust1 = (trust_parties1 + trust_politicians1)/20 . 
 
COMPUTE knowledge1 =(know_polls_close1 + know_libdems1  + 
know_commonwealth1 + know_miliband1 + know_postal_vote1 + know_minage1 + 
know_forty1 +know_conservative1)/8 . 
 
 
RECODE eq1 (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_eastanglia2. 
RECODE eq1 (2=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_eastmids2. 
RECODE eq1 (3=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_london2. 
RECODE eq1 (4=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_north2. 
RECODE eq1 (5=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_northwest2. 
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RECODE eq1 (6=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_scotland2. 
RECODE eq1 (7=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_southeast2. 
RECODE eq1 (8=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_southwest2. 
RECODE eq1 (9=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_wales2. 
RECODE eq1 (10=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_westmids2. 
RECODE eq1 (11=1) (ELSE=0) INTO reg_yorkshire2. 
 
RECODE eq2 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.25) (4=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO av_interest2. 
 
RECODE eq4a eq4b eq4c eq4d eq4e eq4f eq4g eq4h eq4i (1=1) (8=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) 
INTO contact_no_to_av2 contact_yes_to_av2 contact_conservative2 contact_labour2 
contact_libdem2 contact_ukip2 contact_bnp2  
contact_snp2 contact_pc2 . 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE contact_yes2 =contact_yes_to_av2 + contact_libdem2 + contact_ukip2 + 
contact_snp2 + contact_pc2 .  
 
COMPUTE contact_no2 = contact_no_to_av2 + contact_conservative2 + contact_bnp2 . 
EXECUTE . 
 
RECODE eq7 (1=1) (2=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO av_vote2 . 
 
RECODE eq8 (1=1) (2=0.8) (3=0.6) (4=0.4) (5=0.2) (6=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
when_decided2 . 
 
RECODE eq10 eq12 eq11 eq13 eq15 eq14 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) 
(ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO competent_cameron2 competent_miliband2 competent_clegg2 
trust_cameron2 trust_miliband2 trust_clegg2. 
 
RECODE eq17 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
handling_crisis_labour2. 
 
RECODE eq18 eq19 eq20 eq21 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO cuts_necessary2 cuts_labour_mismanage2 cuts_personal_difficulties2 
cuts_cause_spending2. 
 
RECODE eq22 (1=0) (2=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO cuts_strengthen_econ2. 
RECODE eq23 (1=1) (2=0.5) (3=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO tax_increases_needed2. 
RECODE eq24 (1=0) (2=0.25) (3=0.5) (4=0.75) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
tuition_fees2. 
 
RECODE eq25 eq32 (0 thru 10=Copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO tax_spend2 
rights_criminal2. 
 
RECODE eq26 eq27 eq28 (0 thru 10=Copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO tax_spend_con2 
tax_spend_lab2 tax_spend_libdem2 . 
 
RECODE eq33 eq34 eq35 (0 thru 10=Copy) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 




RECODE eq31 (1=0) (2=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO public_services2. 
 
RECODE eq44 eq45 eq47 eq48 eq50 (1=0) (2=0.25) (3=0.75) (4=1) (5=0.5) 
(ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO approve_afghan2 moral_case_libya2 libya_ground_troops2 
libya_benefits2 libya_approval2. 
 
RECODE eq46 eq49 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.25) (4=0) (5=0.5) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
libya_cant_afford2 libya_damage_britain2. 
 
COMPUTE scale3 = (approve_afghan2 + libya_approval2)/2. 
EXECUTE . 
 
RECODE eq66 eq68 eq69 eq71 eq76 eq79 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) 
(6=0.5) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO elect_lords2 change_to_pr2 local_govt_more_authority2 
abolish_monarchy2 mp_manifesto_resign2 europe_approve2. 
 
RECODE eq67 eq70 eq72 eq73 eq74 eq75 (1=1) (2=0.75) (3=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) 
(6=0.5) (ELSE=SYSMIS)  INTO reduce_size_commons2 reduce_echr2 
church_england_status2 europe_taxpowers_reduced2 more_referendums2 
noneed_written_constitution2. 
 
RECODE eq97 eq98 eq99 (1=0) (2=0.25) (3=0.5) (4=0.75) (5=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) 
INTO av_elections_cost2 av_extremist_parties2 libdems_threat_legal2. 
 
RECODE eq100 (1=0) (2=0.25) (3=0.5) (4=0.75) (5=1) (6=0.5) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO 
av_mudslinging2. 
 
RECODE eq101a eq101c eq101e eq101g (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_yes_strong2 
av_yes_informative2 av_yes_positive2 av_yes_interesting2. 
 
RECODE eq101b eq101d eq101f eq101h (1=-1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_yes_weak2 
av_yes_notinformative2  av_yes_negative2 av_yes_boring2. 
 
RECODE eq102a eq102c eq102e eq102g (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_no_strong2 
av_no_informative2 av_no_positive2 av_no_interesting2. 
 
RECODE eq102b eq102d eq102f eq102h (1=-1) (ELSE=0) INTO av_no_weak2 
av_no_notinformative2 av_no_negative2 av_no_boring2. 
EXECUTE . 
 
COMPUTE av_yes_sum2 =av_yes_strong2 + av_yes_informative2 + av_yes_positive2 
+ av_yes_interesting2 + av_yes_weak2 + av_yes_notinformative2 + av_yes_negative2 
+ av_yes_boring2. 
 
COMPUTE av_no_sum2 =av_no_strong2 + av_no_informative2 + av_no_positive2 + 





COMPUTE av_informative = (av_yes_informative2 - av_yes_notinformative2) - 
(av_no_informative2 - av_no_notinformative2) . 
 
COMPUTE av_strength=(av_yes_strong2 - av_yes_weak2)  -  (av_no_strong2-
av_no_weak2) . 
 




COMPUTE av_camp_sum2 = av_yes_sum2 - av_no_sum2 . 
EXECUTE . 
 
RECODE postgen (1=1) (2=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO male . 
 
RECODE eq107 (1=1) (98 thru 99=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO school14 . 
RECODE eq107 (2=1) (98 thru 99=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO school15 . 
RECODE eq107 (3=1) (98 thru 99=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO school16 . 
RECODE eq107 (4=1) (98 thru 99=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO school17to18 . 
RECODE eq107 (5=1) (98 thru 99=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO school19to20 . 
RECODE eq107 (6=1) (98 thru 99=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO school21to22 . 
RECODE eq107 (7=1) (98 thru 99=SYSMIS) (ELSE=0) INTO school23to24 . 









Appendix 7. Coding of the Regression Models 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24     
school25plus 
av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1 
reg_scotland1 reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1 likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1 knowledge1 trust1 av_interest1 attention1  
pid_lab1 pid_con1 pid_libdem1 pid_snp1 pid_pc1 pid_green1 pid_ukip1 pid_bnp1 
av_nomajav1 av_fptptradition1 av_smallparty1 av_fairer1 av_reflectopinion1 
av_makempswork1 ifav_libdems1 fptp_responsible1 av_too_hard1 
coalition_goodthing1  
contact_no2 contact_yes2 
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24 
school25plus 
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24    
school25plus av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1    
reg_scotland1 reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1  
 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24 
school25plus av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1 reg_scotland1 
reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1 likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1 knowledge1 trust1 av_interest1 attention1 









school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24 
school25plus 
av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1 reg_scotland1 
reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1 likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1 knowledge1 trust1 av_interest1 attention1  
pid_lab1 pid_con1 pid_libdem1 pid_snp1 pid_pc1 pid_green1 pid_ukip1 pid_bnp1  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24 
school25plus  
av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1 reg_scotland1 
reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1 likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1 knowledge1 trust1 av_interest1 attention1  
pid_lab1 pid_con1 pid_libdem1 pid_snp1 pid_pc1 pid_green1 pid_ukip1 pid_bnp1 
av_nomajav1 av_fptptradition1 av_smallparty1 av_fairer1 av_reflectopinion1 
av_makempswork1 ifav_libdems1 fptp_responsible1 av_too_hard1 
coalition_goodthing1  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24 
school25plus 
av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1 reg_scotland1 
reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1 likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1 knowledge1 trust1 av_interest1 attention1  
pid_lab1 pid_con1 pid_libdem1 pid_snp1 pid_pc1 pid_green1 pid_ukip1 pid_bnp1 
av_nomajav1 av_fptptradition1 av_smallparty1 av_fairer1 av_reflectopinion1 
av_makempswork1 ifav_libdems1 fptp_responsible1 av_too_hard1 
coalition_goodthing1  
contact_no_to_av2 contact_yes_to_av2 contact_conservative2 contact_labour2 
contact_libdem2 contact_ukip2 contact_bnp2 contact_snp2 contact_pc2 
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24 
school25plus  
av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1  
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reg_scotland1 reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1 likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1 knowledge1 trust1 av_interest1 attention1  
pid_lab1 pid_con1 pid_libdem1 pid_snp1 pid_pc1 pid_green1 pid_ukip1 pid_bnp1 
av_nomajav1 av_fptptradition1 av_smallparty1 av_fairer1 av_reflectopinion1 
av_makempswork1 ifav_libdems1 fptp_responsible1 av_too_hard1 
coalition_goodthing1  
contact_no_to_av2 contact_yes_to_av2 contact_conservative2 contact_labour2 
contact_libdem2 contact_ukip2 contact_bnp2 contact_snp2 contact_pc2 
trust_cameron1  trust_miliband1 trust_clegg1 
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES av_vote2 
/METHOD=ENTER  
male  
school15 school16 school17to18 school19to20 school21to22 school23to24 
school25plus  
av_vote1a  
reg_eastanglia1 reg_eastmids1 reg_london1 reg_north1 reg_northwest1  
reg_scotland1 reg_southwest1 reg_wales1 reg_westmids1 reg_yorkshire1 likes_risks1 
attention_politics1 influence_politics1 knowledge1 trust1 av_interest1 attention1  
pid_lab1 pid_con1 pid_libdem1 pid_snp1 pid_pc1 pid_green1 pid_ukip1 pid_bnp1 
av_nomajav1 av_fptptradition1 av_smallparty1 av_fairer1 av_reflectopinion1 
av_makempswork1 ifav_libdems1 fptp_responsible1 av_too_hard1 
coalition_goodthing1  
contact_no_to_av2 contact_yes_to_av2 contact_conservative2 contact_labour2 
contact_libdem2 contact_ukip2 contact_bnp2 contact_snp2 contact_pc2 
trust_cameron1  trust_miliband1 trust_clegg1 
av_camp_sum2 
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